

DIO'S ROME

AN

HISTORICAL NARRATIVE ORIGINALLY COMPOSED IN GREEK DURING THE REIGNS OF SEPTIMIUS
SEVERUS, GETA AND CARACALLA, MACRINUS, ELAGABALUS AND ALEXANDER SEVERUS:

AND

NOW PRESENTED IN ENGLISH FORM

BY

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FIRST VOLUME

Gleanings from the Lost Books

I. The Epitome of Books 1-21 arranged by Ioannes Zonaras, Soldier and Secretary,
in the Monastery of Mt. Athos, about 1130 A.D.

II. Fragments of Books 22-35.

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Transcriber's Note: This e-text contains a number of words and phrases in Greek. In the original text, some of the Greek characters have diacritical marks which do not display properly in commonly used browsers such as Internet Explorer. In order to make this e-text as accessible as possible, the diacritical marks have been ignored, except that

the rough-breathing mark is here represented by an apostrophe at the beginning of the word. All text in Greek has a mouse-hover transliteration, e.g., καλος.

To
My Friend Teacher and Inspirer
Mr. Gildersleeve of Baltimore
Who Has Won to the Age of Greek Lore even as to the Youth of Greek Life
I Offer a Redundant Tribute

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CONCERNING THE TRANSLATION

[Pg ix]

Cassius Dio, one of the three original sources for Roman history to be found in Greek literature, has been accessible these many years to the reader of German, of French, and even of Italian, but never before has he been clothed complete in English dress. In the Harvard College Library is deposited the fruit of a slight effort in that direction, a diminutive volume dated two centuries back, the title page of which (agog with queer italics) reads as follows:

THE
HISTORY
OF
DION CASSIUS
ABBRIDG'D BY XIPHILIN
CONTAINING

The most considerable Passages under the *Roman* emperors
from the time of *Pompey* the Great, to the Reign of *Alexander Severus*.

In Two Volumes

Done from the *Greek*, by Mr. Manning

Tametsi haudquaquam par gloria sequatur Scriptorem, & Authorem rerum,
tamen in primis arduum videtur res gestas scribere. Salust.

London: Printed for A. and J. Churchill, in Paternoster Row, 1704.

[Pg x]

Four hundred and seven small pages, over and above the Epistle Dedicatory, are contained in Volume One. Really, however, this is not the true Dio at all, but merely his shadow, seized and distorted to satisfy the ideas of his epitomizer, the monk Xiphilinus, who was separated from him by a thousand years in the flesh and another thousand in the spirit. Of the little specimens here and there translated for this man's or that man's convenience no mention need here be made. Hence, practically speaking, Dio now for the first time emerges in his impressive stature before the English-speaking public after there has elapsed since his own day a period twice as long as then constituted the extent of that history which was his theme.

The present version, begun while I was serving as Acting Professor of Greek at St. Stephen's College, Annandale, N.Y., has been carried forward during such intervals of leisure as I could snatch from an overflowing schedule at the University of South Dakota. It has been my companion on many journeys and six states have witnessed its progress toward completion. In spite of the time consumed it seems in retrospect not far short of presumptuous to have tried in three or four years to put into acceptable English what Dio spent twelve in writing down. Yet the task was not quite the same, for half of this historian's books have been caught up and whirled away in the cyclone of time; and who knows whether they still possess any resting-place above or beneath the earth?

The text originally chosen as the basis for the translation was that of Melber, the idea of the translator being that the Teubner edition would be the most convenient and readily obtainable standard of reference for any one who wished to compare the Greek and the English. Hence the numbering of the Fragments is that of Melber (subdivisions are distinguished by a notation simpler than that of the original "sections"). Since no Teubner volumes beyond the second proved to be forthcoming, the rest of the work followed the stereotyped Tauchnitz edition, which also enjoys a large circulation. This text, however, contained so many cases of corruption and clumsiness that it seemed best to work over carefully nearly all of the latter portion of the English and to embody as many as possible of the improvements of Boissevain. Incidentally Boissevain's interior

arrangement of all the later books was adopted, though it was deemed preferable (for mere readiness of reference) to adhere to the old external division of books established by Leunclavius. (Boissevain's changes are, however, indicated.) The Tauchnitz text with all its inaccuracies endeavors to present a coherent and readable narrative, and this is something which the exactitude of Boissevain does not at all times permit. In the translation I have striven to follow a conservative course, and at some points a straightforward narrative interlarded with brackets will give evidence of its origin in Tauchnitz, whereas at others loose, disjointed paragraphs betray the hand of Boissevain who would not willingly let Xiphilinus and Dio ride in the same compartment. My main desire through it all has been not so much to attain a logical unity of form as to present a history which shall look well and read well in English. For this reason also I have banished most of the Fragments (which must have only[Pg xii] a comparatively limited interest) to the last volume and have replaced them in my first by portions of Zonaras (taken from Melber) which have their origin in Dio and are at the same time clear, comprehensible, and connected.

Should any person object that even so my text does not offer eye and ear a pellucid field for smooth advance, I must reply that the original is likewise very far from being a serene and joyous highway; and it has not appeared to me necessary or desirable to improve upon the form of Dio's record further than the difference in the genius of the two languages demanded. I am reminded here of what Francisque Reynard says regarding the difficulties of Boccaccio, and because of a similarity in the situation I venture to quote from the preface of his (French) version of the Decameron:

"Dans son admiration exclusive des anciens, Boccace a pris pour modèle Cicéron et sa longue période académique, dans laquelle les incidences se greffent sur les incidences, poursuivant l'idée jusqu'au bout, et ne la laissant que lorsqu'elle est épuisée, comme le souffle ou l'attention de celui qui lit.... Aussi le plus souvent sa phraséologie est-elle fort complexe, et pour suivre le fil de l'idée première, faut-il apporter une attention soutenue. Ce qui est déjà une difficulté de lecture dans le texte italien, devient un obstacle très sérieux quand on a à traduire ces interminables phrases en français moderne, prototype de précision, de clarté, de logique grammaticale.... Je sais bien qu'il y a un moyen commode de l'éluder...: c'est de couper les phrases et d'en faire, d'une seule, deux, trois, quatre, autant qu'il est besoin. Mais à ce jeu on[Pg xiii] change notablement la physionomie de l'original, et c'est ce que je ne puis admettre."

As is Boccaccio to Cicero, so is Cassius Dio, *mutatis mutandis*, to Thukydides; and of course the imitator improves upon the model. Imagine a man who out-Paters Pater when Pater shall be but a memory, and you begin to secure a vision of the style of this Roman senator, who accentuates every peculiarity of the tragic historian's packed periods; and whereas his great predecessor made sentences so long as to cause mediæval scholars heartily to wish him in the Barathron, books and all, comes forward six hundred years later marshaling phrase upon phrase, clause upon clause, till a modern is forced to

exclaim: "What, will the line stretch out to the crack of doom?" Now I have dealt with these complexes in different ways; and sometimes I have cleft and hacked and wrenched them out of all semblance of their original shape, and sometimes I have hauled them almost entire, like a cable, tangled with particles, out of the sea-bed of departed days.

This principle of inconsistency which I have pursued in varying the rendering of long sentences, periodic or loose, according to external modifying conditions, may be observed also in certain other features of the book. For I have felt obliged to allow inconsistency of letter in the hope of approaching a consistency of spirit. I suppose that the ideal plan to follow in a translation would be to let a given English word represent a given Greek word, so that "beautiful" should occur as many times in the English version as *καλος* in the original, and "strength" as many times as *ῥωμη*. Such a [Pg xiv] scheme, however, is not feasible in a passage of any length, and its impossibility simply goes to show what a makeshift translation is and always has been, after all. Therefore single Greek words will be found reproduced by various English terms, but with that color which seems best adapted to the context.

Again, in spelling I have chosen a method not unknown to recent historians, which consists in anglicising familiar proper names that are household words, like Antony, Catiline, etc., but keeping the classical Latin form for persons less well known, as Antonius the grandfather of Mark Antony. To the names of gods I have given a Latin dress unless a particular god happened to be named by a Greek on Greek soil. Similarly in geographical or topographical designations the translator of Dio must needs confront a more difficult situation than did Dio himself. Greek reduces *all* names to its own basis. In English one must often select from the Latin form, Greek form, Native form, or Anglicised form. Since Dio lived in Italy and was to all intents and purposes a Roman I decided to make the Latin form the standard, and admit rarely the Anglicised form, less often the Greek, and least often the Native. As to the minutiae of spelling I need scarcely say that I have been tremendously aided by Boissevain's exhaustive studies, briefly summarized in his notes. This painstaking care, for which he feels almost obliged to apologize, will lend a permanent lustre to his invaluable work.

That many errors must have crept into an undertaking of this magnitude I have only too vivid forebodings, [Pg xv] and this in spite of no inconsiderable efforts of mine to avoid them: herein I can but beg the clemency of my readers and judges and hope that such faults may be found to be mostly of a minor character. And perhaps I can do no better than to make common cause at once with Mr. Francis Manning whose book I recently mentioned; for, in his Epistle Dedicatory "To The | Right Honourable | CHARLES | Earl of Orrery", he voices as well as possible the feelings with which I write on the dedication page the name of Professor Gildersleeve:

"Your Lordship will forgive me for detaining you thus long with relation to the Work I have made bold to present you with in our own Tongue. How well it is perform'd, I

must leave entirely to my Readers. I assume nothing to myself but an endeavour to make my Author speak intelligible *English*. I shall only add what my Subject leads me to, and what for my Reader's sake I ought to mention: That as there are but few Authors that can present any Book to your Lordship in most other Languages, and on most of the Learned Subjects, but might wish they had been assisted by your Lordship's Skill and Knowledge therein, as well as Patronage and Protection; so the Translator of this *Greek* Historian in particular must lament, that notwithstanding all his Industry and Pains, he is fallen infinitely short of that great Judgment, Nicety and Criticism in the *Greek* Language, which your Lordship has in your Writings made appear to the World."

Dio has long served as a source to writers treating topics of greater or less length in Roman history. He is now presented entire to the casual reader: his ve[Pg xvi]racious narrative must ever continue to interest the historical student, who may correct him by others or others by him, the ecclesiastic, to whom is here offered so graphic a picture of the conditions surrounding early Christianity, and the literary man, who finds the limpid stream of Hellenic diction far from its source grow turbid and turgid in turning the mill wheels for this dealer in οὔκος. Dio's faults are patent, but his excellencies, fortunately, are patent, too; and the world may rejoice that in an age of lust and bloodshed this serious-minded magistrate bethought him to record with religious exactness what he believed to be the truth respecting the Kingdom, the Republic, and the Empire of Rome even to his own day.

I desire in conclusion to express especial gratitude and appreciation for assistance and suggestions to Professor C.W.E. Miller of Johns Hopkins University, Professors J.H. Wright and A.A. Howard of Harvard University, and to Mr. A.T. Robinson of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Likewise I must acknowledge my obligations, in the elucidation of particularly vexed and corrupt passages, to the illuminative comments of Sturz, or Wagner, or Gros, or Boissée, or all combined. Additional thanks are due to many others who have helped or shall yet help to make Dio in English a success.

HERBERT BALDWIN FOSTER.

BETHLEHEM,
June, 1905.

PENNSYLVANIA,

[Pg 1]

CONCERNING THE ORIGINAL.

[Pg 3]

A.—THE WRITING.

[Pg 5]

Cassius Dio Cocceianus, Roman senator and prætor, when about forty years of age delivered himself of a pamphlet describing the dreams and omens that had led the general Septimius Severus to hope for the imperial office which he actually secured. One evening there came to the author a note of thanks from the prince; and the temporary satisfaction of the recipient was continued in his dreams, wherein his guiding angel seemed to urge him to write a detailed account of the reign of the unworthy Commodus (Book Seventy-two), just ended. Once again did Dio glow beneath the imperial felicitations and those of the public. Inoculated with the bacillus of publication and animated by a strong desire for immortality,—a wish happily realized,—he undertook the prodigious task of giving to the world a complete account of Roman events from the beginning to so late a date as Fortune might vouchsafe. Forthwith he began the accumulation of materials, a task in which ten active years (A.D. 200 to 210) were utilized. The actual labor of composition, continued for twelve years more at intervals of respite from duties of state, brought him in his narrative to the inception of the reign of his original patron, the first Severus.—All the foregoing facts are given us as Dio's own statement, in what is at present the twenty-third chapter of the seventy-second book, by that painter in miniature, Ioannes Xiphilinus.

It was now the year A.D. 223, Dio was either consul for the first time (as some assert) or had the consular[Pg 6] office behind him, the world was richer by the loss of Elagabalus, and Alexander Severus reigned in his stead. Under this emperor the remaining books (Seventy-three to Eighty, inclusive) must have been composed, for Dio puts the finishing touches on his history in 229. Since by that time he was nearly eighty years of age and since he has written of no reign subsequent to Alexander's, we may conclude that he did not survive his master, who died in 235. The sum total of his efforts, then, as he left it, consisted of eighty books, covering a period from 1064 B.C. to 229 A.D. At present there are extant of that number complete only Books Thirty-six to Sixty inclusive, treating the events of the years 68 B.C. to 47 A.D. The last twenty books, Sixty-one to Eighty, appear in fairly reliable excerpts and epitomes, but for the

first thirty-five books we are dependent upon the merest scraps and fragments. How and by what steps this great work disintegrated, and in what form it has been preserved to modern times, this it is to be our next business to trace.

It seems that Dio's work had no immediate influence, but "Time brings roses", and in the Byzantine age we find that he had come to be regarded as the canonical example of the way in which Roman History should be written. Before this desirable result, however, had been brought to pass, Books Twenty-two to Thirty-five inclusive had disappeared. These gave the events of the years from the destruction of Carthage and Corinth (in the middle of the second century B.C.) to the activity of Lucullus in 69. A like fate befell Books[Pg 7] Seventy and Seventy-one at an early date. The first twenty-one books and the last forty-five (save the two above noted) seem to have been extant in their original forms at least as late as the twelfth century. Which end of the already syncopated composition was the first to go the way of all flesh (and parchment, too,) it would not be an easy matter to determine. It is regarded by most scholars as certain that Ioannes Zonaras, who lived in the twelfth century, had the first twenty-one and the last forty-five for his epitomes. Hultsch, to be sure, advances the opinion[\[1\]](#) that Books One to Twenty-one had by that time fallen into a condensed form, the only one accessible; but the majority of scholars are against him. After Zonaras's day both One to Twenty-one and Sixty-one to Eighty suffer the corruption of moth and of worm.

The world has, then, in this twentieth century, those entire books of Dio which have already been mentioned,—Thirty-six to Sixty,—and something more. Let us first consider, accordingly, the condition in which this intact remnant has come down to the immediate present, and afterward the sources on which we have to depend for a knowledge of the lost portion.

There are eleven manuscripts for this torso of Roman History, taking their names from the library of final deposit, but they are not all, by any means, of equal value. First come Mediceus A (referred to in this book as Ma), Vaticanus A, Parisinus A, and Venetus A (Va) of the first class; then Mediceus B[Pg 8] of the second class; finally, Parisinus B, Escorialensis, Turinensis, Vaticanus B, and Venetus B, with the mongrel Vesontinus, which occupies a position in this group best designated, perhaps, as 2-1/2.

Vaticanus A has been copied from Mediceus A, and Parisinus A from Vaticanus A, so that they are practically one with their archetype. Venetus A is of equal age and authority with Mediceus A. One can not now get back of these two codices. There is none of remoter date for Dio save the parchment Cod. Vat. 1288, containing most of Books Seventy-eight and Seventy-nine,—a portion of the work for the moment not under discussion. Coming to the second class, Mediceus B is a joint product of copying from the two principal MSS. just mentioned. In the third class, Parisinus B is a copy of Mediceus B with a little at the opening taken from Mediceus A. This was the version selected as a guide by Robert Estienne in the first important edition of Dio ever

published (A.D. 1548). All the rest, Escorialensis, Turinensis, Vaticanus B, and Venetus B are mere offshoots of Parisinus B. The Vesontinus codex is derived partly from Venetus A and partly from some manuscript of the third class.

The parchment manuscript to which allusion was made above is only some three centuries later than the time of Dio himself. It covers the ground from Book 78, 2, 2, to 79, 8, 3 inclusive (ordinary division). It belonged to Orsini, and after his death (A.D. 1600) became the property of the Vatican Library. It is square in shape and consists of thirteen leaves, each[Pg 9] containing three columns of uncials. In spite of its age it is fairly overflowing with errors of every sort, many of which have been emended by an unknown corrector who also wrote in uncials; this same corrector would appear to have added the last leaf. And there are a few additions in minuscules by a still later hand. The leaves are very thin and in some places the ink has completely faded, showing only the impression of the pen. For specimen illustrations of this codex see Silvestre (*Paléographie Universelle* II, plate 7), Tischendorf (*cod. Sinait.* plate 20) and Boissevain's *Cassius Dio* (Vol. III).

The dates of these codices (centuries indicated by Arabic numerals) are about as follows:

I. Mediceus A-Ma-	(11)
I. Venetus A-Va-	(11)
I. Vaticanus A	(15)
I. Parisinus A	(17)
II. Mediceus B	(15)
III. Parisinus B	(15)
III. Venetus B	(15)
III. Vaticanus B	(15)
I. and III. Vesontinus	(15)
III. Turinensis	(16)

I. Codex Vaticanus græcus No. 1288 (5-6)

Mediceus A contains practically Books Thirty-six to Fifty-four, and Venetus A Books Forty-one to Sixty (two "decades"). As they are both the oldest copies[Pg 10] extant and the sources of all the others, modern editors would confine themselves to them exclusively but for the fact that in each some gaps are found. In Mediceus A, for instance, two quaternions (sixteen leaves) are lacking at the start, Leaf 7 is gone from the third quaternion, Leaves 1 and 8 from the fourth; from the thirty-first (now Quaternion 29) Leaf 1 has been cut, from the thirty-third and last Leaf 5 has disappeared. Likewise in Venetus A there are some gaps, especially near the end, in Book Sixty, where three leaves are missing. Hence (without stopping to take up gaps and breaks in detail) it may be said that the general plan pursued at the present day is to adopt a reading drawn for each book from the following sources respectively:

Book 36.	Mediceus A, with lacuna of chapters 3-19 incl., supplied by the mutual corrections of Vaticanus A and Parisinus B.
Books 37 to 49.	Mediceus A.
Books 50 to 54.	Vaticanus A (vice Mediceus A).
Books 55 to 59.	Venetus A.
Book 60.	Venetus A, except chapter 17, sections 7 to 20, and chapter 22, section 3, to chapter 26, section 2,—two passages supplied by Mediceus B.

What knowledge has the world of the first thirty-five books of Dio's Roman History? To such a question answer must be made that of this whole section the[Pg 11] merest glimpse can be had. It is here that we encounter the name of Zonaras, concerning whom some information will now be in order. Ioannes Zonaras was an official of the Byzantine Court who came into prominence under Alexis I. Comnenus in the early part of the twelfth century. For a time he acted as both commander of the body-guard and first

private secretary to Alexis, but in the succeeding reign,—that of Calo-Ioannes,—he retired to the monastery of Mt. Athos, where he devoted himself to literary labors until his death, which is said to have occurred at the advanced age of eighty-eight. He was the author of numerous works, such as a Lexicon of Words Old and New, an Exposition of the Apostolic and Patristic Canons, an Argument Directed Against the Marriage of Two Nephews to the Same Woman, etc.; but our special interest lies in his Χρονικον (Chronicon), a history of the world in eighteen books, from the creation to 1118 A.D.,—this last being the date of the demise of Alexis. The earlier portions of this work are drawn from Josephus; for Roman History he uses largely Cassius Dio; Plutarch, Eusebius, Appian also figure. But it has already been stated that Books Twenty-two to Thirty-five perished at an indefinitely early date; hence it follows that Zonaras has only Books One to Twenty-one at hand to use for his account of *early* Rome; besides these he has later employed Books Forty-four to Eighty. Consequently it is possible to get many of the facts related to Dio, and in some cases his exact words, by reading Books VII to XII of this[Pg 12] Χρονικον or Επιτομη Ιστοριων by Zonaras. It is Books VII, VIII, and IX especially which follow Books One to Twenty-one of Dio.

Parallel with this account of Zonaras and extending beyond it, even to the extent of throwing a wire of communication across the yawning time-chasm represented by Books Twenty-two to Thirty-five, are certain excerpts and epitomes found in various odd corners and strangely preserved to the present moment. These are: Excerpts Concerning Virtues and Vices; Excerpts Concerning Judgments; Excerpts Concerning Embassies. The so-called "Planudean Excerpts" which used to be admitted to editions are rejected on good authority[2] by Melber, whom I have followed. I shall attempt only a brief mention of those excerpts, to show their pertinence.

The *Excerpts Concerning Virtues and Vices* exist in a manuscript of the tenth century at the library of Tours, originally brought from the island of Cyprus and sold to Nicolas Claude Fabre de Peiresc, who lived from 1580 to 1637. Apparently it is a collection made at the order of Constantine VII. Porphyrogenitus. It was first published at Paris by Henri de Valois in 1634. The collection consists of quotations from Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, Nicolas Damascenus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Appian, Dio, John of Antioch, and others.

The *Excerpts Concerning Judgments* are found in a Vatican manuscript known as Codex Vaticanus Rescriptus Græcus, N. 73. Angelo Mai first published the[Pg 13] collection at Rome in 1826. They consist of many narrative fragments extending over the field of Roman History from early to late times, but fall into two parts: between these two parts there is a gap of six or more pages. That the former set of fragments is taken directly from Dio all scholars are ready to allow. In regard to the latter set there have been, and perhaps still are, diverse opinions. The trouble is that on the one hand these passages do not end with the reign of Alexander Severus, where Dio manifestly

ended his history, but continue down to Constantine and (since the manuscript has lost some sheets at the close) possibly much farther: and on the other hand the style and diction differ considerably from Dio's own. It was once the fashion to say that as many of the fragments as come before the reign of Valerian (A.D. 253)[\[3\]](#) came from Dio's composition, but that the remainder were written by an unknown author. Now, however, it is generally agreed that all the excerpts of the second set were the work of one man, whether John of Antioch, or Peter Patricius, or some third individual. Still, though not direct quotations from Dio, they are regarded as of value in filling out both his account and that of Xiphilinus. The words are different, but the facts remain undoubtedly true.

The *Excerpts Concerning Embassies* are contained in somewhat less than a dozen manuscripts, all of which prove to have sprung from a Spanish archetype (since destroyed by fire) that Juan Paez de Castro owned in the sixteenth century. Many of the copies were made[\[Pg 14\]](#) by Andreas Darmarius. The first publisher of these selections was Fulvio Orsini (= Ursinus), who brought them out at Antwerp in 1582. As their name indicates, they are accounts of embassies sent either by the Romans to foreign tribes or by foreign tribes to the Romans. Some of them are taken from Cassius Dio; hence their importance here.

Now it was the custom of the earlier editors to arrange the (early) fragments of Dio according to the groups from which they were taken: (1) the so-called *Fragmenta Valesia* (pickings from grammarians, lexicographers, scholiasts), edited by the same Henri de Valois above mentioned; (2) the *Fragmenta Peiresciana* (= *Excerpts Concerning Virtues and Vices*); (3) the *Fragmenta Ursina* (= *Excerpts Concerning Embassies*); and finally, in the edition of Sturz[\[4\]](#) (4) *Excerpta Vaticana* (= *Excerpts Concerning Judgments and the now rejected "Planudean Excerpts"*). The above grouping has been abandoned and a strictly chronological order followed in all the later editions, including Bekker, Dindorf, Melber, Boissevain.

The body of Fragments preceding Book Thirty-six cites, in addition to the collections mentioned, the following works or authors:

Anecdota Græca of Immanuel Bekker (1785-1871), a scholar of vast attainments and profound learning in classical literature. These *Anecdota* are excerpts made from various Greek manuscripts found in the course of travels extending through France, Italy, England, and Germany. There were three volumes, appearing from 1814 to 1821.[\[Pg 15\]](#)

Antonio Melissa.—A Greek monk living between 700 and 1100 A.D. He collected two books of quotations from early Christian Fathers (one hundred and seventy-six titles) on the general subject of Virtues and Vices.

Arsenius.—Archbishop of Monembasia: age of the Revival of Learning.

Cedrenus.—A Greek monk of the eleventh century who compiled a historical work (Συνοψις ἱστοριῶν) the scope of which extended from the creation to 1057 A.D. He gives no evidence of historical knowledge or the critical sense, but rather of great credulity and a fondness for legends. His treatise is, moreover, largely plagiarized from the *Annals* of Ioannes Scylitzes Curopalates.

Cramer, J.A.—An Oxford scholar who published two collections of excerpts (similar to those of Bekker) between 1835 and 1841. The collection referred to in our text had its source in manuscripts of the Royal Library in Paris. It was in three octavo volumes.

Etymologicum Magnum.—A lexicon of uncertain date, after Photius (886 A.D.) and before Eustathius. This dictionary contains many valuable citations from lost Greek works. First edition, Venice, 1499.

Eustathius.—Archbishop of Thessalonica and the most learned man of his age (latter half of the twelfth century). His most important composition is his *Commentary on Homer's Iliad and Odyssey* in which he quotes vast numbers of authors unknown to us now except by name. First edition, Rome, 1542-1550.

Glossary of C. Labbæus, the editor of Ancient Glosses of Law Terms, published in Paris, 1606.[Pg 16]

John of Antioch.—Author of a work called "Chronological History from Adam" quoted in the *Excerpts Concerning Virtues and Vices* (vid. supra). Internal evidence indicates that the book was written after 610 and before 900 A.D.

John of Damascus.—A voluminous ecclesiastical writer belonging to the reigns of Leo Isauricus and Constantine VII. (approximately from 700 to 750 A.D.). He was an opponent of the iconoclastic movement. The best edition of his works was published at Paris in 1712. The passage cited in our Fragments is from περί Δράκοντων, a mutilated essay on dragons standing between a "Dialogue Between a Saracen and a Christian" and a "Discussion of the Holy Trinity."

John Laurentius Lydus.—A Byzantine writer, born at Philadelphia (the city of Revelation, III, 7), in 490 A.D. Although he was famed during his lifetime as a poet, all his verses have perished. The work cited in our Fragments,—"*Concerning the Offices of the Roman Republic, in Three Books*,"—had a curious history. For centuries it was regarded as lost, but about 1785 nine tenths of it was discovered by De Villoison in a MS. in the suburbs of Constantinople. It was published in Paris, 1811.—Laurentius in the course of his career held important political posts and received two important literary appointments from the Emperor Justinian I.

Suidas.—A lexicographer of the tenth century, composer of the most comprehensive Greek dictionary of early times. It is a manual at once of language and of antiquities.

Inestimable as its value is, the workman[Pg 17]ship is careless and uneven. The arrangement is alphabetical.

John Tzetzes.—A Greek grammarian of the twelfth century. His learning was great but scarcely equaled his self-conceit, as repeatedly displayed in passages of his works. Many of his writings are still extant. One of these is called *Chiliades* (or *Thousands*), a name bestowed by its first editor, who divided the work into sections of one thousand lines each. The subject-matter consists of the most miscellaneous historical or mythological narratives or anecdotes, absolutely without connection. Tzetzes copied these accounts from upward of four hundred writers,—one of them being Cassius Dio. The *Chiliades* is written in the so-called *Versus politicus*, or "political verse," which is really not verse at all, but a kind of decadent doggerel.—A minor treatise by the same author is the *Exegesis of the Iliad of Homer*, published by Hermann (Leipzig, 1812).

Isaac Tzetzes, who has attracted less attention than his brother John, is best known as the author of a commentary on the *Cassandra* of Lycophron (a poem of 1474 iambic verses by a post-classical tragedian, about 285 B.C., embodying the warnings of the royal prophetess and couched in appropriately incomprehensible expressions). It was hardly worth all the care that Tzetzes lavished upon it. From manuscript evidence and various claims of John Tzetzes it seems that John worked over, improved, and enlarged the commentary of his brother. Isaac's name, however, still remains associated with this particular exposition.

We are now at length placed in a position to consider[Pg 18] the condition of the ultimate portion of the work, i.e., the last twenty books, Sixty-one to Eighty inclusive. In general it may be said that for this section of the history we are thrown back upon an epitome of Ioannes Xiphilinus, who lived about fifty years earlier than the Ioannes Zonaras recently under discussion. To this general statement there are two important exceptions. First, even as early as Xiphilinus wrote (eleventh century) nearly two books of this last portion had perished. Book Seventy, containing the reign of Antoninus Pius, was entirely gone save a few miserable chapters, and Book Seventy-one had suffered the same fate in its beginning, so that our account of the renowned Marcus Aurelius begins practically with the year 172 instead of 161. The gap thus created has been partially filled by extracts of every conceivable quality and merit, from Suidas, from John of Antioch, even from Asinius Quadratus. This on the side of loss: on the side of gain there are numerous little excerpts (just as in the case of the early books) that may serve to fill crevices or cover scars, and above all there exists a parchment manuscript, known as Vaticanus 1288, older than Mediceus A, older than Venetus A, and containing Books Seventy-eight and Seventy-nine probably very much as Dio wrote them, save that the account is mutilated at beginning and end.

Boissevain concludes (by comparing the Table of Contents found with a remark of Photius) that this particular piece of salvage was originally Books Seventy-nine and

Eighty (instead of Seventy-eight and Seventy-nine), that Book Eighty of Dio was really what is[Pg 19] now commonly called Seventy-nine *and* Eighty, and that the so-called Book Eighty (of only five chapters) was but a kind of epilogue to the whole work. Whatever we may decide respecting the merits of his argument, the important fact is that here for a short distance we have Dio's original narrative, as in Books Thirty-six to Sixty, and are no longer obliged to depend upon epitomes.

A word of explanation about Xiphilinus must come next. This Xiphilinus was a native of Trapezos (Trebizond) and became a monk at Constantinople. Here, at the behest of Michael VII. Ducas (1071-1078) he made an abridgment of Books Thirty-six to Eighty of Dio; thus it is his version of the lost books Sixty-one to Eighty on which we are compelled to rely. His task was accomplished with an even greater degree of carelessness than is customary in such compositions, and it may be said that his ability or, at least, his good will is not nearly so great as that of Zonaras. Yet he is largely a *pis aller* for the would-be reader of Cassius Dio.

Whereas the original was divided arbitrarily into books, Xiphilinus divided his condensation into "sections," each containing the life of one emperor. Readers must further note that the present division of Books Seventy-one to Eighty dates only from Leunclavius (1592, first edition) and is not necessarily correct. Improvements in arrangement by Boissevain (latest editor of Dio entire) are indicated in the present translation, though for convenience of reference the old headlines are still retained.[Pg 20]

Before speaking of the editions through which Dio's *Roman History* has passed it seems desirable to summarize briefly the condition of the whole as explained in the preceding pages. Here is a bird's-eye view of the whole situation.

Books 1-21 exist in Zonaras and various fragments.

" 22-35 exist in fragments only.

" 36-54 exist in Dio's own words, and are found in universally approved MSS.

" 54-60 exist in generally approved MSS.

" 60-69 exist in Xiphilinus and excerpts.

Book 70 exists in fragments only.

Books 71-77 exist in Xiphilinus and excerpts.

" 78,
79 exist in Dio's own words (oldest MS).

Book 80 exists in Xiphilinus.

EDITIONS.

A brief list of important editions of this author is appended; the order is chronological.

1. N. Leoniceus.—Italian translation of Books 35 to 60. Venice, 1533. Free, and with many errors.

2. R. Stephanus.—Greek text of Books 35 to 60. Paris, 1548. Work well done, but based on a poor MS.

3. Xylander.—Latin translation of Books 35 to 60, with a brief Latin index. Basle, 1557. This version was made from No. 2.

4. Baldelli.—Italian translation of Books 35 to 60. Venice, 1562.[Pg 21]

5. H. Stephanus.—A second edition of No. 2 with Latin translation of No. 2 added. A few corrections have been made and the Latin index is a little fuller. Paris, 1591.

6. Leunclavius.—A second edition of No. 3, somewhat emended, *and with Books 61 to 80 (Xiphilinus) added*; also containing *Orsini's Excerpts Concerning Embassies* (in Greek and Latin), notes of Leunclavius, and a still fuller Latin index. Frankfurt, 1592.

7. Leunclavius.—Posthumous edition. Text of Dio and of Xiphilinus (the latter from Nero to Alexander Severus). Corrections of R. Stephanus in Dio proper, and of Xylander in both Dio and Xiphilinus, notes of Leunclavius on Dio, and notes of Orsini on *Excerpts Concerning Embassies*. Same Latin index as in No. 6. Hanover, 1606.

8. REIMAR. (Important. All previous editions are taken from codex Parisinus B. Reimar, assisted by Gronovius (father and son) and by Quirinus, employed Mediceus A (the standard codex) together with Vaticanus A and Vaticanus B.) Text of Dio and Xiphilinus (Books 36 to 80), the Xylander-Leunclavius Latin version, the *Excerpts Concerning Virtues and Vices*, and fragments collected from various sources by Henri de Valois. Reimar used not only the three MSS. mentioned above, but three copies of previous editions,—one of No. 2 (with notes of Turnebus and others), one[Pg 22] of No. 5 (with, notes of Oddey), and one of No. 7 (with notes of an unknown individual of much learning, cited by Reimar and in this edition as *N*). Finally he gathered all possible

emendations from as many as fourteen scholars who had suggested improvements in the text. Hamburg, 1750.

9. J.A. Wagner.—German translation in five volumes. Frankfurt, 1783.

10. Penzel.—German translation with notes. Four volumes. Leipzig, 1786-1818.

11. Morellius.—Fragments of Dio, with new readings of the same. Emphasizes the importance of codex Venetus A and has some remarks on Venetus B. Published in 1793.

12. Sturz.—New edition of Dio based on No. 8, improved by a new collation of the Medicean manuscripts and with collation of the codex Turinensis, besides emendations gathered from many new sources. Eight volumes. Leipzig, 1824-5. (Volume IX in 1843, containing Mai's *Excerpts Concerning Judgments*.)

13. Tauchnitz text.—Stereotyped edition, four volumes, Leipzig, 1829. New impression, Leipzig, 1870-77. (Originally used as a basis for the present translation after Book Fifty: later, wholesale revisions were undertaken to make the English for the most part conform to the text of Boissevain.)

14. Tafel.—German translation, three volumes. Stuttgart, 1831-1844.[Pg 23]

15. J. Bekker.—Dio entire. (With new collation of the old MS. containing most of Books Seventy-eight and Seventy-nine, and with many new and brilliant conjectural emendations by the editor.) Two volumes. Leipzig, 1849.

16. Gros-Boissée.—French translation together with the Greek text and copious notes. (With new collation of the Vatican, Medicean, and Venetian codices, besides use of Parisinus A and Vesontinus; manuscripts of the Fragments, especially the Tours manuscript (concerning Virtues and Vices) have been carefully gone over.) Ten volumes. Gros edited the first four; Boissée the last six. Paris, 1845-1870.

17. Dindorf.—Teubner text. Dindorf was the first to perceive the relation of the manuscripts and their respective values. He used Herwerden's new collation of the Vatican palimpsest containing *Excerpts Concerning Judgments*. From making fuller notes and emendations he was prevented by untimely death. Five volumes. Leipzig, 1863-1865.

18. Melber.—Teubner text, being a new recension of Dindorf, with numerous additions. To consist of five volumes. Leipzig, from 1890. The first two volumes, all that were available, have been used for this translation.

19. Boissevain.—The most modern, accurate, and artistic edition of Dio. The editor is very conservative in the matter of manuscript tradition. He personally read in Italy many of the MSS., and had the aid of numerous friends at[Pg 24] home and abroad in collating MSS., besides the help of a few in the suggestion of new readings. In the later portion

of the text he makes a new division of books, and essays also to assign the early fragments to their respective books. Three volumes. Berlin, 1895, 1898, 1901. Vol. I, pp. 359 + cxxvi; Vol. II, pp. 690 + xxxi; Vol. III, pp. 800 + xviii. The second volume contains two phototype facsimiles of pages of the Laurentian and Marcian MSS., and the third volume three similar specimens of the Codex Vaticanus. In the appendix of the last volume are found, in the order named, the following aids to the study of Dio.

1. The *entire* epitome of Xiphilinus (Books 36-80).
2. Vatican Excerpts of Peter Patricius (Nos. 1-38), compared with Dio's wording.
3. Vatican Excerpts of Peter Patricius (Nos. 156-191), containing that portion of the *Historia Augusta* which is subsequent to Dio's narrative.
4. Excerpts by John of Antioch, taken from Dio.
5. The "Salmasian Excerpts."
6. Some "Constantinian Excerpts," compared with Dio.
7. The account of Dio given by Photius and by Suidas.[Pg 25]
8. Table of Fragments.

Boissevain's invaluable emendations and interpretations have been liberally used by the present translator, and some of his changes of arrangement have been accepted outright, others only indicated.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NARRATIVE.

The atmosphere of Dio's Roman History is serious to a degree. Its author never loses sight of the fact that by his labor he is conferring a substantial benefit upon mankind, and he follows, moreover, a particular historical theory, popular at the time, which allows little chance for sportiveness or wit. Just as the early French drama could concern itself only with personages of noble or royal rank, so Dio's ideal compels him for the most part to restrict himself to the large transactions of governments or rulers and to diminish the consideration that idiosyncrasies of private life or points of antiquarian interest might otherwise seem to claim. The name of this ideal is "Dignity" (οὔκος is the Greek), a principle of construction which is opposed to a narration adorned with details. However much it may have been overworked at times, its influence was certainly healthful, for it demanded that the material be handled in organic masses to prevent the reader from being lost in a confused mass of minutiae. Racy gossip and old wives' tales are to be replaced by philosophic reflection and pictures of temperament. Instead of mere lists of anecdotes there must be a careful survey of political[Pg 26] relations. Names, numbers, and exact dates may often be dispensed with. Still, amid all this, there is enough humor of situation in the gigantic tale and enough latitude of

speech on the part of the acting personages to prevent monotony and to render intellectual scintillations of the compiler comparatively unnecessary. Occasionally, for the sake of sharper focus on the portrait of some leader, Dio will introduce this or that trivial incident and may perhaps feel called upon immediately, under the strictness of his self-imposed régime, to apologize or justify himself.

The style of the original is rendered somewhat difficult by a conscious imitation of the involved sentence-unit found in Thukydides (though reminiscences of Herodotos and Demosthenes also abound) but gives an effect of solidity that is symmetrical with both the method and the man. Moreover, one may assert of it what Matthew Arnold declared could *not* be said regarding Homer's style, that it rises and falls with the matter it treats, so that at every climax we may be sure of finding the charm of vividness and at many intermediate points the merit of grace. It is a long course that our historian, pressed by official cares, has to cover, and he accomplishes his difficult task with creditable zeal: finally, when his Thousand Years of Rome is done, he compares himself to a warrior helped by a protecting deity from the scene of conflict. Surely it must have been one of the major battles of his energetic life to wrest from the formless void this orderly record of actions and events embroidered with[Pg 27] discussion of the motives for those actions and the causes of such events.

Dio has apparently equipped himself extremely well for his undertaking. A fragment edited by Mai (see Fragment I) seems to make him say that he has read every available book upon the subject; and, like Thukydides, he is critical, he is eclectic, and often supports his statements by the citation or introduction of documentary testimony. His superstition is debasing and repellent, but works harm only in limited spheres, and it is counterbalanced by the fact that he had been a part of many events recounted and had held high governmental offices, enjoying a career which furnished him with standards by which to judge the likelihood of allegations regarding earlier periods of Rome,—that, in a word, he was no mere carpet-knight of History. He is honestly conscientious in his use of language, attempting to give the preference to standard phrases and words of classical Greek over corrupt idioms and expressions of a decadent tongue; it is this very conscientiousness, of course, which leads him to adopt so much elaborate syntax from bygone masters of style. Finally,—the point in which, I think, Dio has come nearest to the gloomy Athenian,—something of the matter-of-fact directness of Thukydides is perceptible in this Roman History. The operator unrolls before us the long panorama of wars and plots and bribes and murders: his pictures speak, but he himself seldom interjects a word. Sometimes the lack of comment seems almost brutal, but what need to darken the torture-chamber in the House of Hades?[Pg 28]

There are two ways of writing history. One is to observe a strictly chronological order, describing together only such events as took place in a single year or reign; and the other, to give all in one place and in one narration the story of a single great movement, though it should cover several years and a fraction,—or, again, to sketch the condition

of affairs in one province, or valley, or peninsula for so long a time as the story of such a region seems to possess unity of development. The first kind of writing takes the year or the reign as its standard, whereas the second uses the matter under discussion or some part of the earth in the same way: and they may accordingly be called, one, the chronological method, and the other, the pragmato-geographical. The difference between the two is well illustrated by the varying ways in which modern works on Greek history treat the affairs of Sicily.

The first plan is that which Dio follows, and his work would have been called by the Romans *annales* rather than *historiæ*. The method has its advantages, one of which is, or should be, that the reader knows just how far he has progressed; he can compare the relative significance of events happening at the same time in widely separated lands: he is, as it were, *living* in the past, and receives from week to week or month to month reports of the world's doings in all quarters. On the other hand, this plan lacks dramatic force; there are sub-climaxes and one grand climax: and the interest is apt to flag through being obliged to divide itself among many districts. The same results, both [Pg 29] good and bad, are observable in Thukydides, whom Dio follows in constructive theory as well as style. It has already been said that our historian sacrifices sharpness of dates to the Onkos, depending, doubtless, on his chronological arrangements to make good the loss. Usually it does so, but occasionally confusion arises. Whether because he noticed this or not, he begins at the opening of the fifty-first book to be accurate in his dates, generally stating the exact day. Rarely, Dio lets his interest run away with him and mixes the two economies.

If we read the pages closely, we find that by Dio's own statement his work falls properly into three parts. The first consists of the first fifty-one books, from the landing of Æneas to the establishment of the empire by Octavianus. Up to that time, Dio says (in LIII, 19), political action had been taken openly, after discussion in the senate and before the people. Everybody knew the facts, and in case any authors distorted them, the public records were open for any one to consult. After that time, however, the rulers commonly kept their acts and discussions secret; and their censored accounts, when made public, were naturally looked upon by the man in the street with doubt and suspicion. Hence, from this point, says the historian, a radical difference must inevitably be found in the character of his account.

The second portion, opening with Book Fifty-two, ends at the death of Marcus Aurelius (180 B.C.). In LXXI, 36, 4 Dio admits that the old splendor ended with Marcus and was not renewed. His history, he [Pg 30] says, makes here a sheer descent (καταπιπτει) from the golden to the iron age. It fades, as it were, into the light of common day in a double sense: for the events succeeding this reign Dio himself was able to observe as an intelligent eyewitness.

The third section, then, extends from the beginning of Book Seventy-two to the end of the work. Here Dio breaks away oftener than before from his servility to the Dignity of History, only to display a far more contemptible servility to his imperial masters. According to his own account he stood by and passively allowed atrocities to be multiplied about him, nor does he venture to express any forceful indignation at the performance of such deeds. Had he protested, the world's knowledge of Rome's degenerate tyrants would undoubtedly have been less complete than it now is; and Dio was quite enough of an egotist to believe that his own life and work were of paramount importance. If we compare him unfavorably with Epictetus, we must remember that the latter was obscure enough to be ignored.

In both the second and the third parts, that is to say throughout the entire imperial period, Dio is conceded to have committed an error in his point of view by making the relations of the emperor to the senate the leading idea in his narrative and subordinating other events to that relation. Senator as he was, he naturally magnified its importance, and in an impartial estimate of his account one must allow for personal bias.

Our historian's sources for the earlier part of his work are not positively known. He has been credited[Pg 31] with the use of Livy, of Cœlius, of Appian, and of Dionysios of Halicarnassos, but the traces are not definite enough to warrant any dogmatic assertion. Perhaps he knew Tacitus and perhaps Suetonius: the portrait of Tiberius is especially good and was probably obtained from an author of merit. But there were in existence a great multitude of books inferior or now forgotten besides the works of the authors above mentioned; and Dio's History in general shows no greater evidence of having been drawn from writers whom we know than from others whom we do not know.

We have already noticed Dio's similarity to Thukydides in style, arrangement, and emotional attitude. There remains one more bond of brotherhood,—the speeches. Just as the sombre story of the Peloponnesian conflict has for a prominent feature the pleas and counterpleas of contending parties, together with a few independent orations, so this Roman History is filled with public utterances of famous men, either singly or in pairs. Dio evinces considerable fondness for these wordy combats (ἀμιλλαι λόγων). About one speech to the book is the average in the earlier portion of the work. The author probably adapted them from rhetorical μελεται, or essays, then in existence. He was himself a finished product of the rhetorical schools and was inclined to give their output the greatest publicity. The most interesting of these efforts,—some go so far as to say the only one of real interest,—is[Pg 32] the speech of Mæcenas in favor of the establishment of monarchy by Augustus: this argument undoubtedly sets forth Dio's own views on government. Like the rival deliverance of Agrippa it shows traces of having undergone a revision of the first draught, and it is more than probable that the two did not assume their present shape until the time of Alexander Severus.

[Pg 33]

B.—THE WRITER.

[Pg 35]

Suidas, the lexicographer of the tenth century, who is profitable for so many things, has this entry under "Dio":

Dio—called Cassius, surnamed Cocceius (others "Cocceianus"), of Nicæa, historian, born in the times of Alexander son of Mammæa, wrote a Roman History in 80 books (they are divided by decades), a "Persia", "The Getæ", "Journey-signs", "In Trajan's Day", "Life of Arrian the Philosopher".

Photius, an influential Patriarch of Constantinople and belonging to the ninth century, has in his "Bibliotheca" a much longer notice, which, however, contains almost nothing that a reader will not find in Dio's own record. This is about the extent of the information afforded us by antiquity, and modern biographers usually fall back upon the author's own remarks regarding himself, as found scattered through his Roman History. Such personal references were for the first time carefully collected, systematically arranged, and discussed in the edition of Reimar; subsequently the same matter was reprinted in the fifth volume of the Dindorf Teubner text.

Just a word first in regard to the lost works with which Suidas credits Dio. He probably never wrote the "Persia": perhaps it belonged to Dio of Colophon, or possibly Suidas has confused *Dion* with [Pg 36] *Deinon*. It is certain that he did not write "The Getæ": this composition was by his maternal grandfather, Dio of Prusa, and was the fruit of exile. "Journey-signs" or "Itineraries" is an enigmatic title, and the more cautious scholars forbear to venture an opinion upon its significance. Bernhardt, editor of Suidas, says "*Intelligo Librum de Signis*" and translates the title "De Ominibus inter congregiendum." Leonhard Schmitz (in the rather antiquated *Smith*) thinks it means "Itineraries" and that Dio Chrysostom very likely wrote it, because he traveled considerably. Concerning "In Trajan's Day" two opinions may be mentioned,—one, that the attribution of such a title to Dio is a mistake (for, if true, he would have mentioned it in his larger work): the other, that its substance was incorporated in the larger work, and that it thereby lost its identity and importance. The "Life of Arrian" is probably a fact. Arrian was a fellow-countryman of Dio's and had a somewhat similar character and career. It may be true, as Christ surmises, that this biography was a youthful task or an essay of leisure, hastily thrown off in the midst of other enterprises.

Coming to Dio's personality we have at the outset to decide how his name shall be written. We must make sure of his proper designation before we presume to talk about him. The choice lies between Dio Cassius and Cassius Dio, and the former is the popular form of the name, if it be permissible to speak of Dio at all as a "popular" writer. The facts in the case, however, are simple. The Greek arrangement is Δίων 'ο Κασσιός. Now the regular Greek custom is to place[Pg 37] the gentile name, or even the prænomen, *after* the cognomen: but the regular Latin custom (and after all Dio has more of the Roman in his makeup than of the Greek) is to observe the order *prænomen, nomen, cognomen*. It is objected, first, that the Greeks *sometimes* followed the regular Latin order, and, second, that the Romans *sometimes* followed the regular Greek order (e.g., Cicero, in his *Letters*). But the Greek exception cannot here make Dio the *nomen* and Cassius the *cognomen*: we *know* that the historian belonged to the gens Cassia (his father was Cassius Apronianus) and that he took Dio as cognomen from his grandfather, Dio Chrysostom. And the Latin exception simply offers us the alternative of following a common usage or an uncommon usage. The real question is whether Dio should be regarded rather as Greek or as Roman. To be logical, we must say either Dion Kassios or Cassius Dio. Considering the historian's times and his *habitat*, not merely his birthplace and literary dialect, I must prefer Cassius Dio as his official appellation. Yet, because the opposite arrangement has the sanction of usage, I deem it desirable to employ as often as possible the unvexed single name *Dio*.

Dio's prænomen is unknown, but he had still another cognomen, Cocceianus, which he derived along with the *Dio* from his maternal grandfather. The latter, known as Dio of Prusa from his birthplace in Bithynia, is renowned for his speeches, which contain perhaps more philosophy than oratory and won for him from posterity the title of Chrysostom,—“Golden Mouth.” Dio of Prusa was exiled by the tyrant Domitian, but recalled and showered with favors by the em[Pg 38]peror Cocceius Nerva (96-98 A.D.); from this patron he took the cognomen mentioned, Cocceianus, which he handed down to his illustrious grandson.

Besides this distinguished ancestor on his mother's side Dio the historian had a father, Cassius Apronianus, of no mean importance. He was a Roman senator and had been governor of Dalmatia and Cilicia; to the latter post Dio bore his father company (Books 49, 36; 69, 1; 72, 7). The date of the historian's birth is determined approximately as somewhere from 150 to 162 A.D., that is, during the last part of the reign of Antoninus Pius or at the beginning of the reign of Marcus Aurelius. The town where he first saw the light was Nicæa in Bithynia.

The careful education which the youth must have had is evident, of course, in his work. After the trip to Cilicia already referred to Dio came to Rome, probably not for the first time, arriving there early in the reign of Commodus (Book 72, 4). This monster was overthrown in 192 A.D.; before his death Dio was a senator (Book 72, 16): in other

words, he was by that time above the minimum age, twenty-five years, required for admission to full senatorial standing; and thus we gain some scanty light respecting the date of his birth. Under Commodus he had held no higher offices than those of quæstor and ædile: Pertinax now, in the year 193, made him prætor (Book 73, 12). Directly came the death of Pertinax, as likewise of his successor Julianus, and the accession of him whom Dio proudly hailed as the "Second Augustus,"—Septimius Severus. The new emperor exerted a great influence upon Dio's political views. He pretended that the gods had brought him forward, as they had Augustus, especially for his work. The proofs of Heaven's graciousness to this latest sovereign were probably by him delivered to Dio, who undertook to compile them into a little book and appears to have believed them all; Severus, indeed, had been remarkably successful at the outset. Before long Dio had begun his great work, which he doubtless intended to bring to a triumphant conclusion amid the golden years of the new prince of peace.

Unfortunately the *entente cordiale* between ruler and historian did not long endure. Severus grew disappointing to Dio through his severity, visited first upon Niger and later upon Cæsar Clodius Albinus: and Dio came to be *persona non grata* to Severus for this reason among others, that the emperor changed his mind completely about Commodus, and since he had begun to revere, if not to imitate him, what Dio had written concerning his predecessor could be no longer palatable. The estrangement seems to be marked by the fact that until Severus's death Dio went abroad on no important military or diplomatic mission, but remained constantly in Italy. He was sometimes in Rome, but more commonly resided at his country-seat in Capua (Book 76, 2). In a very vague Passage in Book 76, 16 Dio speaks of finding "when I was consul" three thousand indictments for adultery inscribed on the records. This leads[Pg 40] most scholars to assume that he was consul *before* the death of Severus. Reimar thought differently, and produces arguments to support his view. I do not deem many of the passages which he cites entirely apposite, and yet some of the points urged are important. I can only say that the impression left in my mind by a rapid reading of the Greek is that Dio was consul while Severus reigned; if such be the case, he probably held the rank of *consul suffectus* ("honorary" or "substitute"). All who refuse to admit that he could have obtained so high an office at that time place the date of his first consulship anywhere from 219 to 223 A.D. because of his own statement that in 224 he was appointed to the (regularly proconsular) governorship of Africa.

The son of Severus, Caracalla or Antoninus, drew Dio from his homekeeping and took him with him on an eastern expedition in 216, so that our historian passed the winter of 216-217 as a member of Caracalla's retinue at Nicomedeia (Book 77, 17 and 18) and joined there in the annual celebration of the Saturnalia (Book 78, 8). Dio takes occasion to deplore the emperor's bestial behavior as well as the considerable pecuniary outlay to which he was personally subjected, but at the same time he evidently did not allow his convictions to become indiscreetly audible. Much farther than Nicomedeia Dio

cannot have accompanied his master; for he did not go to the Parthian war, presently undertaken, and he was not present either at Caracalla's death (217) or at the overthrow of [Pg 41] Macrinus (218). This Macrinus, one of the short-time emperors, gave Dio the post of *curator ad corrigendum statum civitatum*, with administrative powers over the cities of Pergamum and Smyrna (Book 79, 7), and his appointee remained in active service during much of the reign of Elagabalus,—possibly, indeed, until the accession of Alexander Severus (see Book 78, 18, end). Mammæa, the mother of the new sovereign, surrounded her son with skilled helpers of proved value, and it was possibly due to her wisdom that Dio was first sent to manage the proconsulate of Africa, and, on his return, to govern the imperial provinces of Dalmatia and Upper Pannonia. Somewhat later, in the year 229, he became consul for the second time, *consul ordinarius*, as colleague of Alexander himself. But Dio's disciplinary measures in Pannonia had rendered him unpopular with the pampered Pretorians, and heeding at once his own safety and the emperor's request he remained most of the time outside of Rome. This state of affairs was not wholly satisfactory, and it is not surprising that after a short time Dio complained of a bad foot and asked leave to betake himself to Nicæa, his native place.

Here we must leave him. Whether his death came soon or late after 229 A.D. is a matter of some uncertainty. It would be difficult to make a more complete record out of the available material, save to say that from two casual references it is inferred that Dio had a wife and children, and that in his career he often, sometimes with imperial assistance, tried cases in court.

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A LIST OF THE MORE RECENT DISSERTATIONS

ON

CASSIUS DIO.

[Pg 45]

A. Baumgartner.—*Über die Quellen des Cassius Dio für die ältere römische Geschichte.* (1880.)

F. Beckurts.—*Zur Quellenkritik des Tacitus, Sueton und Cassius Dio.* (1880.)

J. Bergmans.—*Die Quellen der Vita Tiberii (Buch 57 der Historia Romana) des Cassius Dio.* (1903.)

Breitung.—*Bemerkungen über die Quellen des Dio Cassius LXVI-LXIX.* (1882.)

H. Christensen.—*De fontibus a Cassio Dione in Vita Neronis enarranda adhibitis.* (1871.)

A. Deppe.—*Des Dio Cassius Bericht über die Varusschlacht verglichen mit den übrigen Geschichtsquellen.* (1880.)

P. Fabia.—*Julius Paelignus, préfet des vigiles et procureur de Cappadoce (Tacite, Ann. XII, 49; Dion Cassius LXI, 6, 6).* (1898.)

R. Ferwer.—*Die politischen Anschauungen des Cassius Dio.* (1878.)

J.G. Fischer.—*De fontibus et auctoritate Cassii Dionis.* (1870.)

H. Grohs.—*Der Wert des Geschichtswerkes des Cassius Dio als Quelle für die Geschichte der Jahre 49-44 v. Chr.* (1884.)

G. Heimbach.—*Quid et quantum Cassius Dio in historia conscribenda inde a libro XI usque ad librum XLVII e Livio desumpserit.* (1878.)

F.K. Hertlein.—*Conjecturen zu griechischen Prosaikern.* (1873.)[Pg 46]

D.G. Ielgersma.—*De fide et auctoritate Dionis Cassii Cocceiani.* (1879.)

E. Kyhnitzsch.—*De contionibus, quas Cassius Dio historiæ suæ intexuit, cum Thucydideis comparatis.* (1894.)

E. Litsch.—*De Cassio Dione imitatore Thucydidis.* (1893.)

Madvig.—*Adversaria Critica.* (1884.)

J. Maisel.—*Observationes in Cassium Dionem.* (1888.)

J. Melber.—*Der Bericht des Dio Cassius über die gallischen Kriege Cæsars.* (1891.)

J. Melber.—*Dio Cassius über die letzten Kämpfe gegen Sext. Pompeius, 36 v. Chr.* (1891.) In "Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiet der Klassischen Alterthumswissenschaft, W. v. Christ zum 60. Geburtstag dargebracht von seinen Schülern."

P. Meyer.—*De Mæcenatis oratione a Dione ficta.* (1891.)

M. Posner.—*Quibus auctoribus in bello Hannibalico enarrando usus sit Dio Cassius.* (1874.)

E. Schmidt.—*Plutarchs Bericht über die Catilinarische Verschwörung in seinem Verhältnis zu Sallust, Livius und Dio.* (1885.)

G. Sickel.—*De fontibus a Cassio Dione in conscribendis rebus inde a Tiberio usque ad mortem Vitelii gestis adhibitis.* (1876.)

D.R. Stuart.—*The attitude of Dio Cassius towards epigraphic sources.* (1904.)—In "Roman Historical Sources," etc., pp. 101-147.[Pg 47]

H. van Herwerden.—*Lectiones Rheno-Traiectinae.* (1882.) Pp. 78-95.

A. v. Gutschmid.—See *Kleine Schriften*, V, pp. 547-554. (1894.)

J. Will.—*Quæ ratio intercedat inter Dionis Cassii de Cæsaris bellis gallicis narrationem et commentarios Cæsaris de bello gallico.* (1901.)

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A LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL ARTICLES

ON

CASSIUS DIO

Found in Periodicals for the Twenty Years Preceding the Date of the Present Translation (1884-1904).

[Pg 51]

1884.

—— A review of *R. Ferwer.* (Die politischen Anschauungen des Cassius Dio.) (Bursian, Jhrb.)

H. HAUPT.—Dio Cassius. (Yearly Review, continued.) (Rh. Mus., Book 4.)

K. SCHENKL.—A general review of the advance made in the study of Dio from 1873 to 1884. (Bursian, Jhrb. pp. 277-8; and also pp. 186-194 for 1883.)

1885.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.—De Cassii Dionis libris manuscriptis (with author's stemma). (Mnemos., Vol. 13, Part 3. Also see Note on p. 456 of Part 4, same volume.)

H. HAUPT.—A review of *Grohs* (Der Wert des Geschichtswerkes des Cassius Dio als Quelle der Jahre 49-44 V.C.). (Philolog. Anzeiger.)

Id.—Dio Cassius. (Yearly Review, continued.) (Philol., Vol. 44, Book 1 and Book 3.)

H. SCHILLER.—A review of *Grohs* (same article). (B.P.W., Feb. 21.)

—— A review of U. Ph. Boissevain. (Program. On the Fragments of Cassius Dio.) (Bursian, Jhrb.)

1886.

S.A. NABER.—Emendations in Dio XLII, 34, and XXXVI, 49. (Mnemos., N.S. 14, pp. 93 and 94.)[Pg 52]

—— Mention of Haupt's Survey in Philol. 44. (See above. Bursian, Jhrb.)

—— A review of *Grohs*. (Article cited above. Bursian, Jhrb.)

—— A review of *Grohs*. (Do. do.—Litt. Cbl., Jan. 16.)

1887.

—— A review of *C.J. Rockel* (De allocutionis usu qualis sit apud Thucydidem, Xenophontem, oratores Atticos, *Dionem*, Aristidem.). (Jhrb. of I. Müller.)

—— Mention of H. Haupt's Survey in Philol. 44. (Jhrb. of I. Müller.)

BR. KEIL.—A criticism of *Rockel*. (Article above cited. W. Kl. Ph., May 4.)

W.F. ALLEN.—The Monetary Crisis in Rome, A.D. 33. (Containing citations from Dio. Tr. A. Ph. A., Vol. 18.)

E.G. SIHLER.—The Tradition of Cæsar's Gallic Wars from Cicero to Orosius. (Containing citations from Dio. Tr. A. Ph. A., Vol. 18.)

LIATYSCHEV.—(An article containing citations from Dio that contribute to a knowledge of the location of the city of Olbia.—Journal Ministerstva Narodnavo Prosvêschtscheniia, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.)

1888.

W.F. ALLEN.—Lex Curiata de Imperio. (Containing citations from Dio XXXIX, 19 and elsewhere.—Tr. A. Ph. A., Vol. 19.)[Pg 53]

S.A. NABER.—Critical observations. (Including Dio XLVI, 15; LI, 14; LV, 10; LXIX, 28; LXXVI, 14; LXXVII, 4. *Mnemos.*, Vol. 16, part 1.)

—— A review of *L. Poetsch*. (Program. Bei.—träge zur Kritik der Kaiserbiographien *Cassius Dio*, Herodian, und *Ælius Lampridius* auf Grund ihrer Berichte über den Kaiser Commodus Antoninus.—*Z. æst. Gymn.*, 1888, Book 3.)

1889.

BREITUNG.—A review of *Maisel* (*Observationes in Cassium Dionem.*). (*W. Kl. Ph.*, June 19.)

—— A review of *Maisel*. (*Do. do.*—The Academy, February.)

J. HILBERG.—A review of *Maisel*. (*Do. do.*—*Z. æst. Gymn.*, 1889, Book 3.)

H. KONTOS.—Critical note on Dio, XLIX, 12, 2. (*AΘHNA*, Vol. 1, parts 3-4.)

MELBER.—Contribution to a new order of the Fragments in Cassius Dio. (*Sitzb. d. philos.-philolog. u. hist. d. k. B. Akademie d. Wiss. zu München*, Feb. 9.)

NAUCK.—*Analecta Critica*. (Proposition to restore six fragments of Cassius Dio to Dio Chrysostom.—*Hermes*, Vol. 24, part 3.)

ALEX RIESE.—*Die Sueben* (based upon Dio). (*Rh. Mus.*, Vol. 44, part 3.)

SP. VASIS.—Passage of Dio applied to correct conclusions of Willems on Cic. ad Att. 5, 4, 2. (*AΘHNA*, Vol. 1, parts 3-4.)[Pg 54]

—— A review of *E. Cornelius* (*Quomodo Tacitus historiæ scriptor in hominum memoria versatus sit usque ad nascentes litteras sæc. XIV et XV.*—Dio is indirectly involved.). (*Jhrb. d. phil. Ver. zu Berlin*, 1889.)

—— A review of *C.J. Rockel*. (Title cited under 1887.—*Jhrb. of I. Müller.*)

1890.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.—A misplaced fragment of Dio (LXXV, 9, 6). (*Hermes*, Vol. 25, part 3.)

TH. HULTZSCH.—On Dio Cassius (relative to early alteration of the text). (*N. JB. f. Ph. u. Pæ.*, Vol. 141, book 3.)

KARL JACOBY.—A review of *Maisel*. (Title cited under 1889.—*B.P.W.*, Feb. 15.)

MELBER.—Regarding the chronological relocation of several fragments of Dio. (*Bl. f. d. Bayer. Gymn.*, Vol. 26, books 6 and 7.)

—— A citation of the Kontos note (see above) from AΘHNA. (Rev. d. Et. Gr., Vol. 3, N. 9.)

1891.

BOISSEVAIN.—A review of *Melber*. (Text edition of Dio, Vol. I.) (B.P.W., Jan. 24.)

BREITUNG.—A review of *Melber*. (Do. do.—W. Kl. Ph., June 24.)

B. KÜBLER.—A review of *Melber*. (Do. do.—Deutsche LZ., Nov. 28.)

Id.—Five conjectures in the (earlier portion of) text of Dio. (Rh. Mus., Vol. 46, part 2.)[Pg 55]

MELBER.—A review of *Maisel*. (Title cited under 1889.—Bl. f. d. Bayer. Gymn., Vol. 27, books 6 and 7.)

Id.—A correction in Zonaras, IX, 5. (Bl. f. d. Bayer. Gymn., Vol. 27, book 1.)

G.M. RUSHFORTH.—A review of *Melber* (Dio, Vol. 1). (Cl. Rev., Vol. 5, Nos. 1 and 2.)

C. WACHSMUTH.—The pentad arrangement in Dio and others. (Rh. Mus., Vol. 46, part 2.)

—— Mention of an article on Dio (Cæsar's Gallic Wars) in Festgruss des kgl. Max.-Gymn. zu München. (Phil. Rundsch., Dec. 5.)

1892.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.—On the spellings Callæci—Gallæci, etc. (Mnemos., N.S. Vol. 20, p. 286 ff.)

H. SCHILLER.—A review of *Meyer* (De Mæcenatis oratione a Dione ficta). (B.P.W., Sept. 17.)

1893.

BÜTTNER-WOBST.—An account of Dio in the Cod. Peir. (Berichte der kgl. sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissensch., part 3.)

C.G. COBET.—Emendations. (Mnemos. N.S., Vol. 21, p. 395.)

B. HEISTERBERGK.—An emendation in XLVIII, 12. (Philol., Vol. 50, part 4.)

J.J.H.—An emendation of LXVII, 12. (Mnemos., Vol. 21, part 4.)

MAISEL.—A review of *Melber*. (Dio, Vol. 1.—Phil. Rundsch., March 4.)

S.A. NABER.—Four emendations. (Mnemos., Vol. 21, part 4.)[Pg 56]

1894.

K. BURESCH.—A comment on Dio, LIV, 30, 3. (W. Kl. Ph., Jan. 24.)

1895.

AD. BAUER.—Dio's account of the war in Dalmatia and Pannonia (6-9 A.D.). (Archäologisch-Epigraphische Mittheilungen aus Oesterreich-Ungarn, 17th year, book 2.)

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.—A review of *Maisel* (Beiträge zur Würdigung der Hdss. des Cassius Dio). (B.P.W., Apr. 13.)

K. JACOBY.—A review of *Maisel*. (Do. do.—W. Kl. Ph., July 3.)

Id.—A review of *Melber*. (Dio, Vol. 2.—Ibid.)

TH. MOMMSEN.—The miracle of the rain on the column of Marcus Aurelius. (Dio as a source.) (Hermes, Vol. 30, part 1.)

—— A review of *E. Kyhnitzsch* (De contionibus quas Cassius Dio historiae suae intexuit, cum Thucydideis comparatis). (Litt. Cbl., Oct. 26.)

1896.

U. PH. BOISSEVAIN.—A review of *E. Kyhnitzsch*. (Title just above.—B.P.W., Jan. 18.)

P. ERCOLE.—A review of *M.A. Micallela* (La Fonte di Dione Cassio per le guerre galliche di Cesare). (Riv. di Fil. e d'Istr. Class., 25th year, part 1.)

PH. FABIA.—The statement of Dio about Nero and Pappæa shown to be parallel with that of Tacitus (Hist. I, 13). (Rev. de Phil., de Litt., et d'Hist. anciennes, Vol. 20, part 1.)[Pg 57]

K. KUIPER.—De Cassii Dionis Zonaræque historiis epistula critica ad Ursulum Philippum Boissevain. (Mnemos., N.S. Vol. 24.)

B. NIESE.—Dio's contributions to the history of the war against Pyrrhus. (Hermes, Vol. 31, part 4.)

F. VOGEL.—Dio worthless for facts regarding Cæsar's second expedition into Britain. (N. JB. f. Ph. u. P., 1896, books 3 and 4.)

—— Dio LIII, 23, compared with inscription discovered at Philæ, Egypt. (Philol., Vol. 55, part 1.)

1897.

D. DETLEFSEN.—Dio LIV, 32, as a sample of ancient knowledge in regard to the North Sea. (Hermes, Vol. 32, part 2.)

PH. FABIA.—*Ofonius* rather than *Sophonius* (Dio MSS.) for the gentile name of Tigillinus. (Rev. de Phil., de Litt., et d'Hist. anciennes, Vol. 21, book 3.)

P. GAROFOLO.—A citation of Dio. (Jhrb. of I. Müller, 1897.)

B. KÜBLER.—A review of *Melber*. (Dio, Vol. 2.—Deutsche LZ., March 6.)

Id.—A review of *Boissevain*. (Edition of Dio.—B.P.W., May 15.)

—— A mention of three articles by *Melber*.
1.) Der Bericht des Dio Cassius über d. gall. [Pg 58]Kriege Cäsars.
2.) Des Dio Cassius Bericht über d. Seeschlacht d. D. Brutus geg. d. Veneter.
3.) Dio Cassius über d. letzten Kämpfe geg. S. Pompejus, 36 v. Chr.
(Jhrb. of I. Müller, 1897.)

—— Mention of a rearrangement favored by *Boissevain* ("Ein verschobenes Fragment des Cassius Dio") who holds that a certain fragment, old style LXXV, 9, 6, properly belongs to the year 116 A.D. and to Trajan's expedition against the Parthians.

1898.

BÜTTNER-WOBST.—Dio corrected in regard to an episode in the siege of Ambracia, 189 B.C. (Philol., Vol. 57, part 3.)

PH. FABIA.—An emendation and a change of order in Dio, LXI, 6, 6. (Rev. de Phil., de Litt., et d'Hist. anciennes, 1898, book 2.)

J. KROMAYER.—Studies in the Second Triumvirate (Dio as a source). (Hermes, Vol. 33, part 1.)

B. KÜBLER.—A review of *Boissevain*. (Dio, Vol. 2.—B.P.W., Nov. 26 and Dec. 3.)

J. VAHLEN.—Varia. (Dio LV, 6 and 7, for date of death of Mæcenus). (Hermes, Vol. 33, part 2.)

1899.

WILH. CRÖNERT.—A study of 34 pp. on the transmission of the text of Dio. (Wiener Studien, 1899, book 1.)

K. JACOBY.—A review of *Boissevain*. (Dio, Vol. 1.—W. Kl. Ph., March 22.)[Pg 59]

1900.

WILH. CRÖNERT.—Criticism of *Boissevain*. (Rev. Crit., July 2.)

C. ROBERT.—On Dio LV, 10. (Hermes, Vol. 25, No. 4.)

—— On Dio XLVII, 17, 1. (Archiv. f. Papyrusforschung u. verw. Geb., vol. 2, book 1.)

—— Observationes. (Philol., Vol. 59, No. 2.)

—— Mélanges (including Dio XXXVIII, 50, 4). (Wiener Studien, 22nd year, book 2.)

N. VULIĆ.—A note on Cassius Dio, XXXVIII, 50, 4. (Wiener Studien, 22nd year, book 2, p. 314.)

1901.

C. JULLIAN.—Dio's account of the surrender of Vercingetorix compared with others. (Rev. des Et. Anc., Vol. 3, No. 2.)

H. ST. SEDIMAYER.—Apocolocyntosis, i.e. Apotheosis per Satiram (Dio, LX, 35). (Wiener Studien, I, pp. 181-192.)

1902.

B. KÜBLER.—A review of *Boissevain*. (Dio, Vol. 3.—B.P.W., Dec. 20.)

—— Reference to portraiture in Dio. (Philol., Vol. 61, No. 3.)

—— Record of a new coin bearing the name of L. Munatius Plancus (cp. Dio XLVI, 50). (Numismat. Zeitschr., Vol. 34.)

1903.

A. BOMER.—An opinion to the effect that Ελισων (Dio LIV, 33) is a corrupt reading for Στιβαρνα = Stever. (N. JB. f. d. kl. Alt., Gesch., u. deut. Lit., 6th year, part 3.)[Pg 60]

S.B. COUGEAS.—An account of a new MS. of Xiphilinus (No. 812 of the Iberian monastery on Mt. Athos. It is incomplete and ends at L, 11, 3 of Dio). (AΘHNA, Vol. 15.)

H. PETER.—A review of *G.M. Columba* (Cassio Dione e del guerre galliche di Cesare.—B.P.W., Sept. 5).

of

DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

as conjectured by A. von Gutschmid (*Kleine Schriften*, V, p. 561).

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A.	Rome	under	the	Kings	(Two	Books).
Book		I,		B.C.		753-673.
Book		II,		B.C.		672-510.

B.	Rome	under	a	Republic	(Thirty-nine	Books).
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a.)	To	the	End	of	the	Second	Punic	War	(Fifteen	Books.)
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1.)	To	the	Beginning	of	the	Second	Samnite	War	(Five	Books):
Book			III,				B.C.			509.
Book			IV,				B.C.			508-493.
Book			V,				B.C.			493-449.
Book			VI,				B.C.			449-390.
Book			VII,				B.C.			390-326.

2.)	To	the	Beginning	of	the	Second	Punic	War	(Five	Books):
Book			VIII,				B.C.			326-290.
Book			IX,				B.C.			290-278.
Book			X,				B.C.			277-264.
Book			XI,				B.C.			264-250.
Book			XII,				B.C.			250-219.

3.)	To	the	End	of	the	Second	Punic	War	(Five	Books):
Book			XIII,				B.C.			219-218.
Book			XIV,				B.C.			218-217.
Book			XV,				B.C.			216-211.
Book			XVI,				B.C.			211-206.
[Pg		64]	Book			XVII,			B.C.	206-201.

b.)	From	the	End	of	the	Second	Punic	War	(Twenty-four	Books).
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1.)	To	the	Death	of	Gaius	Gracchus	(Eight	Books):
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Book		XVIII,	B.C.	200-195.
Book		XIX,	B.C.	195-183.
Book		XX,	B.C.	183-149.
Book		XXI,	B.C.	149-146.
Book		XXII,	B.C.	145-140.
Book		XXIII,	B.C.	139-133.
Book		XXIV,	B.C.	133-124.
Book		XXV,	B.C.	124-121.

2.)	To	the	Dictatorship	of	Sulla	(Eight	Books):
Book			XXVI,		B.C.		120-106.
Book			XXVII,		B.C.		105-101.
Book			XXVIII,		B.C.		100-91.
Book			XXIX,		B.C.		90-89.
Book	XXX,	B.C.	88	(Happenings	at	Home).	
Book	XXXI,	B.C.	88	(Events	Abroad)	and	87 (Happenings at Home).
Book	XXXII,	B.C.	87	(Events	Abroad)-84.		
Book			XXXIII,		B.C.		84-82.

3.)	To	the	Battle	of	Pharsalus	(Eight	Books):
Book			XXXIV,		B.C.		81-79.
Book			XXXV,		B.C.		78-70.
[Pg	65]	Book	XXXVI,		B.C.		69-66.
Book			XXXVII,		B.C.		65-60.
Book			XXXVIII,		B.C.		59-58.
Book	XXXIX,	B.C.	57-54	(=	a.u.	700)	(Happenings at Home).
Book	XL,	B.C.	54				(Events Abroad)-50.
Book			XLI,		B.C.		49-48.

C. Rome under Political Factions and under the Monarchy (Thirty-nine Books).

a.) To the Death of Augustus (Fifteen Books).

1.)	To	the	Triumvirate	(Five	Books):
Book			XLII,	B.C.	48-47.
Book			XLIII,	B.C.	46-44.
Book			XLIV,	B.C.	44.
Book			XLV,	B.C.	44-43.
Book			XLVI,	B.C.	43.

2.) To the Bestowal of the Imperial Title upon Augustus (Five Books):

Book			XLVII,		B.C.		43-42.
Book			XLVIII,		B.C.		42-37.
Book			XLIX,		B.C.		36-33.
Book	L,		B.C.	32-Sept.	2,	B.C.	31.
Book	LI,	Sept.	2, B.C.	31-29 (=	a.u. 725)	(Events Abroad).	
3.)	To	the	Death	of	Augustus	(Five	Books):
Book	LII,		B.C.	29	(Happenings	at	Home).
Book			LIII,		B.C.		28-23.
Book			LIV,		B.C.		22-10.
Book		LV,		B.C.		9-A.D.	8.
[Pg		66]	Book	LVI,		A.D.	9-14.
b.)	From	the	Death	of	Augustus	(Twenty-four	Books).
1.)	To		Vespasian		(Eight		Books):
Book			LVII,		A.D.		14-25.
Book			LVIII,		A.D.		26-37.
Book			LIX,		A.D.		37-41.
Book			LX,		A.D.		41-46.
Book	LXI,		A.D.	47	(= a.u.	800)-59.	
Book			LXII,		A.D.		59-68.
Book			LXIII,		A.D.		68-69.
Book			LXIV,		A.D.		69-70.
2.)	To		Commodus		(Eight		Books):
Book			LXV,		A.D.		70-79.
Book			LXVI,		A.D.		79-81.
Book			LXVII,		A.D.		81-96.
Book			LXVIII,		A.D.		96-117.
Book			LXIX,		A.D.		117-138.
Book			LXX,		A.D.		138-161.
Book			LXXI,		A.D.		161-169.
Book			LXXII,		A.D.		169-180.
3.)	To	Dio's	Second	Consulate	(Eight		Books).
Book			LXXIII,		A.D.		180-192.
Book			LXXIV,		A.D.		193.
Book			LXXV,		A.D.		193-197.
Book			LXXVI,		A.D.		197-211.
Book			LXXVII,		A.D.		211-217.

Book	LXXVIII,	A.D.	217-218.
Book	LXXIX,	A.D.	218-222.
Book LXXX, A.D. 222-229.			

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AN EPITOME
of
THE LOST BOOKS I-XXI OF DIO
as found in the
CHRONICON
of
IOANNES ZONARAS.

[Pg 69]

(BOOK 1, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. 1VII, 1.—Æneas after the Trojan war came to the Aborigines, who were the former inhabitants of the land wherein Rome has been built and at that time had Latinus, the son of Faunus, as their sovereign. He came ashore at Laurentum, by the mouth of the river Numicius, where in obedience to some oracle he is said to have made preparations to dwell.

The ruler of the land, Latinus, interfered with Æneas's settling in the land, but after a sharp struggle was defeated. Then in accordance with dreams that appeared to both leaders they effected a reconciliation and the king beside permitting Æneas to reside there gave him his daughter Lavinia in marriage. Thereupon Æneas founded a city which he named Lavinium and the country was called Latium and the people there were termed Latins. But the Rutuli who occupied adjoining territory had been previously

hostile to the Latins, and now they set out from the city of Ardea with warlike demonstrations. They had the support of no less distinguished a man than Turnus, a relative of Latinus, who had taken a dislike to Latinus because of Lavinia's marriage, for it was to him that the maiden had originally been promised. A battle took place, Turnus and Latinus fell, and Æneas gained the victory and his father-in-law's kingdom as well. After a time, however, the Rutuli secured the Etruscans as allies and marched upon Æneas. They won in this war. Æneas vanished, being seen no more alive or dead, and was honored as a god by the[Pg 70] Latins. Hence he has come to be regarded by the Romans as the fountain head of their race and they take pride in being called "Sons of Æneas." The Latin domain fell in direct succession to his son Ascanius who had accompanied his father from home. Æneas had not yet had any child by Lavinia, but left her pregnant. Ascanius was enclosed round about by the enemy, but by night the Latins attacked them and ended both the siege and the war.

As time went on the Latin nation increased in size, and the majority of the people abandoned Lavinium to build another town in a better location. To it they gave the name of Alba from its whiteness and from its length they called it Longa (or, as Greeks would say, "white" and "long").

At the death of Ascanius the Latins gave the preference in the matter of royal power to the son borne to Æneas by Lavinia over the son of Ascanius, their preference being founded on the fact that Latinus was his grandfather. The new king's name was Silvius. Silvius begat Æneas, from Æneas sprang Latinus, and Latinus was succeeded by Pastis. Tiberinus, who came subsequently to be ruler, lost his life by falling into a river called the Albula. This river was renamed *Tiber* from him. It flows through Rome and is of great value to the city and in the highest degree useful to the Romans. Amulius, a descendant of Tiberinus, displayed an overweening pride and had the audacity to deify himself, pretending an ability to answer thunder with thunder by mechanical contrivances and to lighten in response to the lightnings and to hurl thunderbolts. He met his end by the overflow[Pg 71] of the lake beside which his palace was set, and both he and the palace were submerged in the sudden rush of waters. Aventinus his son perished in warfare.

So far the account concerns Lavinium and the people of Alba. At the beginning of Roman history we see Numitor and Amulius, who were grandsons of Aventinus and descendants of Æneas.

(BOOK 2, BOISSEVAIN.)

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B.C.

672

(*a.u.* 82)VII, 6.—When Numa died leaving no successor, Tullus Hostilius was chosen by the people and the senate. He followed in the footsteps of Romulus, and both

welcomed combats himself and encouraged the people to do the same. The Albanians having become the victims of a marauding expedition on the part of the the Romans, both sides proceeded into battle; before they came into actual conflict, however, they effected a reconciliation and both races decided to dwell together in one city. **FRAG. 6²**BUT AS EACH CLUNG TO HIS OWN TOWN AND INSISTED THAT THE OTHER RACE SHOULD REMOVE TO IT, THEY FAILED OF THEIR OBJECT. NEXT THEY DISPUTED ABOUT THE LEADERSHIP. As neither one would yield it to the other, **FRAG. 6²**THEY ARRANGED TO HAVE A CONTEST FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY. They did not care to fight with entire armies nor yet to let the decision be made by a duel of champions. But there were on both sides brethren born three at a birth, the offspring of twin mothers, of like age and alike in strength: the Roman brethren were called Publihoratii and the Albanian Curiatii. These they set into battle over against one another, paying no heed to their relationship. So they, having armed themselves and having arrayed themselves in opposing files in the vacant space between the camps, called upon the same family gods and cast repeated glances upward at the sun. Having joined issue they fought now in groups, now in pairs. Finally, when two of the Romans had fallen and all of the Al[Pg 73]banians had been wounded, the remaining Horatius, because he could not withstand the three at once, even were he unwounded, gave way in order that in pursuing him they might be scattered. And when they had become separated in the pursuit, **FRAG. 6²**ATTACKING EACH ONE he despatched them all. Then he was given honors. But because he further killed his sister when she lamented on seeing Horatius carrying the spoils of her cousins, he was tried for murder; and having taken an appeal to the people he was released.

The Albanians now became subjects of the Romans, but later they disregarded the compact; and having been summoned, in their capacity of subjects, to serve as allies, they attempted at the crisis of the battle to desert to the enemy and to join in the attack upon the Romans. They were detected, however, and punished: many (including their leader, Mettius) were put to death, and the rest suffered deportation; their city Alba was razed to the ground, after being deemed for five hundred years the mother city of the Romans.

FRAG. 6⁴NOW AGAINST THE ENEMY TULLUS WAS THOUGHT TO BE VERY EFFICIENT, BUT HE NEGLECTED RELIGION. WHEN, HOWEVER, A PESTILENCE WAS INCURRED AND HE HIMSELF FELL SICK, HE TURNED ASIDE TO A GODFEARING COURSE. He is said to have reached the end of his life by being consumed by lightning[\[5\]](#) or else as the result of a plot formed by Ancus Marcius, who happened to be (as has been stated) a son of Numa's daughter. He was king of the Romans thirty-two years.

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VII, 7.—When Hostilius died, Marcius succeeded to the kingdom, receiving it as a voluntary gift from the Romans. And he was not perfect in his arm, for he was maimed at the joint (or bend), whence he got the title Ancus (bent arm). Though gentle he was

compelled to **FRAG. 7**CHANGE HIS HABITS and he turned his attention to campaigns. For the rest of the Latins, on account of the destruction of Alba and in fear that they themselves might suffer some similar disaster, were angry at the Romans. As long as Tullus survived, they humbled themselves, dreading his reputation for warfare: but thinking that Marcius was easy to attack because of his peaceful disposition, they assailed his territory and pillaged it. He, **FRAG. 7**COMPREHENDING THAT PEACE COULD BE CAUSED BY WAR, attacked the attackers, defended his position, and captured their cities, one of which he razed to the ground, and treated many of the men taken as slaves and transferred many others to Rome. As the Romans grew and land was added to their domain, the neighboring peoples were displeased and set themselves at odds with the Romans. Hence the latter had to overcome the Fidenates by siege, and they damaged the Sabines by falling upon them while scattered and seizing their camp, and by terrifying others they got them to embrace peace even contrary to inclination. After this the life-stint of Marcius was exhausted, when he had ruled for twenty-four years, being a man that paid strict attention to religion according to the manner of his grandfather Numa.

VII, 8.—The sovereignty was now appropriated by Lucius Tarquinius, who was the son of Demaratus a Corinthian, borne to the latter by a native woman[Pg 75] after he had been exiled and had taken up his abode in Tarquinii, an Etruscan city; the boy had been named Lucumo. And though he inherited much wealth from his father, yet, because as an immigrant he was not deemed worthy of the highest offices by the people of Tarquinii, he removed to Rome, changing his appellation along with his city; and he changed his name to Lucius Tarquinius,—from the city in which he dwelt. It is said that as he was journeying to his new home an eagle swooped down and snatched the cap which he had on his head, and after soaring aloft and screaming for some time placed it again exactly upon his head: wherefore he was inspired to hope for no small advancement and eagerly took up his residence in Rome. Hence not long after he was numbered among the foremost men. **FRAG. 8**FOR BY USING HIS WEALTH QUITE LAVISHLY AND BY WINNING OVER THE NOBLES THROUGH HIS INTELLIGENCE AND WIT HE WAS INCLUDED AMONG THE PATRICIANS AND IN THE SENATE BY MARCIUS, WAS APPOINTED PRÆTOR, AND WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THE SUPERVISION OF THE KING'S CHILDREN AND OF THE KINGDOM. HE SHOWED HIMSELF AN EXCELLENT MAN, SHARING HIS MONEY WITH THOSE IN NEED AND BESTOWING HIS SERVICES READILY IF ANY ONE NEEDED HIM TO HELP. HE NEITHER DID NOR SAID ANYTHING MEAN TO ANY ONE. IF HE RECEIVED A KINDNESS FROM PERSONS HE MADE MUCH OF THE ATTENTION, WHEREAS IF ANY OFFENCE WAS OFFERED HIM, HE EITHER DISREGARDED THE INJURY OR MINIMIZED IT AND MADE LIGHT OF IT, AND FAR FROM MAKING REPRISALS UPON THE MAN THAT HAD DONE THE INJURY, HE WOULD[Pg 76] EVEN BENEFIT HIM. THUS HE CAME TO DOMINATE BOTH MARCIUS HIMSELF AND HIS CIRCLE, AND ACQUIRED THE REPUTATION OF BEING A SENSIBLE AND UPRIGHT MAN.

But the aforesaid estimate of him did not continue permanently. For at the death of Marcius he behaved in a knavish way to the latter's two sons and made the kingdom his own. The senate and the people were intending to elect the children of Marcius, when Tarquinius made advances to the most influential of the senators;—he had first sent the fatherless boys to some distant point on a hunting expedition:—and by his talk and his efforts he got these men to vote him the kingdom on the understanding that he would restore it to the children when they had attained manhood. And after assuming control of affairs he so disposed the Romans that they should never wish to choose the children in preference to him: the lads he accustomed to indolence and ruined their souls and bodies by a kind of kindness. As he still felt afraid in spite of being so placed, he secured some extra strength for himself in the senate. Those of the populace who felt friendly towards him he enrolled (to the number of about two hundred) among the patricians and the senators, and thus he put both the senate and the people within his own control. He altered his raiment, likewise, to a more magnificent style. It consisted of toga and tunic, purple all over and shot with gold, of a crown of precious stones set in gold, and of ivory sceptre and chair, which were later used by various officials and especially by those that held sway as emperors. He also on the[Pg 77] occasion of a triumph paraded with a four-horse chariot and kept twelve lictors for life.

He would certainly have introduced still other and more numerous innovations, had not Attus Navius prevented him, when he desired to rearrange the tribes: this man was an augur whose equal has never been seen. Tarquinius, angry at his opposition, took measures to abase him and to bring his art into contempt. So, putting into his bosom a whetstone and a razor, he went among the populace having in his mind that the whetstone should be cut by the razor,—a thing that is impossible. He said all that he wished, and when Attus vehemently opposed him, he said, still yielding not a particle: "If you are not opposing me out of quarrelsomeness, but are speaking the truth, answer me in the presence of all these witnesses whether what I have in mind to do shall be performed." Attus, having taken an augury on almost the very spot, replied immediately: "Verily, O King, what you intend shall be fulfilled." "Well, then," said the other, "take this whetstone and cut it through with this razor; this is what I have had in mind to come to pass." Attus at once took the stone and cut it through. Tarquinius, in admiration, heaped various honors upon him, accorded him the privilege of a bronze image, and did not again make any change in the established constitution, but employed Attus as a counselor on all matters.

He fought against the Latins who had revolted, and afterwards against the Sabines, who, aided by the Etruscans as allies, had invaded the Roman country;[Pg 78] and he conquered them all. He discovered that one of the priestesses of Vesta, who are required by custom to remain virgins all their life, had been seduced by a man, whereupon he arranged a kind of underground chamber with a long passage, and after placing in it a bed, a light, and a table nearly full of foods, he brought thither the unchaste woman

escorted by a procession and having introduced her alive into the room walled it up. From his institution this plan of punishing those of the priestesses that do not keep their virginity has continued to prevail. The men that outrage them have their necks inserted in cloven pillars in the Forum, and then are maltreated naked until they give up the ghost.

However, an attack was made upon Tarquinius by the children of Marcius because he would not yield the sovereignty to them, but instead placed a certain Tullius, borne to him by a slave woman, at the head of them all. This more than anything else displeased the patricians. The young men interested some of the latter class in their cause and formed a plot against the king. They arrayed two men like rustics, equipped with axes and scythes, and made them ready to attack him. So these two, when they did not find Tarquinius in the Forum, went to the royal court (pretending, of course, to have a dispute with each other) and asked for admission to his presence. Their request was granted and they began to make opposing arguments, and while Tarquinius was giving his attention to one of them pleading his cause, the other slew him.[Pg 79]

VII, 9.—Such was the end that befell Tarquinius who had ruled for thirty-eight years. By the coöperation of Tanaquil, wife of Tarquinius, Tullius succeeded to the kingdom of Rome. He was the child of a certain woman named Ocrisia, the wife of Spurius Tullius, a Latin; she had been captured in the war and chosen by Tarquinius: she had either become pregnant at home or conceived after her capture; both stories are current. When Tullius had reached boyhood he went to sleep on a chair once in the daytime and a quantity of fire seemed to leap from his head. Tarquinius, seeing it, took an active interest in the child and on his arriving at maturity had him enrolled among the patricians and in the senate.

The murderers of Tarquinius were arrested and his wife and Tullius learned the plan of the plot; but instead of making Tarquinius's death known at once, they took him up and tended him (pretending that he was still alive), and meantime exchanged mutual pledges that Tullius should take the sovereignty but surrender it to Tanaquil's sons when they became men. And when the multitude ran together and raised an outcry, Tanaquil, leaning out of an upper story, said: "Be not afraid. My husband both lives and shall be seen by you shortly. But in order that he may regain health at leisure and that no hindrance to business may arise from his being incapacitated, he entrusts the management of the public weal for the present to Tullius." These were her words and the people not unwillingly accepted Tullius: for he was thought to be an upright man.[Pg 80]

So, having been granted the administration of public affairs, he managed them for the most part according to orders supposed to emanate from Tarquinius. **FRAG. 9**BUT WHEN HE SAW THE PEOPLE OBEYING HIM IN ALL POINTS, he brought the assassins of Tarquinius before the senate, though, to be sure, only because of their plot; for he was still

pretending that the king was still alive. They were sentenced and put to death, and the sons of Marcius through fear took refuge among the Volsci. Then did Tullius reveal the death of Tarquinius and openly take possession of the kingdom. At first he put forward the children of Tarquinius as his excuse and caused it to be understood that he was the guardian of their royal office, but afterward he proceeded to pay court to the people, believing that he could secure control of the multitude very much more easily than of the patricians. He gave them money, assigned land to each individual, and made preparations to free the slaves and adopt them into tribes. As the nobles were irritated at this, he gave instructions that those liberated should perform some services, in requital, for the men that had liberated them. Now since the patricians were disaffected in the matter of his aspirations and circulated among other sayings one to the effect that no one had chosen him to hold the sovereignty, he gathered the people and harangued them. And by the use of many alluring statements he so disposed them toward himself that they at once voted the kingdom to him outright. He in return bestowed many gifts upon them and enrolled some of them in the senate.[Pg 81] These originally in most matters were at a disadvantage as compared with the patricians, but as time went on they shared equally with the patricians in everything save the office of interrex and the priesthoods, and were distinguished from them in no respect except by their shoes. For the shoes of the patricians were made ornate by the addition of straps and the imprint of the letter, which were intended to signify that they were descended from the original hundred men that had been senators. The letter R, they say, either indicates the number of the hundred men referred to or else is used as the initial of the name of the Romans.

In this way Tullius gained control of the populace, but fearing that some rebellion might take place he delivered the greater number and the more important of the public positions to the care of the more powerful citizens. Thus they became harmonious in their views and transacted the public business in the best manner. He also conducted a few wars against the Veians and against all the Etruscans, in the course of which nothing was done worthy of record. Wishing to affiliate the Latins still more closely with the Romans he persuaded them to construct in Rome a temple out of common funds. This he devoted to Minerva. But differences arose in regard to its superintendence. Meantime a Sabine brought to Rome an exceedingly fine cow, intending to sacrifice her to Minerva in accordance with an oracle. The oracle said that he who should sacrifice her would enlarge his country. One of the Romans learning this went to the man and told[Pg 82] him that it was requisite for the victim first to be purified in the river, and by his talk persuaded him. Having persuaded him he took the cow under the pretence of keeping her safe and having taken her he sacrificed her. When the Sabine made known the oracle the Latins both yielded the presidency of the shrine to the Romans and in other ways honored them as superior to themselves.

This was the course these matters took. Now Tullius joined his daughters in marriage with the Tarquins, and though he announced that he was going to restore the kingdom

to them he kept putting it off, now on one excuse and now on another. And they were not at all disposed to be complaisant, but were indignant. The king paid no heed to them and urged the Romans to democracy and freedom. Then were the Tarquins all the more disquieted. But the younger one, however ill at ease he was, still endured it, until in the course of time he thought he could bear Tullius no longer. And when he found that his wife did not approve his attitude, nor did his brother, he put to death his own wife **FRAG. 10¹**AND COMPASSED HIS BROTHER'S DEATH BY POISON ADMINISTERED BY THE LATTER'S WIFE. Then, uniting his fortunes with his brother's spouse, he plotted with her help against Tullius. After persuading many of the senators and patricians whose reputations were under a cloud to coöperate with him against Tullius he unexpectedly repaired with them to the senate, his wife Tullia also following him. He there spoke many words to remind them of his father's worth and uttered many[Pg 83] jests at the expense of Tullius. When the latter on hearing of it hastily made his appearance and said a word or two, the pretender seized him, and thrusting him out cast him down the steps in front of the senate-house. So the king, bewildered by the audacity of Tarquin and surprised that no one came to his assistance, did not say or do anything more. Tarquin at once obtained the kingdom from the senate, and sent some men who despatched Tullius while he was on his way home. The latter's daughter, after embracing her husband in the senate-house and saluting him as king, departed to the palace and drove her chariot over the dead body of her father as he lay there.

VII, 10.—Thus ruled Tullius and thus he died after a reign of forty-four years. Tarquin, who succeeded to the kingdom, stationed body-guards around him after the manner of Romulus, and used them both night and day, at home and abroad. For, as a result of what he had done to his father-in-law, and his wife to her father, they in turn were afraid of other people. **FRAG. 10²**AND WHEN HE HAD EQUIPPED HIMSELF TO RULE OVER THEM TYRANNICALLY HE ARRESTED AND PUT TO DEATH THE MOST POWERFUL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND OF THE REST, EXECUTING PUBLICLY THOSE AGAINST WHOM HE WAS ABLE TO BRING A CHARGE, AND OTHERS SECRETLY; SOME ALSO HE BANISHED. HE DESTROYED NOT MERELY THOSE WHO WERE ATTACHED TO THE PARTY OF TULLIUS, BUT IN ADDITION THOSE WHO HAD COÖPERATED WITH HIM IN SECURING THE MONARCHY, AND THUS HE MADE AWAY WITH THE BEST PART OF THE SENATE AND OF THE KNIGHTS. HE UNDERSTOOD[Pg 84] THAT HE WAS HATED BY THE ENTIRE POPULACE; HENCE HE DID NOT APPOINT ANY PERSONS WHATEVER TO TAKE THE PLACES OF THOSE WHO KEPT PERISHING, BUT UNDERTAKING TO ABOLISH THE SENATE ALTOGETHER HE DID NOT APPOINT A SINGLE NEW PERSON TO IT AND COMMUNICATED NO NEWS OF IMPORTANCE TO THOSE WHO STILL WERE MEMBERS. HE CALLED THE SENATORS TOGETHER NOT TO HELP HIM IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF ANY IMPORTANT MEASURES, BUT IN ORDER THAT THEIR FEWNESS MIGHT BE MADE EVIDENT TO ALL AND THEY BE CONSEQUENTLY DESPISED. MOST OF HIS BUSINESS HE CARRIED ON BY HIMSELF OR WITH THE AID OF HIS SONS. IT WAS HARD TO APPROACH AND HARD TO ACCOST HIM, AND HE SHOWED GREAT HAUGHTINESS AND BRUTALITY TOWARD ALL ALIKE, AND HE AS WELL AS HIS CHILDREN

ADOPTED A MORE TYRANNICAL BEARING TOWARD ALL PERSONS. Hence he also cast eyes of suspicion upon the members of his guard and secured a new body-guard from the Latin nation, intermingling the Latins with Romans in the ranks. He intended that the Latins by obtaining equal privileges with the Romans should owe him gratitude therefor, and that the Romans should cause him less terror, since they no longer had a place of their own but bore arms only in association with the Latins.

He also joined battle with the people of Gabii and fared ill in the conflict, but by treachery overcame them; for he suggested to his son Sextus that he desert to their side. Sextus, in order to get some plausible pretext for the desertion, **FRAG. 10³** REVEILED HIS FATHER PUBLICLY AS A TYRANT AND FORESWORN, and the latter flogged his son and took measures of defence. Then, according to [Pg 85] arrangement, the son made his treacherous desertion to the people of Gabii, taking along with him money and companions. The enemy believed the trick on account of the cruelty of Tarquin and because at this time the son spoke many words of truth in abusing his father and by his conduct seemed to have become thoroughly estranged from him. So they were very glad to receive him, and in his company made many incursions into Roman territory and did it no slight damage. For this reason and because he privately furnished some persons with money and spent it lavishly for public purposes he was chosen prætor by them and was entrusted with the management of the government among them. At that he secretly sent a man and acquainted his father with what had occurred, asking him for his intentions with regard to the future. The king made no answer to the emissary, in order that he might not, being equally informed, either willingly or unwillingly reveal something; but leading him into a garden where there were poppies he struck off with a rod the heads that were prominent and strewed the ground with them; hereupon he dismissed the message-bearer. The latter, without comprehending the affair, repeated the king's actions to Sextus, and he understood the sense of the suggestion. Therefore he destroyed the more eminent men of Gabii, some secretly by poison, others by robbers (supposedly), and still others he put to death after judicial trial by contriving against them false accusations of traitorous dealings with his father.

Thus did Sextus visit sorrow upon the men of Gabii and destroyed their superior citizens, distributing [Pg 86] their money among the crowd. Later, when some had already perished and the rest had been cozened and thoroughly believed in him, assisted by the Roman captives and the deserters (many of whom he had gathered for his projects), he seized the city and surrendered it to his father. The king bestowed it upon his son, but himself made war upon other nations.

VII, 11.—The oracles of the Sibyl to the Romans he obtained even against his will. A woman whom they called Sibyl, gifted with divine inspiration, came to Rome bringing **FRAG. 10⁴** THREE OR NINE books, offered these to Tarquin for purchase, and stated the value of the books. As he paid no attention to her, she burned one or three of the books. When again Tarquin scorned her, she destroyed part of the rest in a similar

way. And she was about to burn up also those still left when the augurs compelled him to purchase the few that were intact. He bought these for the price for which he might have secured them all, and delivered them to two senators to keep. As they did not entirely understand the contents, they sent to Greece and hired two men to come from there to read and interpret these things. The dwellers in the vicinity, desiring to learn what was revealed by the books, **FRAG. 10**⁴MANAGED TO BRIBE MARCUS ACILIUS,^[6] ONE OF THE CUSTODIANS, AND HAD SOME STATEMENTS COPIED OUT. THE AFFAIR BECAME PUBLIC AND MARCUS AFTER BEING THROWN INTO TWO HIDES SEWN TOGETHER was drowned (and beginning with him this punishment has ever since prevailed in the case of parricides), in order that earth nor water nor sun might be defiled by his death.

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The temple on the Tarpeian rock he constructed according to the vow of his father. And the earth having yawned even to the substructure of the foundations there appeared the head of a man freshly slain, still with blood in it. Accordingly the Romans sent to a soothsayer of Etruria to ask what was signified by the phenomenon. And he, desiring to make the portent apply to Etruria, made a diagram upon the ground and in it laid out the plan of Rome and the Tarpeian rock. He intended to ask the envoys: "Is this Rome? Is this the Rock? Was the head found here?" They would suspect nothing and agree in their assent, and so the efficacy of the portent would be transferred to the place where it had been shown in the diagram. This was his design, but the envoys learned from his son what his device was, and when the question was put to them, they answered: "The settlement of Rome is not here, but in Latium, and the hill is in the country of the Romans, and the head was found on that hill." Thus the design of the soothsayer was thwarted and they learned the whole truth and reported it to their fellow-citizens, to wit, that they should be very powerful and rule very many people. So this was another event that imbued them with hope. Then the hill was renamed by them "Capitolium": for *capita* in the Roman speech means "the head."

Needing money for the building of the temple Tarquin waged war upon the inhabitants of Ardea; but from it he gained no money, and he was driven out of the kingdom. Signs also came in his way that indicated his expulsion. Out of his garden vultures[Pg 88] drove the young of eagles, and in the men's hall, where he was having a banquet with his friends, a huge serpent appeared and caused him and his companions at table to decamp. In consequence of this he sent his sons Titus and Aruns to Delphi. But as Apollo declared that he should not be driven from his domain till a dog should use human speech, he was elated with hopes for the best, thinking that the oracle could never be fulfilled.

FRAG. 10⁵NOW LUCIUS JUNIUS WAS A SON OF TARQUIN'S SISTER; HIS FATHER AND BROTHER TARQUIN HAD KILLED. SO HE, FEARING FOR HIS OWN PERSON, FEIGNED

MADNESS, EMPLOYING THIS MEANS OF SAFETY AS A SCREEN FOR HIS LIFE. HENCE HE WAS DUBBED BRUTUS, FOR THIS IS THE NAME BY WHICH THE LATINS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO CALL IDIOTS. WHILE PRETENDING TO BE MAD HE WAS TAKEN ALONG AS A PLAYTHING BY THE CHILDREN OF TARQUIN, WHEN THEY JOURNEYED TO DELPHI. AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS CARRYING A VOTIVE OFFERING TO THE GOD; THIS WAS A STAFF, APPARENTLY POSSESSING NO POINT OF EXCELLENCE, so that he became a laughing stock for it all the more. It furnished a kind of image of the affliction that he feigned. For he had hollowed it out and had secretly poured in gold, indicating thereby that the disesteem which he suffered for his madness served to conceal a sound and estimable intelligence. **FRAG. 10⁷**TO THE QUERY OF THE SONS OF TARQUIN AS TO WHO SHOULD SUCCEED TO THEIR FATHER'S SOVEREIGNTY THE GOD REPLIED THAT THE FIRST WHO KISSED HIS MOTHER SHOULD OBTAIN THE POWER. AND BRUTUS, COMPREHENDING, FELL DOWN AS IF ACCIDENTALLY AND COV[Pg 89]ERED THE EARTH WITH KISSES, RIGHTLY DEEMING HER TO BE THE MOTHER OF ALL.

FRAG. 10⁸THIS BRUTUS OVERTHREW THE TARQUINS, taking as his justification the case of Lucretia, though these rulers were even without that hated by all for their tyrannous and violent characteristics. Lucretia was a daughter of Lucretius Spurius, a man that was a member of the senate, and she was wife of the distinguished Tarquinius Collatinus and was renowned, as it chanced, for her beauty and chastity. **FRAG. 10⁸**SEXTUS, THE SON OF TARQUIN, SET HIS HEART UPON OUTRAGING HER, NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE HE WAS INSPIRED WITH PASSION BY HER BEAUTY AS BECAUSE HE CHOSE TO PLOT AGAINST HER CHASTE REPUTATION. SO, HAVING WATCHED FOR COLLATINUS TO BE AWAY FROM HOME, HE CAME BY NIGHT TO HER AND LODGED AT HER HOUSE, SINCE SHE WAS THE WIFE OF A RELATIVE. AND FIRST HE TRIED BY PERSUASION TO SECURE ILLICIT PLEASURE FROM HER AND THEN HE RESORTED TO VIOLENCE. AS HE COULD NOT SUCCEED, HE THREATENED TO CUT HER THROAT. BUT INASMUCH AS SHE DESPISED DEATH, HE THREATENED FURTHERMORE TO LAY A SLAVE BESIDE HER AND TO KILL THEM BOTH AND TO SPREAD THE REPORT THAT HE HAD FOUND THEM SLEEPING TOGETHER AND KILLED THEM. THIS RENDERED LUCRETIA DISTRAUGHT, AND IN FEAR THAT THIS MIGHT BE BELIEVED TO HAVE SO HAPPENED SHE SURRENDERED. AND AFTER THE ACT OF ADULTERY SHE PLACED A DAGGER BENEATH THE PILLOW AND SENT FOR HER HUSBAND AND HER FATHER. WHEN THEY CAME, ACCOMPANIED BY BRUTUS AND PUBLIUS VALERIUS, SHE SHED MANY TEARS AND WITH MOANS RELATED THE ENTIRE TRANSACTION. THEN SHE ADDED: "AND I WILL TREAT MY CASE AS BE[Pg 90]COMES ME, BUT DO YOU, IF YOU ARE MEN, AVENGE ME, YOURSELVES, AND SHOW THE TYRANTS WHAT MANNER OF CREATURES YOU ARE AND WHAT MANNER OF WOMAN THEY HAVE OUTRAGED." HAVING SPOKEN TO THIS EFFECT SHE IMMEDIATELY DREW THE DAGGER FROM ITS HIDING PLACE AND KILLED HERSELF.

VII, 13.—The Sabines, however, because of wrath at their treatment, did not keep quiet even through the winter, but overran Roman territory and damaged the forces of Postumius when he was for the second time consul. And they would absolutely have captured him, had not Menenius Agrippa, his colleague, come to his aid. And assaulting them they killed a number, with the result that the rest withdrew. After this Spurius Cassius and Opiter Verginius as consuls made peace with the Sabines. And capturing the city of Camerium they executed most of the inhabitants; the remnant they took alive and sold, and razed the city to the ground.

Postumius Cominius and Titus Larcus arrested and put to death some slaves who were hatching a conspiracy to seize the Capitoline. Servius Sulpicius and Marcus Tullius in their turn anticipated a second conspiracy composed of slaves and some others that had joined them, for it was reported to the consuls by certain men privy to the plot. They surrounded and overpowered the conspirators and cut them down. To the informers citizenship and other rewards were given.

When a new war was stirred up on the part of the Latins against Rome, the people, demanding that a cancellation of debts be authorized, refused to take up arms. Therefore the nobles then for the first time established a new office to have jurisdiction over both[Pg 92] classes. Dictator was the name given to the person entitled to the position, and he possessed all powers as much as had the kings. People hated the name of king on account of the Tarquins, but being anxious for the benefit to be derived from sole leadership (which seemed to exert a potent influence amid conditions of war and revolution), they chose it under another name. Hence the dictatorship was, as has been said, so far as its authority went, equivalent to kingship, except that the dictator might not ride on horseback unless he were about to start on a campaign, and was not permitted to make any expenditure from the public funds unless the right were specially voted. He might try men and put them to death at home and on campaigns, and not merely such as belonged to the populace, but also members of the knights and of the senate itself. No one had the power to make any complaint against him nor to take any action hostile to him,—no, not even the tribunes,—and no case could be appealed from him. The office of dictator extended for a period of not more than six months, to the end that no such official by spending much time in the midst of so much power and unhampered authority should become haughty and plunge headlong into a passion for sole leadership. This was what happened later to Julius Cæsar, when contrary to lawful precedent he had been approved for the dictatorship.

VII, 14.—At this time, consequently, when Larcus became dictator, the populace made no uprising but presented themselves under arms. When, however, the Latins came to terms and were now in a quiescent state,[Pg 93] the lenders proceeded to treat the debtors more harshly and the populace for this reason again rebelled and even came running in

a throng into the senate. And all the senators would there have perished at the hands of the intruding mob, had not some persons at this juncture reported that the Volsci had invaded the country. In the face of such news the populace became calm, not regarding this action, however, in the light of clemency to the senate, for they felt sure that that body would almost immediately be destroyed by the enemy. Hence they did not take the trouble to man the walls nor render any assistance until Servilius released the prisoners held for default of payments and decreed a suspension of taxes for as long as the campaign lasted and promised to reduce the debts. Then in consequence of these concessions they proceeded against the enemy and won the day. Inasmuch, however, as they were not relieved of their debts and in general could obtain no decent treatment, they again raised a clamor and grew full of wrath and made an uprising against both the senate and the prætors.

But at the approach of another war the prætors decreed a cancellation of debts: others opposed this measure: and so Marcus Valerius was named dictator. He was of the kindred of Poplicola and was beloved by the people. Then, indeed, so many gathered, animated with such zeal (for he had promised them prizes, too), that they overran not only the Sabines, but the Volsci and Æqui who were allied with them. As a sequel, the populace voted many honors to Valerius, one of which[Pg 94] was their bestowal of the title Maximus. This name, translated into Greek, signifies "greatest." And he, wishing to do the populace some favors, made many addresses to the senate but could not get it to follow his guidance. Consequently he rushed out of the senatorial assembly in a rage, and after making to the populace a long speech against the senate resigned his command. **FRAG. 16⁴**AND THE POPULACE WAS ALL THE MORE PROVOKED TO REVOLT. AS FOR THE MONEY-LENDERS, BY INSISTING IN THE CASE OF DEBTS UPON THE VERY LETTER OF THE AGREEMENT AND REFUSING TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION TO THOSE WHO OWED THEM THEY BOTH FAILED TO SECURE THE EXACT AMOUNT AND WERE DISAPPOINTED IN MANY OTHER HOPES. FOR POVERTY AND THE RESULTING DESPERATION IS A HEAVY CURSE, AND IS, IF IT SPREADS AMONG A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE, VERY DIFFICULT TO COMBAT. NOW THE CAUSE OF MOST OF THE TROUBLES THAT BEFELL THE ROMANS LAY IN THE UNYIELDING ATTITUDE ADOPTED AT THIS TIME BY THE MORE POWERFUL TOWARD THEIR INFERIORS. For as the military contingent came to be hard pressed by dint of campaigns and was baffled out and out in frequent hopes frequently entertained, and the debtors were repeatedly abused and maltreated by the money-lenders, the people became inflamed to such a pitch of fury that many of the destitute abandoned the city, withdrew from the camp, **FRAG. 16⁵**AND LIKE ENEMIES GATHERED THEIR SUBSISTENCE FROM THE COUNTRY.

WHEN THIS SITUATION HAD BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT, SINCE NUMBERS CAME FLOCKING TO THE SIDE OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS, THE SENATORS, DREADING THAT THE LATTER MIGHT BECOME MORE ESTRANGED AND THE NEIGHBORING TRIBES[Pg 95] JOIN THEIR REBELLION FOR PURPOSES OF ATTACK, MADE PROPOSITIONS TO THEM IN WHICH THEY

PROMISED EVERYTHING THAT THE SENATE WAS EMPOWERED TO DO FOR THEM. BUT WHEN THEY DISPLAYED THE UTMOST AUDACITY AND WOULD ACCEPT NO OFFER, ONE OF THE ENVOYS, AGRIPPA MENENIUS, BEGGED THEM TO HEARKEN TO A FABLE. HAVING OBTAINED THEIR CONSENT HE SPOKE AS FOLLOWS. ONCE ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE BODY BEGAN A CONTENTION AGAINST THE BELLY. AND THE EYES SAID: "WE GIVE THE HANDS THE POWER TO WORK AND THE FEET THE POWER TO GO." AND THE TONGUE AND THE LIPS: "THROUGH US THE COUNSELS OF THE HEART ARE MADE KNOWN." AND THEN THE EARS: "THROUGH US THE WORDS OF OTHERS ARE DESPATCHED TO THE MIND." AND THE HANDS: "WE ARE THE WORKERS AND LAY UP STORES OF WEALTH." AND FINALLY THE FEET: "WE TIRE OURSELVES OUT CARRYING THE WHOLE BODY IN JOURNEYS AND WHILE WORKING AND WHILE STANDING." AND ALL IN A CHORUS: "WHILE WE LABOR SO, THOU ALONE, FREE FROM CONTRIBUTION AND LABOR, LIKE A MISTRESS ART SERVED BY US ALL AND THE FRUIT OF ALL OUR LABORS THOU THYSELF ALONE DOST ENJOY." THE BELLY HERSELF ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO, AND SAID SHE: "IF YOU LIKE, LEAVE ME UNSUPPLIED AND MAKE ME NO PRESENTS." THIS PROPOSITION SUITED, AND THE MEMBERS VOTED NEVER MORE TO SUPPLY THE BELLY BY THEIR COMMON EFFORT. WHEN NO FOOD WAS PRESENTED TO HER, THE HANDS WERE NOT NIMBLE TO WORK, BEING RELAXED ON ACCOUNT OF THE FAILURE OF THE BELLY, NOR WERE THE FEET POSSESSED OF STRENGTH, NOR DID ANY OTHER OF THE LIMBS SHOW ITS NORMAL ACTIVITY UNINJURED, BUT ALL WERE INEFFICIENT, SLOW, OR COMPLETELY MOTIONLESS. AND THEN THEY COMPREHENDED THAT THE[Pg 96] PRESENTS MADE TO THE BELLY HAD BEEN SUPPLIED NOT MORE TO HER THAN TO THEMSELVES AND THAT EACH ONE OF THEM INCIDENTALLY ENJOYS THE BENEFIT CONFERRED UPON HER.

FRAG. 16⁵THROUGH THESE WORDS THE POPULACE WAS MADE TO COMPREHEND THAT THE ABUNDANCE OF THE PROSPEROUS TENDS ALSO TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE POOR, AND THAT EVEN THOUGH THE FORMER BE ADVANTAGED BY THEIR LOANS AND SO INCREASE THEIR ABUNDANCE, THE OUTCOME OF THIS IS NOT HURTFUL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE MANY; SINCE, IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE WEALTHY OWNING PROPERTY, THE POOR WOULD NOT HAVE IN TIMES OF NEED PERSONS TO LEND TO THEM AND WOULD PERISH UNDER THE PRESSURE OF WANT. ACCORDINGLY THEY BECAME Milder AND REACHED AN AGREEMENT, THE SENATE FOR ITS PART VOTING A REDUCTION IN THEIR DEBTS AND A RELEASE FROM SEIZURE OF PROPERTY.

VII, 15.—They feared, however, that when their society had been disbanded they might either find the agreements not effectual or might **FRAG. 16⁶**BE HARMED ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR SEPARATION, ONE BEING PUNISHED ON ONE PRETEXT, ANOTHER ON ANOTHER, in constant succession. So they formed a compact to lend aid to one another in case any one of them should be wronged in any particular; and they took oaths to this effect and forthwith elected two representatives from their own number (and afterward still more) in order that by such a partnership arrangement they might have assistants and avengers. And this they did not only once, but the idea now conceived in this form kept growing,

and they appointed their representatives for a year, as to some office. The men were called in the tongue of the[Pg 97] Latins *tribunes* (the commanders of thousands are also so named) but are styled *dêmarchoi* in the Greek language. In order that the titles of the tribuni might be kept distinct they added to the name of the one class the phrase "of the soldiers" and to that of the other class the phrase "of the people." These *tribunes of the people*, then, or *dêmarchoi* became responsible for great evils that befell Rome. For though they did not immediately secure the title of magistrates, they gained power beyond all the rest, defending every one that begged protection and rescuing every one that called upon them not only from private persons, but from the very magistrates, except the dictators. If any one ever invoked them when absent, he, too, was released from the person holding him prisoner and was either brought before the populace by them or was set free. And if ever they saw fit that anything should not be done, they prevented it, whether the person acting were a private citizen or an official: and if the people or the senate were about to do or vote anything and a single tribune opposed it, the action or the vote became null and void. As time went on, they were allowed or allowed themselves to summon the senate, to punish whoever disobeyed them, to practice divination, and to hold court. And in case they were refused permission to do anything, they gained their point by their incontestable opposition to every project undertaken by others. For they introduced laws to the effect that whoever should obstruct them by deed or word, be he private citizen or magistrate, should be[Pg 98] "hallowed" and incur pollution. This being "hallowed" meant destruction; for this was the name applied to everything (as, for instance, a victim) that was consecrated for slaughter. The tribunes themselves were termed by the multitude "sacrosanct", since they obtained sacred enclosures for the shelter of such as invoked them. For *sacra* among the Romans means "walls", and *sancta* "sacred". Many of their actions were unwarrantable, for they threw even consuls into prison and put men to death without granting them a hearing. Nobody ventured to oppose them; or, in case any one did, he became himself "hallowed." If, however, persons were condemned not by all the tribunes, they would call to their help those who had not concurred in the verdict, and so they went duly through the forms of court procedure before the tribunes themselves or before some arbiters or before the populace, and became the possession of the side that won. In the course of time the number of the tribunes was fixed at ten, **FRAG. 16**⁷AND AS A RESULT OF THIS MOST OF THEIR POWER WAS OVERTHROWN. FOR AS THOUGH BY NATURE (BUT REALLY, OF COURSE, BY REASON OF JEALOUSY) FELLOW OFFICIALS INVARIABLY QUARREL; AND IT IS DIFFICULT FOR A NUMBER OF MEN, ESPECIALLY IN A POSITION OF INFLUENCE, TO ATTAIN HARMONY. No sooner did outsiders, planning to wreck their influence, raise factional issues to the end that dissension might make them weaker, than the tribunes actually attached themselves some to one party, some to another. **FRAG. 16**⁷IF EVEN ONE OF THEM OPPOSED A MEASURE, he rendered the decisions of the rest null and void.[Pg 99]

Now at first they did not enter the senate-house, but sitting at the entrance watched proceedings, and in case aught failed to please them, they would show resistance. Next they were invited inside. Later, however, the ex-tribunes were numbered with the senators, and finally some of the senators actually were permitted to be tribunes, unless a man chanced to be a patrician. Patricians the people would not accept: having chosen the tribunes to defend them against the patricians, and having advanced them to so great power, they dreaded lest one of them might turn his strength to contrary purposes and use it against them. But if a man abjured the rank given him by birth and changed his social standing to that of a common citizen, they received him gladly. Many of the patricians whose position was unquestioned renounced their nobility through desire for the immense influence possible, and so became tribunes.

Such was the growth of the domination of the tribunes. In addition to them the people chose two *ædiles*, to be their assistants in the matter of documents. They took charge of everything that was submitted in writing to the plebs, to the populace, and to the senate, and kept it, so that nothing that was done escaped their notice. This and the trying of cases were the objects for which they were chosen anciently, but later they were charged with the supervision of buying and selling, whence they came to be called *agoranomoi* ("clerks of the market") by those who put their name into Greek.[Pg 100]

(BOOK 5, BOISSEVAIN.)

VII, 16.—The first revolution of the Romans, then, terminated as described. Many of the neighboring tribes had found in the revolution a hostile incentive, and the Romans with a unified purpose after their reconciliation conducted vigorously the wars which the latter waged, and conquered in all of them. It was at this time that in the siege of Corioli they came within an ace of being driven from their camp, but a patrician, Gnaeus Marcius, showed his prowess and repelled the assailants. For this he received various tokens of renown and was given the title of Coriolanus from the people which he had routed. **FRAG. 17**²FOR THE TIME HE WAS THUS EXALTED BUT NOT LONG AFTERWARD HE WAS ANXIOUS TO BE MADE PRÆTOR AND FAILED, AND THEREFORE GREW VEXED AT THE POPULACE AND EVINCED DISPLEASURE TOWARD THE TRIBUNES. HENCE THE TRIBUNES (WHOSE FUNCTIONS HE WAS ESPECIALLY EAGER TO ABOLISH) HEAPED UP ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM AND FIXED UPON HIM A CHARGE OF AIMING AT TYRANNY AND EXPELLED HIM FROM ROME. HAVING BEEN EXPELLED HE FORTHWITH BETOOK HIMSELF TO THE VOLSCI. The latter's leaders and those in authority over them were delighted at his arrival and again made ready for war; Attius Tullius urged this course upon them all, but the people showed lack of enthusiasm. So when the nobles neither by advice nor by intimidation could prevail upon them to take up arms, they concocted the following scheme. The Romans were[Pg 101] conducting a horse-race, and the Volsci among other neighboring peoples had gathered in a large body to behold the spectacle. Tullius, as a pretended friend of the Romans, persuaded the Roman prætors

that they should keep watch on the Volsci, since the latter had made ready to attack them unexpectedly in the midst of the horse-race. The prætors, after communicating the information to the others, made proclamation at once, before the contest, that all the Volsci must retire. The Volsci, indignant because they alone of all the spectators had been expelled, put themselves in readiness for battle. Setting at their head Coriolanus and Tullius, and with numbers swollen by the accession of the Latins, they advanced against Rome. The Romans, when informed of it, instead of making a vigorous use of arms fell into mutual recriminations, the popular party censuring the patricians because Coriolanus, who was campaigning against his country, happened to belong to their number, and the other party the populace because they had been unjust in expelling him and making him an enemy. Because of this contention they would have incurred some great injury, had not the women come to their aid. For when the senate voted restoration to Coriolanus and envoys had been despatched to him to this end, he demanded that the land of which the Volsci had been deprived in the previous wars be given back to them. But the people would not relinquish the land. Consequence: a second embassy. **FRAG. 17⁸**AND HE WAS EXCEEDINGLY ANGRY THAT THEY, WHO WERE IN DANGER OF LOSING THEIR OWN COUNTRY, WOULD NOT[Pg 102] EVEN UNDER THESE CONDITIONS WITHDRAW FROM THE POSSESSIONS OF OTHERS. WHEN THIS SITUATION WAS REPORTED TO THE DISPUTANTS, THEY STILL REFUSED TO BUDGE, NOR DID THE DANGERS CAUSE THE MEN, AT LEAST, TO DESIST FROM QUARRELING. BUT THE WOMEN, VOLUMNIA THE WIFE OF CORIOLANUS AND VETURIA[7] HIS MOTHER, GATHERING A COMPANY OF THE REMAINING MOST EMINENT LADIES VISITED HIM IN CAMP AND TOOK HIS CHILDREN ALONG WITH THEM. WHILE THE REST WEPT WITHOUT SPEAKING VETURIA BEGAN: "WE ARE NOT DESERTERS, MY SON, BUT THE COUNTRY HAS SENT US TO YOU TO BE, IF YOU SHOULD YIELD, YOUR MOTHER, WIFE AND CHILDREN, BUT OTHERWISE YOUR SPOIL. AND IF EVEN NOW YOU STILL ARE ANGRY, KILL US THE FIRST. BE RECONCILED AND HOLD NO LONGER YOUR ANGER AGAINST YOUR CITIZENS, FRIENDS, TEMPLES, TOMBS; DO NOT TAKE BY STORM YOUR NATIVE LAND IN WHICH YOU WERE BORN, WERE REARED, AND BECAME CORIOLANUS, BEARER OF THIS GREAT NAME. SEND ME NOT HENCE WITHOUT RESULT, UNLESS YOU WOULD BEHOLD ME DEAD BY MY OWN HAND." THEREUPON SHE SIGHED ALOUD AND SHOWED HER BREASTS AND TOUCHED HER ABDOMEN, EXCLAIMING: "THIS BROUGHT YOU FORTH, MY CHILD, THESE REARED YOU UP." SHE, THEN, SAID THIS, AND HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN AND THE REST OF THE WOMEN JOINED IN THE LAMENT, SO THAT HE TOO WAS MOVED TO GRIEF. RECOVERING HIMSELF WITH DIFFICULTY HE ENFOLDED HIS MOTHER IN HIS ARMS AND AT THE SAME TIME KISSING HER REPLIED: "SEE, MOTHER, I YIELD TO YOU. YOURS IS THE VICTORY, AND TO YOU LET ALL ASCRIBE THIS FAVOR. FOR I CANNOT ENDURE EVEN TO SEE THEM, WHO AFTER RECEIVING SUCH GREAT BENEFITS AT MY[Pg 103] HANDS HAVE GIVEN ME SUCH A RECOMPENSE, NOR WILL I ENTER THE CITY. DO YOU KEEP THE COUNTRY INSTEAD OF ME, BECAUSE YOU HAVE SO WISHED IT, AND I WILL DEPART." HAVING SPOKEN THUS HE

WITHDREW. AND HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE RESTORATION, BUT RETIRED AMONG THE VOLSCI AND THERE AT AN ADVANCED AGE DEPARTED THIS LIFE.

VII, 17.—Now the tribunes demanded that some land acquired by the Romans from the enemy be apportioned among the people, and as a result of their action much damage was incurred by the citizens both from the enemy and from one another. **FRAG. 19**¹FOR THE NOBLES BEING UNABLE TO RESTRAIN THEM IN ANY OTHER WAY STIRRED UP PURPOSELY WARS AFTER WARS, IN ORDER THAT BEING BUSIED THEREWITH THEY MIGHT NOT DISTURB THEMSELVES ABOUT THE LAND. But after a time some persons began to suspect what was going on, and would not permit both of the consuls (or prætors) to be appointed by the nobles, but themselves desired to choose one of them from the patricians. Upon effecting this they selected Spurius Furius, and campaigning with him accomplished with enthusiasm all objects for which they had set out. But those who took the field with his colleague, Fabius Cæso, not only displayed no energy, but abandoned their camp, came to the city, and raised a tumult until the Etruscans, learning of the affair, assailed them. Even then, moreover, they did not leave the city until some of the tribunes came to an agreement with the nobles. Still, they fought vigorously and destroyed many of the enemy, and not a few of their own number also were killed. One of the consuls like[Pg 104]wise fell,—Manlius^[8]: the populace chose Manlius^[9] prætor for the third time.

Again was a war waged against them by the Etruscans. And when the Romans were in dejection and at a loss to know how they should withstand the enemy, the Fabii came to their help. **FRAG. 20**¹THEY, THREE HUNDRED AND SIX IN NUMBER, WHEN THEY SAW THAT THE ROMANS WERE DEJECTED, were not following profitable counsels, and were on all points in desperation, took upon themselves the burden of the war against the Etruscans, exhibiting readiness to carry on the conflict by themselves with their persons and with their wealth. They occupied and fortified an advantageous position from which as a base they harried the entire hostile domain, since the Etruscans would not venture to engage in combat with them, or, if they ever did join issue, were decisively defeated. But, upon the accession of allies, the Etruscans laid an ambushade in a wooded spot: the Fabii, being masters of the whole field, assailed them without precaution, **FRAG. 20**²fell into the snare, were surrounded and all massacred. And their race would have entirely disappeared, had not one of them because of his youth been left at home, in whose descendants the family later attained renewed renown.

After the Fabii had been destroyed as related the Romans received rough treatment at the hands of the Etruscans. Subsequently they concluded a peace with the enemy, but turning against one another committed[Pg 105] many deeds of outrage, the populace not even refraining from attack upon the prætors. They beat their assistants and shattered their fasces and made the prætors themselves submit to investigation on every pretext, great and small. They actually planned to throw Appius Claudius into prison in the very midst of his term of office, inasmuch as he persistently opposed them at every point and

had decimated the partners of his campaign after their giving way before the Volsci in battle. Now decimation was the following sort of process. When the soldiers had committed any grave offence the leader told them off in groups of ten and taking one man of each ten (who had drawn the lot) he would punish him by death. At Claudius's retirement from office the popular party straightway brought him to trial; and though they failed to condemn him, they forced him, by postponing their vote, to commit suicide. And among the measures introduced by some of the tribunes to the prejudice of the patrician interests was one permitting the populace to convene separately, and without interference from the patricians to deliberate upon and transact as much business as they pleased. They also ordained that, if any one for any cause should have a penalty imposed upon him by the prætors, the populace might thereupon have the case appealed to them and decide it. And they increased the number of ædiles and of tribunes, in order to have a large body of persons to act as their representatives.

FRAG. 21¹DURING THE PROGRESS OF THESE EVENTS THE PATRICIANS OPENLY TOOK SCARCELY ANY RETALIATORY MEASURES, EXCEPT IN A FEW CASES, BUT SECRETLY SLAUGHTERED A[Pg 106] NUMBER OF THE BOLDEST SPIRITS. NEITHER THIS, HOWEVER, NOR THE FACT THAT ON ONE OCCASION NINE TRIBUNES WERE DELIVERED TO THE FLAMES BY THE POPULACE SEEMED TO RESTRAIN THE REST. NOT ONLY WERE THOSE WHO SUBSEQUENTLY HELD THE TRIBUNESHIP NOT CALMED, BUT ACTUALLY THEY WERE THE RATHER EMBOLDENED. **FRAG. 21**²THIS WAS THE CONDITION INTO WHICH THE PATRICIANS BROUGHT THE POPULACE. AND THEY WOULD NOT OBEY THE SUMMONS TO GO ON A CAMPAIGN, THOUGH THE FOE ASSAILED, UNLESS THEY SECURED THE OBJECTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE STRIVING, AND IF THEY EVER DID TAKE THE FIELD, THEY FOUGHT LISTLESSLY, UNLESS THEY HAD ACCOMPLISHED ALL THAT THEY DESIRED. HENCE MANY OF THE TRIBES LIVING CLOSE TO THEM, RELYING ON EITHER THE DISSENSION OF THEIR FOES OR THEIR OWN STRENGTH, RAISED THE STANDARD OF REVOLT. **FRAG. 22**¹AMONG THESE WERE ALSO THE ÆQUI, WHO, AFTER CONQUERING AT THIS TIME MARCUS MINUCIUS WHILE HE SERVED AS PRÆTOR, BECAME PRESUMPTUOUS. **FRAG. 22**²THOSE AT ROME, LEARNING THAT MINUCIUS HAD BEEN DEFEATED, CHOSE AS DICTATOR LUCIUS QUINCTIUS, WHO WAS A POOR MAN AND HAD DEVOTED HIS LIFE TO FARMING, BUT WAS DISTINGUISHED FOR HIS VALOR AND WISE MODERATION; AND HE LET HIS HAIR GROW IN CURLS, WHENCE HE WAS NAMED CINCINNATUS.[\[10\]](#) He, being selected as dictator, took the field that very day, used wariness as well as speed, and simultaneously with Minucius attacked the Æqui, killing very many of them and capturing the rest alive: the latter he led under the yoke and then released. This matter of the yoke I shall briefly describe. The Romans used to fix in the ground two poles (upright wooden beams, of course, with a space between them)[Pg 107] and across them they would lay another transverse beam; through the frame thus formed they led the captives naked. This conferred great distinction upon the side that conducted the operation but vast dishonor upon the side that endured it, so that some preferred to die rather than submit to any such treatment. Cincinnatus also captured a

city of theirs called Corvinum^[11] and returned: he removed Minucius from his prætorship because of his defeat, and himself resigned his office.

VII, 18.—The Romans, however, now got another war on their hands at home, in which their adversaries were composed of slaves and some exiles who moved unexpectedly by night and secured possession of the Capitol. This time, too, the multitude did not arm themselves for the fray till they had wrung some further concessions from the patricians. Then they assailed the revolutionists and overcame them, but lost many of their own men.

For these reasons, accordingly, and because of certain portents the Romans became sobered and dismissed their mutual grievances and voted to establish the rights of citizenship on a fairer basis. And they sent three men to Greece with an eye to the laws and the customs of the people there. Upon the return of the commission they abolished all the political offices, including that of the tribunes, and chose instead eight of the foremost men, and B.C. 451

(*a.u.* 303) designated Appius Claudius and Titus Genucius prætors with dictatorial powers for that one year. They empowered them to compile laws and further voted that no case could be appealed^[Pg 108] from them,—a latitude granted previously to none of the magistrates save the dictators. These men held sway each for a day, assuming by turns the dignity of rulership. They compiled laws and exposed the same to view in the Forum. These statutes being found pleasing to all were put before the people, and after receiving their ratification were inscribed on ten tablets; for all records that were deemed worthy of safekeeping used to be preserved on tablets.

B.C. 450

(*a.u.* 304) The above mentioned magistrates at the expiration of the year surrendered their office, but ten more chosen anew (for the overthrow of the State, as it almost seemed) came to grief. They all held sway at once on equal terms and chose from among the patricians some most brazen youths, through whom, as their agents, they committed many acts of violence. At last, toward the end of the year, they compiled a few additional statutes written upon two tablets, all of which were the product of their own individual judgment. From these not harmony, but greater disputes, were destined to fall to the lot of the Romans.

The so-called twelve tablets were thus created at that time. But besides doing this the lawgivers in question, when their year of office had expired, still maintained control of affairs, occupying the city by force; and they would not convene the senate nor the people, lest, if they came together, they should depose them. And when the Æqui and the Sabines now stirred up war against the Romans, these officials by arrangement with their adherents gained their object of hav^[Pg 109]ing the conduct of the wars entrusted to them. Of the decemvirate Servius Oppius and Appius Claudius remained at home: the other eight set out against the enemy.

Absolutely all **FRAG. 22**³THE INTERESTS, however, OF STATE AND CAMP ALIKE WERE THROWN INTO CONFUSION, AND HENCE CONTENTION AGAIN AROSE. The leaders of the force had invaded the land of the Sabines and sent a certain Lucius Sicius, who was accounted a strong tower in warfare and likewise one of the most prominent representatives of the populace, with companions, avowedly to seize a certain position; but they had the man slain by the party that had been sent out with him. The report was brought into camp that the man with others had been killed by the foe, and the soldiers went out to gather up the dead bodies. They found not one corpse belonging to the enemy but many of their own race, whom Sicius had killed in his own defence when they attacked him. And when they saw that the dead were lying all around him and had their faces turned toward him, they suspected what had been done and furthermore raised a tumult.—There was still another incident that had a bearing on the situation.

Lucius Virginius, a man of the people, had a daughter of surpassing beauty whom he intended to bestow in marriage upon Lucius Icilius,[\[12\]](#) a person of similar rank in society. For this maiden Claudius conceived a passion, and not otherwise able to attain[Pg 110] his ends he arranged with certain men to declare her a slave: he was to be the arbiter. The father of the girl accordingly came from the camp and pled his case. When Claudius had given sentence against her and the girl was delivered to those who had declared her a slave and no one came to the rescue, her father wild with grief took a cleaver and ended his daughter's life and, just as he was, rushed out to the soldiers. They, who had been previously far from tractable, were so wrought up that they straightway set out in haste against the city to find Claudius. And the rest, who had gone on a campaign against the Sabines, when they learned this abandoned their intrenchments, and, joining with the rest, set at their head twenty men, determined to accomplish something of importance. The remainder of the multitude in the city likewise espoused their cause and added to the tumult.

Meanwhile Claudius in terror had hidden himself and Oppius convened the senate; and sending to the populace he enquired what they wanted. They demanded that Lucius Valerius and Marcus Horatius, two of the senators who favored their cause, be sent to them, saying that through these men they would make their reply. Owing to the fear of the ten magistrates (for they were now all on the scene) that the people would employ the two as leaders against them they were not sent, whereupon the populace grew still more angry. As a consequence the senators were inspired with no slight fear and against the will of the magistrates they sent Valerius and Horatius to the people.[Pg 111] By this means a reconciliation was effected: the rioters were granted immunity for their acts, and the decemvirate was abolished; the annual magistracies, including that of tribunes, were restored with the same privileges as they had formerly enjoyed. Virginius was one of the magistrates appointed; and they cast into prison Oppius and Claudius (who committed suicide before their cases were investigated), and indicted, convicted, and banished the remainder of the board.

B.C.

449

(*a.u.* 305) VII, 19.—Now the consuls—it is said that this is the first time they were known as consuls, being previously called *prætors*; and they were Valerius and Horatius—both then and thereafter showed favor to the populace and strengthened their cause rather than that of the patricians. The patricians, though subdued, would not readily convene and did not put matters entirely in the power of the lower class, but granted the tribunes the right of practicing augury in their assemblies: nominally this was an honor and dignity for them, since from very ancient times this privilege had been accorded the patricians alone, but really it was a hindrance. The nobles intended that the tribunes and the populace should not accomplish easily everything they pleased, but should sometimes be prevented under this plea of augury. The patricians as well as the senate were displeased at the consuls, whom they regarded as favorable to the popular cause, and so did not vote a triumph to them—though each had won a war—and did not assign to each a day as had been the custom. The populace, however, both held a festival for two days and voted triumphal honors to the consuls.

[Pg 112]

(BOOK 6, BOISSEVAIN.)

B.C.

448

(*a.u.* 306) When the Romans thus fell into discord their adversaries took courage and came against them. It was in the following year, when Marcus Genucius and Gaius Curtius were consuls, that they turned against each other. The popular leaders desired to be consuls, since the patricians were in the habit of becoming tribunes by transference to their order, and the patricians clung tenaciously to the consular office. They indulged in many words and acts of violence against each other. But in order to prevent the populace from proceeding to greater extremities the nobles yielded to them the substance of authority though they would not relinquish the name; and in place of the consuls they named military tribunes in order that the honor of the title might not be sullied by contact with the vulgar throng. It was agreed that three military tribunes be chosen from each of the classes in place of the two consuls. However, the name of consul was not lost entirely, but sometimes consuls were appointed and at other times military tribunes. This, at all events, is the tradition that has come down of what took place, with the additional detail that the consuls nominated dictators, though their own powers were far inferior to those appertaining to that office, and even that the military tribunes likewise did so sometimes. It is further said that none of the military tribunes, though many of them won many victories, ever celebrated a triumph.

[Pg 113]

B.C.

447

(*a.u.* 307) It was in this way, then, that military tribunes came to be chosen at that time: censors were appointed in the following year, during the consulship of Barbatus and

Marcus Macrinus. Those chosen were Lucius Papirius and Lucius Sempronius. The reason for their election was that the consuls were unable, on account of the number of the people, to supervise them all; the duties now assigned to the censors had until that time been performed by the consuls as a part of their prerogatives. Two was the original number of the censors and they were taken from the patricians. They held office at first and at the last for five-year periods, but during the intervening time for three half-years; and they came to be greater than the consuls, though they had taken over only a part of their functions. They had the right to let the public revenues, to supervise roads and public buildings, to make complete records of each man's wealth, and to note and investigate the lives of the citizens, enrolling those deserving of praise in the tribes, in the equestrian order, or in the senate (as seemed to fit the case of each one), and similarly erasing from any class the names of those who were not right livers: this power was greater than all those now left to the consuls. They made declarations attested by oath, in regard to every one of their acts, that no such act was prompted by favor or by enmity but that their considerations and performances were both the result of an unbiased opinion of what was advantageous for the commonwealth. They convened the people when laws were to be introduced and for other purposes, and employed all the insignia of the greater offices save lictors. Such, at its inception, was

[Pg 114]the office of the censors. If any persons did not register their property and themselves in the census lists, the censors sold the property and the consuls the men. This arrangement held for a certain time, but later it was determined that a man once enrolled in the senate should be a senator for life and that his name should not be erased, unless one had been disgraced by being tried for the commission of a crime or was convicted of leading an evil life: the names of such persons were erased and others inscribed in their stead.

In the case of those who gave satisfaction in office principal honors were bestowed upon dictators, honors of the second rank upon censors, and third place was awarded to masters of horse. This system was followed without distinction, whether they were still in office or whether they had already laid it down. For if one descended from a greater office to an inferior one, he still kept the dignity of his former position intact. One particular man, whom they styled *principa* of the senate (he would be called *prokritos* by the Greeks) was preferred before all for the time that he was president (a person was not chosen for this position for life) and surpassed the rest in dignity, without wielding, however, any power.

VII, 20.—For a time they maintained peace with each other and with the adjacent tribes, but then a famine mastered them, so severe that some not able to endure the pangs of hunger threw themselves into the river, and they fell to quarreling. The one class blamed the prosperous as being at fault in the handling of the grain, and the other class blamed the poorer men for unwillingness to till the soil. **B.C. 439 (a.u. 315)**Spurius Mælius, a[Pg 115] wealthy knight, seeing this attempted to set up a

tyranny, and buying corn from the neighboring region he lowered the price of it for many and gave it free to many others. In this way he won the friendship of a great many and procured arms and guardsmen. And he would have gained control of the city, had not Minucius Augurinus, a patrician, appointed to have charge of the grain distribution and censured for the lack of grain, reported the proceeding to the senate. The senate on receiving the information nominated at once and at that very meeting Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, though past his prime (he was eighty years old), to be dictator. They spent the whole day sitting there, as if engaged in some discussion, to prevent news of their action from traveling abroad. By night the dictator had the knights occupy in advance the Capitol and the remaining points of vantage, and at dawn he sent to Mælius Gaius Servilius, master of the horse, to summon him pretendedly on some other errand. But as Mælius had some suspicions and delayed, Servilius fearing that he might be rescued by the populace—for they were already running together—killed the man either on his own responsibility or because ordered to do so by the dictator. At this the populace broke into a riot, but Quinctius harangued them and by providing them with grain and refraining from punishing or accusing any one else he stopped the riot.

Wars with various nations now assailed the Romans, in some of which they were victorious within a few days; but with the Etruscans they waged a long continued contest. Postumius conquered the Æqui and had captured a large city of theirs, but the soldiers[Pg 116] neither had had it turned over to them for pillage nor were awarded a share of the plunder when they requested it. Therefore they surrounded and slew the quæstor who was disposing of it, and when Postumius reprimanded them for this and strove to find the assassins, they killed him also. And they assigned to their own use not only the captive territory but all that at the time happened to be found in the public treasury. The uprising would have assumed even greater dimensions but for the fact that war against the Romans was renewed by the Æqui. Alarmed by this situation they became quiet, endured the punishment for the murders, which touched only a few, and took the field against their opponents, whom they engaged and conquered. For this achievement the nobles distributed the plunder among them, and voted pay first to the infantry and later also to the cavalry. Up to that time they were used to undertaking campaigns without pay and lived at their own expense; now for the first time they began to draw pay.

B.C.

408

(a.u. 346) A war arising between them and Veii, the Romans won frequent victories and reduced the foe to a state of siege as long as the latter fought with merely their own contingent: but when allies had been added to their force they came out against the Romans and defeated them. Meanwhile the lake situated close to the Alban Mount, which was shut in by the surrounding ridges and had no outlet, overflowed its banks during the siege of Veii to such an extent that it actually poured over the crests of the hills and went rushing[Pg 117] down to the sea. The Romans deeming that something

supernatural was certainly signified by this event sent to Delphi to consult the oracle about the matter. There was also among the population of Veii an Etruscan who was a soothsayer. The Pythian interpretation coincided with his; and both declared that the city would be captured when the overflowing water should not fall into the sea but be used up differently. The Romans consequently ordered several religious services to be performed. But the Pythian god did not specify to which of the divinities nor in what way they should offer these, and the Etruscan appeared to have the knowledge but would explain nothing. So the Romans who were stationed about the wall from which he was wont to issue to consort with them pretended friendliness toward him, permitted him to make himself at ease in every way, and allowed him to come to visit them without interference. Thus they succeeded in seizing him and forced him to give all the requisite information. According to the indications he furnished they offered sacrifices, tunneled the hill, and conducted the superfluous water by a secret canal into the plain, so that all of it was used up there and none ran down into the sea.

[Pg 118]

(BOOK 7, BOISSEVAIN.)

VII, 24.—A certain Marcus Fabius, a patrician, who chanced to be the father of two daughters, betrothed the elder to a Licinius Stolo, much inferior to him in rank, and married the younger to Sulpicius Rufus, who belonged to his own class. **FRAG. 27**¹NOW WHILE RUFUS WAS MILITARY TRIBUNE, ONCE WHEN HE WAS IN THE FORUM HIS WIFE HAD A VISIT FROM HER SISTER. AT THE ARRIVAL OF THE HUSBAND THE LICTOR, ACCORDING TO SOME ANCIENT CUSTOM, KNOCKED AT THE DOOR. THE CLATTER STARTLED THE WOMAN, WHO WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THIS PROCEDURE: THEREUPON BOTH HER SISTER AND THE OTHERS PRESENT BURST OUT LAUGHING AND SHE WAS MADE FUN OF AS A SIMPLETON. SHE TOOK THE MATTER AS A SERIOUS AFFRONT AND ROUSED HER HUSBAND TO CANVASS FOR OFFICE. Stolo, accordingly, incited by his wife, confided his intentions to Lucius Sextius, one of his peers, and both forced their way into the tribuneship; they thus overturned the good order of the State to such an extent that for four years the people had no rulers, since these men repeatedly obstructed the patrician elections. This state of affairs would have continued for a still longer time, had not news been brought that the Celtæ were again marching upon Rome.

VII, 25.—It is related that after this a disaster befell Rome. The level land between the Palatine and the Capitoline is said to have become suddenly a yawning gulf, without any preceding earthquake or other phenomenon such as usually takes place in nature on the occasion of such developments. For a long time the[Pg 119] chasm remained *in statu quo*, and neither closed up in the slightest degree nor was to be filled, albeit the Romans brought and cast into it masses of earth and stones and all sorts of other material. In the midst of the Romans' uncertainty an oracle was given them to the effect that the aperture could in no way be closed except they should throw into the chasm their best possession

and that which was the chief source of their strength: then the thing would cease, and the city should command power inextinguishable. Still the uncertainty remained unresolved, for the oracle was obscure. But Marcus Curtius, a patrician, young in years, of a remarkably beautiful appearance, powerful physique, and courageous spirit, conspicuous also for intelligence, comprehended the meaning of the oracle. He came forward before them all and addressed them, saying: "Why, Romans, convict the revelation of obscurity or ourselves of ignorance? We are the thing sought and debated. For nothing lifeless may be counted better than what has life, nor shall that which has comprehension and prudence and the adornment of speech fail of preference before what is uncomprehending, speechless and senseless. What should any one deem superior to Man to be cast into the earth-fissure, that therewith we might contract it? **FRAG. 28**²THERE IS NO MORTAL CREATURE EITHER BETTER OR STRONGER THAN MAN. FOR, IF ONE MAY SPEAK SOMEWHAT BOLDLY, MAN IS NAUGHT ELSE THAN A GOD WITH MORTAL BODY, AND A GOD NAUGHT ELSE THAN A MAN WITHOUT BODY AND THEREFORE IMMORTAL, and we are not far sundered from divine Power. This, to my mind, is the matter and I urge you also to adhere to this view. May no one think that I[Pg 120] shall have recourse to the lot or bid maiden or lad lose a life. I myself willingly bestow myself upon you, that you may send me this very day as herald and envoy to the cthonian gods, to be your representative and helper forever." At the close of these words Curtius proceeded to put on his armor and then mounted his horse. The rest grew mad with grief and mad with joy; they came flocking with adornments, and some adorned the man himself with them as a hero, and others threw some of them into the chasm. Scarcely had Curtius sprung into it fully mounted, when the earth-fissure was closed and no one ever again beheld either the chasm or Curtius. This is the way the story is related by the Romans. Should any person judge it fabulous and not to be credited, he has the right to pay no attention to it.

And again wars were waged against the Romans both by Gauls and by other nations, but they repelled all invaders, voting now for consuls, now for dictators. Whereupon somewhat of the following nature took place. Lucius Camillus was named dictator, as the Gauls were overrunning the environs of Rome. He proceeded against the barbarians with the intention of using up time and not risking the issue in conflict with men animated by desperation: he expected to exhaust them more easily and securely by the failure of provisions. And a Gaul challenged the Romans to furnish a champion for a duel. His opponent, accordingly, was Marcus Valerius, a military tribune, a grandson of the famous Maximus. The course of the battle was brilliant on both sides: the Roman excelled in cleverness and an unusual mastery of his art, and the Gaul in[Pg 121] strength and daring. It was regarded as still more marvelous that a crow lighted on the helmet of Valerius and cawing all the time made dashes at the barbarian, confusing his sight and impeding his onset until he finally received a finishing blow. The Gauls, consequently, indignant at being beaten by a bird, in a rage closed at once with the Romans and

suffered a severe defeat. From the incident of the crow's assistance Valerius obtained the further name of Corvinus.

Thereafter, as the armies began to grow insubordinate and a civil war threatened to break out, the insurgents were brought to terms by the enactment of laws that no one's name should be erased from the lists against his will, that any person who had served as tribune of the soldiers should not be centurion, that both of the consuls might belong to and be appointed from the people, and that the same man should not hold two offices at the same time nor hold the same office twice within ten years.

VII, 26.—Now the Latins, although under treaty with the Romans, revolted and provoked a conflict. They were filled with pride for the reason that they had an abundance of youthful warriors and were practiced in the details of warfare as a result of the constant campaigning with the Romans. The other side, understanding the situation, chose Torquatus consul for the third time and likewise Decius, and came out to meet them. They fought a fierce battle, each party thinking that that day was a precise test of their fortune and of their valor. A certain event seemed to give the battle added distinction. The consuls, seeing that[Pg 122] the Latins were equipped and spoke like the Romans, feared that some of the soldiers might make mistakes through not distinguishing their own and the hostile force with entire ease. Therefore they made proclamation to their men to observe instructions carefully and in no case to fight an isolated combat with any of the antagonists. Most observed this injunction, but the son of Torquatus, who was on the field among the cavalry and had been sent to reconnoitre the enemy's position, transgressed it not through wilfulness but rather through ambition. The leader of the Latin horse saw him approaching and challenged him to a championship contest; and when the youth would not accept the challenge on account of the notice that had been served, the other provoked him, saying: "Are you not the son of Torquatus? Do you not give yourself airs with your father's collar? Are you strong and courageous against those low-lived Gauls but fear us Latins? Where, then, do you find your right to rule? Why do you give orders to us as your inferiors?"—The Roman became frenzied with rage and readily forgot the injunction: he won the combat, and in high spirits conveyed the spoils to his father. The latter, after assembling the army, said: "Nobly you have fought, my child, and for this I will crown you. But because you did not observe the orders issued, though under obligation both as a son and as a soldier to yield obedience, **FRAG. 32**²FOR THIS REASON I SHALL EXECUTE YOU, THAT YOU MAY OBTAIN BOTH THE PRIZE FOR YOUR PROWESS AND THE PENALTY FOR YOUR DISOBEDIENCE." Having spoken these words[Pg 123] he at the same moment placed the garland on his head and cut off the very head that bore it.

Soon after, a dream that appeared to both consuls the same night, of identical import in each case, seemed to tell them that they should overcome the enemy, if one of the consuls should devote himself. Discussing the dream together in the daytime, they decided that it was of divine origin, and agreed that it must be obeyed. And they

disputed with each other, not as to which should be saved, but as to which of them preferably should devote himself: they even presented their arguments before the foremost men in camp. Finally they settled it that one should station himself on the right wing and the other on the left, and that whichever of those two divisions should be defeated, the consul stationed there should give up his life. There was so much rivalry between them in regard to the self-devotion that each of the consuls prayed that he might be defeated, in order to obtain the right to devote himself and the consequent glory. After joining battle with the Latins they carried on a closely contested fight for a long time, but finally Decius's wing gave way before the Latins a little. On perceiving this Decius devoted himself. Slipping off his armor he put on his purple-bordered clothing. Some say that in this costume he sprang upon a horse and rode toward the enemy and met his death at their hands, others that he was slain by a fellow-soldier of his own race. A short time after Decius had perished a decisive victory fell to the lot of the Romans and the Latins were all routed,[Pg 124] yet certainly not on account of the death of Decius. **FRAG. 32⁴**FOR HOW CAN YOU BELIEVE THAT FROM SUCH A DEATH OF ONE MAN SO GREAT A MULTITUDE OF HUMAN BEINGS WAS DESTROYED ON THE ONE SIDE AND ON THE OTHER WAS SAVED AND WON A CONSPICUOUS VICTORY? So the Latins in this way were defeated, **FRAG. 32⁶**AND TORQUATUS, THOUGH HE HAD KILLED HIS SON AND THOUGH HIS COLLEAGUE HAD LOST HIS LIFE, NEVERTHELESS CELEBRATED A TRIUMPH.

Once again did they subdue these very Latins, who had revolted, and they subjugated in battle other nations, employing now consuls and now dictators.

[Pg 125]

(BOOK 8, BOISSEVAIN.)

One of the latter was Lucius Papirius, also called Cursor from his physical condition (he was a very fleet runner) and on account of his practicing running. After this Papirius as dictator with Fabius Rullus as master of the horse was sent out against the Samnites and by defeating them compelled them to agree to such terms as he wished. But when he had resigned his leadership they again arose in arms. They were attacked anew by the dictator Aulus Cornelius, **FRAG. 33³**AND BEING DEFEATED MADE PROPOSALS OF PEACE TO THE MEN AT ROME. THEY SENT THEM ALL THE CAPTIVES THAT THEY HAD, AND ASCRIBED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR TO RUTULUS, A MAN OF INFLUENCE AMONG THEM. HIS BONES, SINCE HE ANTICIPATED THEM IN COMMITTING SUICIDE, THEY SCATTERED ABROAD. YET THEY DID NOT OBTAIN THEIR PEACE, BEING ACCOUNTED UNTRUSTWORTHY; BUT THE VICTORS, THOUGH ACCEPTING THE PRISONERS, VOTED FOR RELENTLESS WAR AGAINST THEM. **FRAG. 33⁴**THE ROMANS, THEN, EXPECTING IN THEIR EXTREME ARROGANCE THAT THEY SHOULD CAPTURE THEM ALL AT THE FIRST BLOW, SUCCUMBED TO A TERRIBLE DISASTER. THE SAMNITES, BEING BADLY FRIGHTENED AND THINKING THE REFUSAL TO MAKE PEACE A CALAMITY, FOUGHT WITH DESPERATION;

AND BY PLANTING AN AMBUSCADE IN A NARROW SPOT RATHER CLOSELY HEMMED IN BY HILLS THEY BOTH CAPTURED THE CAMP AND SEIZED ALIVE THE WHOLE FORCE OF THE ROMANS, ALL OF WHOM THEY SENT UNDER THE YOKE.—What the operation of the yoke was has already been described by me above.^[13]—How[Pg 126]ever, they killed not a man but took away their arms and horses and everything else they had save one garment, and released them thus stripped of possessions under an agreement that they should leave Samnite territory and be their allies on an equal footing. In order to insure the articles of the agreement being ratified also by the senate, they retained six hundred of the knights to serve as hostages.

The consuls Spurius Postumius and Tiberius Calvinus with their army immediately withdrew, and at night they and the most notable of the rest of the force entered Rome, while the remaining soldiers scattered through the country districts. **FRAG. 33**⁹THE MEN IN THE CITY ON HEARING OF THE EVENT DID NOT FIND IT POSSIBLE EITHER TO BE PLEASED AT THE SURVIVAL OF THEIR SOLDIERS OR TO BE DISPLEASED. WHEN THEY THOUGHT OF THE CALAMITY THEIR GRIEF WAS EXTREME, AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAD SUFFERED SUCH A REVERSE AT THE HANDS OF THE SAMNITES INCREASED THEIR GRIEF; WHEN THEY STOPPED TO REFLECT, HOWEVER, THAT IF IT HAD COME TO PASS THAT ALL HAD PERISHED, ALL THEIR INTERESTS WOULD HAVE BEEN ENDANGERED, THEY WERE REALLY PLEASED AT THE SURVIVAL OF THEIR OWN MEN. But concealing for a time their pleasure they went into mourning and carried on no business in the everyday fashion either at once or subsequently, as long as they had control of affairs. The consuls they deposed forthwith, chose others in their stead, and took counsel about the situation. And they determined not to accept the arrangement; but since it was impossible to take this action without throwing the responsibility upon the men who had conducted the negotiations, they hesitated on the one hand to con[Pg 127]demn the consuls and the rest who, associated with the latter in their capacity as holders of certain offices, had made the peace, and they hesitated on the other hand to acquit them, since by so doing they would bring the breach of faith home to themselves. Accordingly they made these very consuls participate in their deliberations and they asked Postumius first of all for his opinion, that he might state separately his sentiments touching his own case, and the shame of having disgrace attach to all of them be avoided. So he came forward and said that their acts ought not to be ratified by the senate and the people, **FRAG. 33**¹¹FOR THEY THEMSELVES HAD NOT ACTED OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL, BUT UNDER THE COMPULSION OF A NECESSITY which the enemy had brought upon them not through valor but through craft and ambushade. Now men who had practiced deception could not, if they were deceived in turn, have any just complaint against those who turned the tables on them. When he had finished saying this and considerable more of the same nature, the senate found itself at a loss how to act: but as Postumius and Calvinus took the burden of responsibility upon their own shoulders, it was voted that the agreements should not be ratified and that these men should be delivered up.

Both the consuls, therefore, and the remaining officials who had been present when oaths were taken were conducted back to Samnium. **FRAG. 33**¹⁴THE SAMNITES, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT ACCEPT THEM, BUT DEMANDED BACK ALL THE CAPTIVES, AND INVOKED THE GODS AND CONJURED THEM BY THE DIVINE POWER, AND FINALLY THEY DISMISSED THE MEN THAT HAD BEEN SURRENDERED. The Romans were glad enough to get them back, but were angry at the[Pg 128] Samnites WHOM THEY ATTACKED IN BATTLE AND VANQUISHED, AFTER WHICH THEY ACCORDED THEM A SIMILAR TREATMENT, FOR THEY SENT THEM UNDER THE YOKE IN TURN AND RELEASED THEM without inflicting any other injury. They also got possession of their own knights, who were being held by the Samnites as hostages and were unharmed.

VIII, 1.—After a long interval the Romans under the leadership of Gaius Junius were again warring with the Samnites, when they met with disaster. While Junius was pillaging the hostile territory, the Samnites conveyed their possessions into the Avernian^[14] woods, so-called from the fact that on account of the closeness of the trees no bird flies into them. Being there ensconced they set out some herds without herdsmen or guards and quietly sent some pretended deserters who guided the Romans to the booty apparently lying at their disposal. But when the latter had entered the wood, the Samnites surrounded them and did not cease from slaughter till they were completely tired out. And though the Samnites fought on many other occasions against the Romans and were defeated, they would not be quiet, but having acquired the Gauls, besides others, as allies, they made preparations to march upon Rome itself. The Romans, when they learned of it, fell into alarm, for their original inclination to do so was augmented by many portents. On the Capitol blood is reported to have issued for three days from the altar of Jupiter, together with honey on one day, and milk on a second—if anybody can believe it: and in[Pg 129] the Forum a bronze statue of Victory set upon a stone pedestal was found standing upon the ground below, without any one's having moved it; and, as it happened, it was facing in that direction from which the Gauls were already approaching. This of itself was enough to terrify the populace, who were even more dismayed by ill-omened interpretations published by the seers. However, a certain Manius, by birth an Etruscan, encouraged them by declaring that Victory, even if she had descended, had gone forward, and being now settled more firmly on the ground indicated to them mastery in the war. Accordingly, many sacrifices, too, should be offered to the gods; for their altars, and particularly those on the Capitol, where they sacrifice thank-offerings for victory, were regularly stained with blood in the midst of their successes and not in their disasters. From these developments, then, he persuaded them to expect some fortunate outcome, but from the honey to expect disease (because invalids crave it) and from the milk famine; for they should encounter so great a scarcity of provisions as to seek for food of native growth and pasturage.

Manius, then, interpreted the omens in this way, **FRAG. 33**²²AND AS HIS PROPHECY TURNED OUT TO BE CORRECT, HE GAINED THEREAFTER A REPUTATION FOR SKILL AND

FOREKNOWLEDGE IN ALL MATTERS. Now Volumnius was ordered to make war upon the Samnites; Fabius Maximus Rullus and Publius Decius were chosen consuls and were sent to withstand the Gauls and the other warriors in the Gallic contingent. They, having come with speed to Etruria, saw the camp of Appius, which was fortified by a[Pg 130] double palisade; and they pulled up the stakes and carried them off, instructing the soldiers to place their hope of safety in their weapons. So they joined battle with the enemy. Meanwhile a wolf in pursuit of a deer had invaded the space between the two armies and darting toward the Romans passed through their ranks. This encouraged them, for they regarded themselves as having a bond of union with him, since, according to tradition, a she-wolf had reared Romulus. But the deer ran to the other side and was struck down, thus leaving to *them* fear and the issue of disaster. When the armies collided, Maximus quite easily conquered the foes opposed to him, but Decius was defeated. And recalling the self-devotion of his father, undertaken on account of the dream, he likewise devoted himself, though without giving anybody any information about his act. Scarcely had he let himself be slain, when the men ranged at his side, partly through shame at his deed (feeling that he had perished voluntarily for them) and partly in the hopes of certain victory as a result of this occurrence, checked their flight and nobly withstood their pursuers. At this juncture Maximus, too, assailed the latter in the rear and slaughtered vast numbers. The survivors took to their heels and were annihilated. Fabius Maximus then burned the corpse of Decius together with the spoils and made a truce with such as asked for peace.

The following year Atilius Regulus again waged war with the Samnites. And for a time they carried on an[Pg 131] evenly contested struggle, but eventually, after the Samnites had won a victory, the Romans conquered them in turn, took them captive, led them beneath the yoke, and so released them. **FRAG. 33**²³THE SAMNITES, ENRAGED AT WHAT HAD OCCURRED, RESORTED TO DESPERATE MEASURES WITH THE INTENTION OF EITHER CONQUERING OR BEING UTTERLY DESTROYED, THREATENING WITH DEATH HIM WHO SHOULD REMAIN AT HOME. So these invaded Campania: but the consuls ravaged Samnium, since it was destitute of soldiers, and captured a few cities. Therefore the Samnites abandoning Campania made haste to reach their own land; and having come into hostile collision with one of the consuls they were defeated by a trick and in their flight met with terrible reverses, losing their camp and in addition the fortress to the assistance of which they were advancing. The consul celebrated a triumph and devoted to public uses the goods gathered from the spoils. The other consul made a campaign against the Etruscans and reduced them in short order: he then levied upon them contributions of grain and money, of which he distributed a part to the soldiers and deposited the rest in the treasuries.

However, there befell a mighty pestilence, and the Samnites and Falisci began to bestir themselves; they entertained a contempt for the Romans both on account of the disease and because, since no war menaced, they had chosen the consuls not on grounds of

excellence. The Romans, ascertaining the situation, sent out Carvilius along with Junius Brutus, and with Quintus Fabius his father Rullus Maximus, as subcommanders or lieutenants. Brutus worsted the Falisci and[Pg 132] plundered their possessions as well as those of the other Etruscans: Fabius marched out of Rome before his father and pushed rapidly forward when he learned that the Samnites were plundering Campania. Falling in with some scouts of theirs and seeing them quickly retire he got the impression that all the enemy were at that point and believed they were in flight. Accordingly, in his hurry to come to blows with them before his father should arrive, in order that the success might appear to be his own and not his elder's, he went ahead with a careless formation. Thus he encountered a compact body of foes and would have been utterly destroyed, had not night intervened. Many of his men died also after that with no physician or relative to attend them, because they had hastened on far ahead of the baggage carriers in the expectation of immediate victory. Of a surety they would have perished on the following day but for the fact that the Samnites, thinking Fabius's father to be near, felt afraid and withdrew.

FRAG. 33²⁴THOSE IN THE CITY ON HEARING THIS BECAME TERRIBLY ANGRY, SUMMONED THE CONSUL, AND WANTED TO PUT HIM ON TRIAL. BUT THE OLD MAN HIS FATHER BY ENUMERATING HIS OWN AND HIS ANCESTORS' BRAVE DEEDS, BY PROMISING THAT HIS SON SHOULD MAKE NO RECORD THAT WAS UNWORTHY OF THEM, AND BY URGING HIS SON'S YOUTH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE MISFORTUNE, IMMEDIATELY ABATED THEIR WRATH. JOINING HIM IN THE CAMPAIGN HE CONQUERED THE SAMNITES IN BATTLE, CAPTURED THEIR CAMP, RAVAGED THEIR COUNTRY, AND DROVE AWAY GREAT BOOTY. A PART OF IT HE DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USES AND A PART HE ACCORDED TO THE SOLDIERS. FOR THESE REASONS THE ROMANS EXTOLLED[Pg 133] HIM AND ORDERED THAT HIS SON ALSO SHOULD COMMAND FOR THE FUTURE WITH CONSULAR POWERS AND STILL EMPLOY HIS FATHER AS LIEUTENANT. THE LATTER MANAGED AND ARRANGED EVERYTHING FOR HIM, SPARING HIS OLD AGE NOT A WHIT, YET HE DID NOT LET IT BE SEEN THAT HE WAS EXECUTING THE BUSINESS ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY, BUT MADE THE GLORY OF HIS EXPLOITS ATTACH TO HIS CHILD.

FRAG. 37^{VIII, 2.}—AFTER THIS, WHEN THE TRIBUNES MOVED AN ANNULMENT OF DEBTS, THE PEOPLE, SINCE THIS WAS NOT YIELDED BY THE LENDERS AS WELL, FELL INTO TURMOIL: and their turbulent behavior was not quieted until foes came against the city.

[Pg 134]

(BOOK 9, BOISSEVAIN.)

Those to begin the wars were the Tarentini, **FRAG. 39¹**WHO HAD ASSOCIATED WITH THEMSELVES THE ETRUSCANS AND GAULS AND SAMNITES AND SEVERAL OTHER TRIBES. These allies the Romans engaged and defeated in various battles, with different consuls on different occasions, but the Tarentini, although they had themselves been

the authors of the war, nevertheless did not yet openly present an imposing array in battle. **FRAG. 39**³NOW LUCIUS VALERIUS WHILE ADMIRAL WANTED TO ANCHOR WITH HIS TRIREMES OFF TARENTUM (BEING ON HIS WAY TO A PLACE WHITHER HE HAD BEEN DESPATCHED WITH THEM), FOR HE DEEMED THE COUNTRY FRIENDLY. **FRAG. 39**⁴BUT THE TARENTINI, OWING TO A GUILTY SENSE OF THEIR OWN OPERATIONS, SUSPECTED THAT VALERIUS WAS SAILING AGAINST THEM, AND IN A PASSION SET SAIL LIKEWISE AND ATTACKING HIM WHEN HE WAS EXPECTING NO HOSTILE ACT SENT HIM TO THE BOTTOM ALONG WITH MANY OTHERS. OF THE CAPTIVES THEY IMPRISONED SOME AND PUT OTHERS TO DEATH. WHEN THE ROMANS HEARD OF THIS, THEY WERE INDIGNANT, TO BE SURE, BUT NEVERTHELESS DESPATCHED ENVOYS UPBRAIDING THEM AND DEMANDING SATISFACTION. THE OFFENDERS NOT ONLY FAILED TO VOUCHSAFE THEM ANY DECENT ANSWER, BUT ACTUALLY JEERED AT THEM, GOING SO FAR AS TO SOIL THE CLOTHING OF LUCIUS POSTUMIUS, THE HEAD OF THE EMBASSY. AT THIS AN UPROAR AROSE AND THE TARENTINI INDULGED IN CONTINUED GUFFAWS. BUT POSTUMIUS CRIED: "LAUGH ON, LAUGH ON WHILE YOU MAY! FOR LONG WILL BE THE PERIOD OF YOUR WEEPING, WHEN YOU SHALL WASH THIS GARMENT CLEAN WITH YOUR BLOOD." [Pg 135]

Upon the return of the envoys the Romans, learning what had been done, were grieved and voted that Lucius Æmilius the consul make a campaign against the Tarentini. He advanced close to Tarentum and sent them favorable propositions, thinking that they would choose peace on fair terms. Now they were at variance among themselves in their opinions. **FRAG. 39**⁶?The elderly and well-to-do were anxious for peace, but those who were youthful and who had little or nothing were for war. The younger generation had its way. Being timid for all that they planned to invite Pyrrhus of Epirus to form an alliance, and sent to him envoys and gifts. Æmilius, learning this, proceeded to pillage and devastate their country. They made sorties but were routed, so that the Romans ravaged their country with impunity and got possession of some strongholds. Æmilius showed much consideration for those taken prisoners and liberated some of the more influential, and the Tarentini, accordingly, filled with admiration for his kindness, were led to hope for reconciliation and so chose as leader with full powers Agis, who was of kindred to the Romans. Scarcely had he been elected when Cineas, sent ahead by Pyrrhus, planted himself in the pathway of negotiations. **FRAG. 40**¹FOR PYRRHUS, KING OF THE SO-CALLED EPIRUS, SURPASSED EVERYBODY THROUGH NATURAL CLEVERNESS AND THROUGH THE INFLUENCE AND EXPERIENCE BESTOWED BY EDUCATION; AND HE HAD MADE THE LARGER PART OF HELLAS HIS OWN, PARTLY BY BENEFITS AND PARTLY BY FEAR. **FRAG. 40**²ACCORDINGLY, CHANCE HAVING THROWN THE ENVOYS OF THE TARENTINI IN HIS WAY, HE DEEMED THE ALLIANCE A PIECE OF GOOD LUCK. FOR A CONSIDERABLE [Pg 136] TIME HE HAD HAD HIS EYE ON SICILY AND CARTHAGE AND SARDINIA, BUT NEVERTHELESS HE SHRANK FROM PERSONALLY TAKING THE INITIATIVE IN HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE ROMANS. He announced that he would lead the Tarentini, but in order that the motive of his declaration might not be suspected (for reasons

indicated) he stated that he should return home without delay, and insisted upon a clause being added to the agreement to the effect that he should not be detained by them in Italy further than actual need required. After settling this agreement he detained the majority of the envoys as hostages, giving out that he wanted them to help him get the armies ready: a few of them together with Cineas he sent in advance with troops. As soon as they arrived the Tarentini took courage, gave up their attempted reconciliation with the Romans, and deposing Agris from his leadership elected one of the envoys leader. Shortly afterward Milo, sent by Pyrrhus with a force, took charge of their acropolis and personally superintended the manning of their wall. The Tarentini were glad at this, feeling that they did not have to do guard duty or undergo any other troublesome labor, and they sent regular supplies of food to the men and consignments of money to Pyrrhus.

Æmilius for a time held his ground, but when he perceived that the Pyrrhic soldiers had come, and recognized his inability on account of the winter to maintain an opposition, he set out for Apulia. The Tarentini laid an ambush at a narrow passage through which he was obliged to go, and by their arrows, javelins and[Pg 137] slingshots rendered progress impossible for him. But he put at the head of his line their captives whom he was conveying. Fear fell upon the Tarentini that they might destroy their own men instead of the Romans, and they ceased their efforts.

Now Pyrrhus set off, **FRAG. 40**⁴NOT EVEN AWAITING THE COMING OF SPRING, taking a large, picked army, and twenty elephants, beasts never previously beheld by the Italians. Hence the latter were invariably filled with alarm and astonishment. While crossing the Ionian Sea he encountered a storm and lost many soldiers of his army: the remainder were scattered by the violent waters. Only with difficulty, then, and by land travel did he reach Tarentum. He at once impressed those in their prime into service alongside of his own soldiers so as to make sure that they should not be led, by having a separate company, to think of rebellion; he closed the theatre, presumably on account of the war and to prevent the people from gathering there and setting on foot any uprising; also he forbade them to assemble for banquets and revels, and ordered the youth to practice in arms instead of spending all day in the market-place. When some, indignant at this, left the ranks, he stationed guards from his own contingent so that no one could leave the city. The inhabitants, oppressed by these measures, and by supplying food, compelled as they were, too, to receive the guardsmen into their houses, repented, since they found in Pyrrhus only a master, not an ally. He, fearing for these reasons that they might lean to the Roman cause, took note of all[Pg 138] the men who had any ability as politicians or could dominate the populace and sent them one after another to Epirus to his son on various excuses; occasionally, however, he would quietly assassinate them instead. A certain Aristarchus, who was accounted one of the noblest of the Tarentini and was a most persuasive speaker, he made his boon companion to the end that this man should be suspected by the people of having the interests of Pyrrhus at heart. When, however,

he saw that he still had the confidence of the throng, he gave him an errand to Epirus. Aristarchus, not daring to dispute his behest, set sail, but went to Rome.

VIII, 3.—Such was the behavior of Pyrrhus toward the Tarentini. **FRAG. 40⁸**THOSE IN ROME LEARNING THAT PYRRHUS HAD COME TO TARENTUM WERE SMITTEN WITH TERROR BECAUSE THE ITALIAN STATES HAD BEEN SET AT ENMITY WITH THEM AND BECAUSE HE WAS REPORTED TO BE WITHOUT DOUBT A GOOD WARRIOR AND TO HAVE A FORCE THAT WAS BY NO MEANS DESPICABLE AS AN ADVERSARY. So they proceeded to enlist soldiers and to gather money and to distribute garrisons among the allied cities to prevent them from likewise revolting; and learning that some were already stirred with sedition they punished the principal men in them. A handful of those from Præneste were brought to Rome late in the afternoon and thrown into the treasury for security. Thereby a certain oracle was fulfilled for the Romans. For an oracle had told them once that these people should occupy the Roman treasure-house. The oracle, then, resulted this way: the men lost their lives.

Valerius Lavinius was despatched against Pyrrhus, the Tarentini, and the rest of their associates, but a[Pg 139] part of the army was retained in the city. As for Lavinius, he at once set out on his march so that he might carry on the war as far as possible from his own territory. He hoped to frighten Pyrrhus by showing the latter those men advancing against him of their own accord whom he had thought to besiege. In the course of his journey he seized a strong strategic point in the land of the Lucanians, and he left behind a force in Lucania to hinder the people from giving aid to his opponents.

Pyrrhus on learning of Lavinius's approach made a start before the latter came in sight, established a camp, and was desirous of using up time while waiting for allies to join. He sent a haughty letter to Lavinius with the design of overawing him. The writing was couched thus: "King Pyrrhus to Lavinius, Greeting. I learn that you are leading an army against Tarentum. Send it away, therefore, and come yourself to me with few attendants. For I will judge between you, if you have any blame to impute to each other, and I will compel the party at fault, however unwilling, to grant justice." Lavinius wrote the following reply to Pyrrhus: "You seem to me, Pyrrhus, to have been quite daft when you set yourself up as judge between the Tarentini and us before rendering to us an account of your crossing over into Italy at all. I will come, therefore, with all my army and will exact the appropriate recompense both from the Tarentini and from you. What use can I have for nonsense and palaver, when I can stand trial in the court of Mars, our progenitor?" After sending such an answering despatch he hurried on and pitched camp, leaving the[Pg 140] stream of the river at that point between them. Having apprehended some scouts he showed them his troops and after telling them he had more of them, many times that number, he sent them back. Pyrrhus, struck with alarm by this, was not desirous of fighting because some of the allies had not yet joined his force, and he was constantly hoping that provisions would fail the Romans while they delayed on hostile soil. Lavinius, too, reckoned on this and was eager to join issue. As the soldiers had

become terrified at the reputation of Pyrrhus and on account of the elephants, he called them together and delivered a speech containing many exhortations to courage; then he busily prepared to close with Pyrrhus, willing or unwilling. The latter had no heart to fight, but in order to avoid an appearance of fearing the Romans he also in person addressed his own men, inciting them to the conflict. Lavinius tried to cross the river opposite the camp, but was prevented. So he retired and himself remained in position with his infantry, but sent the cavalry off (apparently on some marauding expedition) with injunctions to march some distance and then make the attempt. In this way both they assailed the enemy unexpectedly in the rear, and Lavinius, in the midst of the foe's confusion, crossed the river and took part in the battle. Pyrrhus came to the aid of his own men, who were in flight, but lost his horse by a wound and was thought by them to have been killed. Then, the one side being dejected and the other scornfully elated, their actions were correspondingly altered. He became[Pg 141] aware of this and gave his clothing, which was more striking than that of the rest, to Megacles, bidding him put it on and ride about in all directions to the end that thinking him safe his opponents might be brought to fear and his followers to feel encouragement. As for himself, he put on an ordinary uniform and encountered the Romans with his full army, save the elephants, and by bringing assistance to the contestants wherever they were in trouble he did his supporters a great deal of good. At first, then, for a large part of the day they fought evenly; but when a man killed Megacles, thinking to have killed Pyrrhus and creating this impression in the minds of the rest, the Romans gained vigor and their opponents began to give way. **FRAG. 40**¹²PYRRHUS, NOTING WHAT WAS TAKING PLACE, CAST OFF HIS CAP AND WENT ABOUT WITH HIS HEAD BARE; AND THE BATTLE TOOK AN OPPOSITE TURN. Seeing this, Lavinius, who had horsemen in hiding somewhere, outside the battle, ordered them to attack the enemy in the rear. In response to this Pyrrhus, as a device to meet it, raised the signal for the elephants. Then, indeed, at the sight of the animals, which was out of all common experience, at their bloodcurdling trumpeting, and at the clatter of arms which their riders, seated in the towers, made, both the Romans themselves became panic stricken and their horses, in a frenzy, either shook off their riders or bolted, carrying them away. Disheartened at this the Roman army was turned to flight and in their rout some soldiers were destroyed by the men in the towers on the elephants' backs, and others by the beasts themselves, which with their trunks and horns (or teeth?) took the lives of many and crushed and trampled under foot no less. The cavalry, following after, slew many; not one, indeed, would have been left, had not an elephant been wounded, and by its own struggles as a result of the wound as well as by its trumpeting thrown the rest into confusion. Only this restrained Pyrrhus from pursuit and only in this way did the Romans manage to cross the river and make their escape into an Apulian city. Many of Pyrrhus's soldiers and officers alike fell, so that **FRAG. 40**¹³WHEN CERTAIN MEN CONGRATULATED HIM ON HIS VICTORY, HE SAID; "IF WE EVER CONQUER AGAIN IN LIKE FASHION, WE SHALL BE RUINED." THE ROMANS,

HOWEVER, HE ADMIRERD EVEN IN THEIR DEFEAT, DECLARING: "I SHOULD ALREADY HAVE MASTERED THE WHOLE INHABITED WORLD, WERE I KING OF THE ROMANS."

FRAG. 40¹⁴PYRRHUS, ACCORDINGLY, ACQUIRED A GREAT REPUTATION FOR HIS VICTORY AND MANY CAME OVER TO HIS SIDE: THE ALLIES ALSO ESPOUSED HIS CAUSE. THESE HE REBUKED SOMEWHAT ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR TARDINESS, BUT GAVE THEM A SHARE OF THE SPOIL. VIII, 4.—The men of Rome felt grief at the defeat, but they sent an army to Lavinium; and they summoned Tiberius from Etruria and put the city under guard when they learned that Pyrrhus was hastening against it. Lavinium, however, as soon as he had cured his own followers of their wounds and had collected the scattered, the reinforcements from Rome now having arrived, followed on the track of Pyrrhus and harassed him. Finding out that the king was ambitious to capture Capua he occupied it in advance and guarded it. Disappointed there Pyrrhus set out for Neapolis. Since[Pg 143] he developed no power to accomplish anything at this place either and was in haste to occupy Rome, he passed on through Etruria with the object of winning that people also to his cause. He learned that they had made a treaty with the Romans and that Tiberius was moving to meet him face to face. (Lavinium was dogging his footsteps.) **FRAG. 40¹⁹**A DREAD SEIZED HIM OF BEING CUT OFF ON ALL SIDES BY THEM WHILE HE WAS IN UNFAMILIAR REGIONS and he would advance no farther. **FRAG. 40²⁰**WHEN, AS HE WAS RETREATING AND HAD REACHED THE VICINITY OF CAMPANIA, LAVINIUS CONFRONTED HIM AND THE LATTER'S ARMY WAS MUCH LARGER THAN IT WAS BEFORE, HE DECLARED THAT THE ROMAN TROOPS WHEN CUT TO PIECES GREW WHOLE AGAIN, HYDRA-FASHION. AND HE MADE PREPARATIONS IN HIS TURN, BUT DID NOT COME TO THE ISSUE OF BATTLE. He had ordered his own soldiers before the shock of conflict, in order to terrify the Romans, to smite their shields with their spears and cry aloud while the trumpeters and the elephants raised a united blare. But when the other side raised a much greater shout, actually scaring the followers of Pyrrhus, he no longer wanted to come to close quarters, but retired, as if he found the omens bad. And he came to Tarentum. **FRAG. 40²¹**THITHER CAME ROMAN ENVOYS TO TREAT IN BEHALF OF THE CAPTIVES,—FABRICIUS AMONG OTHERS. THESE HE ENTERTAINED LAVISHLY AND SHOWED THEM HONOR, EXPECTING THAT THEY WOULD CONCLUDE A TRUCE AND MAKE TERMS AS THE DEFEATED PARTY. **FRAG. 40²²**FABRICIUS ASKED THAT HE MIGHT GET BACK THE MEN CAPTURED IN BATTLE FOR SUCH RANSOM AS SHOULD BE PLEASING TO BOTH. PYRRHUS, QUITE DUMFOUNDED BECAUSE THE MAN DID NOT SAY THAT[Pg 144] HE WAS ALSO COMMISSIONED TO TREAT ABOUT PEACE, TOOK COUNSEL PRIVATELY WITH HIS FRIENDS, AS WAS HIS WONT, ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE CAPTIVES, BUT ALSO ABOUT THE WAR AND HOW HE SHOULD CONDUCT IT. Milo advised neither returning the captives nor making a truce, but overcoming all remaining resistance by war, since the Romans were already defeated: Cineas, however, gave advice just the opposite of his; he approved of surrendering the captives without price and sending envoys and money to Rome for the purpose of obtaining an armistice and peace. **FRAG. 40²³**TO HIS DECISION DID THE REST ALSO CLEAVE, AND PYRRHUS, TOO,

CHANCED TO BE OF THIS MIND. HAVING CALLED THE AMBASSADORS, THEREFORE, HE SAID: "NOT WILLINGLY, ROMANS, DID I LATELY MAKE WAR UPON YOU, AND I HAVE NO WISH TO WAR AGAINST YOU NOW. IT WAS MY DESIRE TO BECOME YOUR FRIEND. WHEREFORE I RELEASE TO YOU THE CAPTIVES WITHOUT RANSOM AND ASK THE PRIVILEGE OF MAKING PEACE."

FRAG. 40²⁴THESE WORDS HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE ENVOYS AS A WHOLE AND HAD EITHER GIVEN OR FURNISHED THEM PROMISES OF MONEY, BUT IN CONVERSATION WITH FABRICIUS ALONE HE SAID: "I WOULD GLADLY BECOME A FRIEND TO ALL ROMANS, BUT MOST OF ALL TO YOU. I SEE THAT YOU ARE AN EXCELLENT MAN AND I ASK YOU TO HELP ME IN GETTING PEACE." WITH THESE WORDS HE ATTEMPTED TO BESTOW UPON HIM A NUMBER OF GIFTS. BUT FABRICIUS SAID: "I COMMEND YOU FOR DESIRING PEACE, AND I WILL EFFECT IT FOR YOU, IF IT SHALL PROVE TO OUR ADVANTAGE. FOR YOU WILL NOT ASK ME, A MAN WHO, AS YOU SAY, PRETENDS TO UPRIGHTNESS, TO DO ANYTHING AGAINST MY COUNTRY. NAY, I WOULD NOT EVEN ACCEPT ANY OF THESE THINGS WHICH YOU ARE FAINT TO GIVE. I ASK YOU, THEREFORE,[Pg 145] WHETHER YOU IN VERY TRUTH REGARD ME AS A REPUTABLE MAN OR NOT. IF I AM A SCOUNDREL, HOW IS IT THAT YOU DEEM ME WORTHY OF GIFTS? IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, I AM A MAN OF HONOR, HOW CAN YOU BID ME ACCEPT THEM? BE THEN ASSURED THAT I HAVE VERY MANY POSSESSIONS, THAT I AM SATISFIED WITH WHAT I NOW HAVE AND FEEL NO NEED OF MORE. YOU, HOWEVER, EVEN IF YOU ARE EVER SO RICH, ARE IN UNSPEAKABLE POVERTY. FOR YOU WOULD NOT HAVE CROSSED OVER TO THIS LAND, LEAVING BEHIND EPIRUS AND THE REST OF YOUR POSSESSIONS, IF YOU HAD BEEN CONTENT WITH THEM AND WERE NOT REACHING OUT FOR MORE."

After this conversation had taken place as recounted, the envoys took the captives and departed. Pyrrhus despatched Cineas to Rome with a large amount of gold coin and women's apparel of every description, so that even if some of the men should resist, their wives, at least, won by the appeal of the finery, might make them share in the prostitution of principles. Cineas on coming to the city did not seek an audience with the senate, but lingered about, alleging now one reason, now another. He was visiting the houses of leading men and by his conversation and gifts was slowly extending his influence over them. When he had won the attachment of a number, he entered the senate-chamber and spoke, saying; "King Pyrrhus offers as his defence the fact that he came not to make war upon you, but to reconcile the Tarentini, and in answer to their entreaties. Indeed, he has released your prisoners, waiving ransom, and though he might have ravaged your country and assaulted your city, he requests to be en[Pg 146]rolled among your friends and allies, hoping to gain much assistance from you and to render you still more and greater benefits in return."

Thereupon the greater part of the senators evinced pleasure because of the gifts and because of the captives: however, they made no reply, but went on deliberating for several days more as to the proper course to pursue. There was a deal of talk, but the

disposition to accord a truce predominated. On learning this Appius the Blind was carried to the senate-house (for by reason of his age and his infirmity he was a stay-at-home) and declared that the *modus vivendi* with Pyrrhus was not advantageous to the State. He urged them to dismiss Cineas at once from the city and to make known to Pyrrhus by his mouth that the king must first withdraw to his home country and from there make propositions to them about peace or about anything else he wanted. This was the advice Appius gave. The senate delayed no longer, but forthwith unanimously voted to send Cineas that very day across the borders and to wage an implacable war with Pyrrhus, so long as he should abide in Italy. They imposed upon the captives certain degradations in the campaigns and used them no longer against Pyrrhus nor for any other project as a unit (out of apprehension that if they were together they might rebel), but sent them to do garrison duty, a few here, a few there.

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(BOOK 10, BOISSEVAIN).

B.C.

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(a.u. 475)VIII, 5.—During the winter both sides busied themselves with preparations. When spring had now begun, Pyrrhus invaded Apulia and reduced many places by force, many also by capitulation. Finally the Romans came upon him near a city called Asculum and pitched camp opposite. For several days they lingered, rather avoiding each other. The Romans were not feeling confident against men who had once beaten them, and the others dreaded the Romans as persons animated by desperation. Meanwhile some were talking to the effect that Decius was getting ready to "devote himself" after the fashion of his father and grandfather, and by so doing they terribly alarmed the followers of Pyrrhus, who believed that through his death they would certainly be ruined. Pyrrhus then convened his soldiers and discussed this matter, advising them not to be disheartened nor scared out of their wits by such talk. One human being, he said, could not by dying prevail over many nor could any incantation or magic prove superior to arms and men. By making these remarks and confirming his words by arguments Pyrrhus encouraged the army under his lead. Also he enquired into the details of the costume which the Decii had used in devoting themselves, and sent injunctions to his men, if they should see anybody so arrayed, not to kill him, but seize him alive. **FRAG. 40**²⁸AND HE SENT TO DECIUS AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN[Pg 148] ACCOMPLISHING THIS, EVEN IF HE WISHED IT, AND THREATENED THAT IF HE WERE TAKEN ALIVE, HE SHOULD PERISH MISERABLY. TO THIS THE CONSULS ANSWERED THAT THEY WERE IN NO NEED OF HAVING RECOURSE TO SUCH A PROCEEDING AS THE ONE MENTIONED, SINCE THEY WERE SURE TO CONQUER HIM ANYWAY. There was a river not easy to ford running between the two camps, and they enquired whether he chose to cross unmolested himself, while they retired, or whether he would allow them to do it, the object being that the forces should encounter each other intact and so from a battle with conditions equal the test of valor might be made

an accurate one. The Romans delivered this speech to overawe him, but Pyrrhus granted them permission to cross the river, since he placed great reliance upon his elephants. The Romans among their other preparations made ready, as a measure against the elephants, projecting beams on wagons, overlaid with iron and bristling in all directions. From these they intended to shoot and to withstand the animals with fire as well as by other means. When the conflict began, the Romans forced the Greeks back, slowly to be sure, but none the less effectually, until Pyrrhus, bringing his elephants to bear not opposite their chariots but at the other end of the line, routed their cavalry through fear of the beasts even before they had come close. Upon their infantry, however, he inflicted no great damage. Meantime some of the Apulians had started for the camp of the Epirots and by so doing brought about victory for the Romans. For when Pyrrhus sent some of his warriors against them, all the rest were thrown into disorder and suspecting that their tents had been captured and their companions were in flight they gave way. Numbers of them fell, Pyrrhus and many commanding officers besides were wounded, and later on account of the lack of food and of medical supplies they incurred great loss. Hence he retreated to Tarentum before the Romans were aware. As for the consuls, they crossed the river to fight, but when they ascertained that all had scattered, they withdrew to their own cities. They were unable to pursue after their foes on account of wounds among their own following. Then the Romans went into winter quarters in Apulia, whereas Pyrrhus sent for soldiers and money from home and went on with other preparations. But learning that Fabricius and Pappus had been chosen consuls and had arrived in camp, he was not constant in the same intention.

B.C.

278

(*a.u.* 476) The aforesaid consuls were now in the midst of their army, when a certain Nicias, one of those believed to be loyal to Pyrrhus, came to Fabricius and offered to murder him treacherously. Fabricius, indignant at this (for he wanted to overcome the enemy by valor and main force, like Camillus), informed Pyrrhus of the plot. This action of his moved the king so strongly that he again released the Roman captives without price and sent envoys once more in regard to peace. But when the Romans made no reply about peace, but as before bade him depart from Italy and only in that event make propositions to them, and since they kept overrunning and capturing the cities in alliance with him, **FRAG. 40**²⁹HE FELL INTO PERPLEXITY; till at length some Syra

[Pg 150]cusans called on him for aid—they had been quarreling, as it chanced, ever since the death of Agathocles—and surrendered to him both themselves and their city. Hereupon he again breathed freely, hoping to subjugate all of Sicily. Leaving Milo behind in Italy to keep guard over Tarentum and the other positions, he himself sailed away after letting it be understood that he would soon return. The Syracusans welcomed him and laid everything at his feet, so that in brief time he had again become great and the Carthaginians in fright secured additional mercenaries from Italy. But presently his prospects fell to the other extreme of fortune **FRAG. 40**³⁰BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT

HE EITHER EXPELLED OR SLEW MANY WHO HELD OFFICE AND HAD INCURRED HIS SUSPICIONS. Then the Carthaginians, seeing that he was not strong in private forces and did not possess the devotion of the natives, took up the war vigorously. They harbored any Syracusans who were exiled and rendered his position so uncomfortable that he abandoned not only Syracuse, but Sicily as well.

B.C.

277

(*a.u.* 477) VIII, 6.—The Romans on finding out his absence took courage and turned their attention to requiting those who had invited him. Postponing till another occasion the case of the Tarentini they invaded Samnium with their consuls Rufinus and Junius, devastated the country as they went along, and took several deserted forts. The Samnites had conveyed their dearest and most valuable treasures into the hills called the *Cranita*, because they bear a large growth of cornel-wood (*crania*). The Romans in contempt for them dared to[Pg 151] begin the ascent of the aforementioned hills. As the region was tangled with shrubbery and difficult of access many were killed and many, too, were taken prisoners.

The consuls now no longer carried on the war together, since each blamed the other for the disaster, but Junius went on ravaging a portion of Samnium, while Rufinus inflicted injury upon Lucanians and Bruttians. He then started against Croton, which had revolted from Rome. His friends had sent for him, but the other party got ahead of them by bringing a garrison from Milo, of which Nicomachus was commander. Ignorant of this fact he approached the walls carelessly, supposing that his friends controlled affairs, and suffered a setback by a sudden sortie made against him. Then, bethinking himself of a trick, he captured the city. He sent two captives as pretended deserters into Croton; one at once, declaring that he had despaired of capturing the place and was about to set out into Locris, which was being betrayed to him; the other later, corroborating the report with the further detail that he was on his way. That the story might gain credence he packed up the baggage and affected to be in haste. Nicomachus trusted this news (for his scouts made the same report), and leaving Croton set off with speed into Locrian territory by a somewhat shorter road. When he had got well into Locris, Rufinus turned back to Croton, and escaping observation because he was not expected and because of a mist that then prevailed he captured the city. Nicomachus learn[Pg 152]ing this went back to Tarentum, and encountering Rufinus on the way lost many men. The Locrians came over to the Roman side.

B.C.

276

(*a.u.* 478) The next year the Romans made expeditions into Samnium and into Lucania and fought with the Bruttians. Pyrrhus, who had been driven out of Sicily and had returned, was now troubling them grievously. He got back the Locrians (by their killing the Roman garrison and changing their rulers), but in a campaign against Rhegium was repulsed, was himself wounded, and lost great numbers. He then retired into Locris and after executing a few who opposed his cause he got food and money from the rest and

made his way back to Tarentum. The Samnites, hard pressed by the Romans, caused him to leave the shelter of that town: **B.C. 275 (a.u. 479)** but on coming to their assistance he was put to flight. A young elephant was wounded, and shaking off its riders wandered about in search of its mother; the latter thereupon became unmanageable, and as all the rest of the elephants raised a din everything was thrown into dire confusion. Finally the Romans won the day, killing many men and capturing eight elephants, and occupied the enemy's entrenchments. Pyrrhus accompanied by a few horsemen made his escape to Tarentum, and from there sailed back to Epirus, leaving Milo behind with a garrison to take care of Tarentum because he expected to come back again. He also gave them a chair fastened with straps made from the skin of Nicias, whom he put to death for treachery. This was the vengeance, then, that he [Pg 153] took upon Nicias, **FRAG. 40³²** AND HE WAS INTENDING TO EXACT VENGEANCE FROM SOME YOUTHS WHO HAD RIDICULED HIM AT A BANQUET; BUT HE ASKED THEM WHY THEY WERE RIDICULING HIM, AND WHEN THEY ANSWERED: "WE SHOULD HAVE SAID A LOT MORE THINGS A GOOD DEAL WORSE, IF THE WINE HADN'T FAILED US", HE LAUGHED AND LET THEM GO.

Now Pyrrhus, who had made a most distinguished record among generals, who had inspired the Romans with great fear and left Italy in the fifth year to make a campaign against Greece, not long afterward met his death in Argos. A woman, as the story runs, being eager to catch a sight of him from the roof as he passed by, made a misstep and falling upon him killed him. The same year Fabricius and Pappus became censors; and among others whose names they erased from the lists of the knights and the senators was Rufinus, though he had served as dictator and had twice been consul. The reason was that he had in his possession silver plate of ten pounds' weight. This shows how the Romans regarded poverty as consisting not in the failure to possess many things but in wanting many things. Accordingly, their officials who went abroad and others who set out on any business of importance to the State received besides other necessary allowances a seal-ring as a public gift.

Some of the Tarentini who had been abused by Milo attacked him, with Nico at their head. Not accomplishing anything they occupied a section of their own wall, and with that as headquarters kept making assaults upon Milo. When they found out that the Romans were [Pg 154] disposed to make war upon them, they despatched envoys to Rome and obtained peace.

FRAG. 41

B.C.

273

(a.u. 481) AND PTOLEMY PHILADELPHUS, KING OF EGYPT, WHEN HE LEARNED THAT PYRRHUS HAD FARED POORLY AND THAT THE ROMANS WERE GROWING, SENT GIFTS TO THEM AND MADE A COMPACT. AND THE ROMANS, PLEASED WITH THIS, DESPATCHED AMBASSADORS TO HIM IN TURN. THE LATTER RECEIVED MAGNIFICENT GIFTS FROM HIM,

WHICH THEY WANTED TO PUT INTO THE TREASURY; THE SENATE, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT ACCEPT THEM, BUT ALLOWED THEM TO KEEP THEM.

B.C.

272

(*a.u.* 482)After this, by the activity of Carvilius they subdued the Samnites, and overcame the Lucanians and Bruttians by the hands of Papirius. The same Papirius quelled the Tarentini. The latter, angry at Milo and subjected to abuse by their own men, who, as has been told, made the attack on Milo, called in the Carthaginians to their aid when they learned that Pyrrhus was dead. Milo, seeing that his chances had been contracted to narrow limits, as the Romans beset him on the land side and the Carthaginians on the water front, surrendered the citadel to Papirius on condition of being permitted to depart unharmed with his immediate followers and his money. Then the Carthaginians, as representatives of a nation friendly to the Romans, sailed away, and the city made terms with Papirius. They delivered to him their arms and their ships, demolished their walls, and agreed to pay tribute.

The Romans, having thus secured control of the Tarentini, turned their attention to Rhegium, whose inhabitants after taking Croton by treachery had razed[Pg 155] the city to the ground and had slain the Romans there. They averted the danger that was threatening them from the Mamertines holding Messana (whom the people of Rhegium wanted to get as allies), by coming to an agreement with them; but in the siege of Rhegium they suffered hardships through a scarcity of food and some other causes until Hiero by sending from Sicily grain and soldiers to the Romans strengthened their hands and materially aided them in capturing the city. **B.C. 270**
(*a.u.* 484)The place was restored to the survivors among the original inhabitants: those who had plotted against it were punished.

Hiero, who was not of distinguished family on his father's side and on his mother's was akin to the slave class, ruled almost the whole of Sicily and was deemed a friend and ally of the Romans. After the flight of Pyrrhus he became master of Syracuse, and having a cautious eye upon the Carthaginians who were encroaching upon Sicily he was inclined to favor the Romans; and the first mark of favor that he showed them was the alliance and the forwarding of grain already narrated.

After this came a winter so severe that the Tiber was frozen to a great depth and trees were killed. The people of Rome suffered hardships and the hay gave out, causing the cattle to perish.

B.C.

269

(*a.u.* 485)VIII, 7.—The next year a Samnite named Lolius living in Rome as a hostage made his escape, gathered a band and seized a strong position in his native country from which he carried on brigandage. Quintus Gallus[Pg 156] and Gaius Fabius made a campaign against him. Him and the rabblement with him, most of them unarmed, they suppressed; on proceeding, however, against the Carcini in whose keeping the robbers

had deposited their booty, they encountered trouble. Finally one night, led by deserters, they scaled the wall at a certain point and came dangerously near perishing on account of the darkness,—not that it was a moonless night but because it was snowing fiercely. But the moon shone out and they made themselves absolute masters of the position.

A great deal of money fell to the share of Rome in those days, so that they actually used silver denarii.

B.C.

267

(*a.u.* 487)Next they made a campaign into the district now called Calabria. Their excuse was that the people had harbored Pyrrhus and had been overrunning their allied territory, but as a fact they wanted to gain sole possession of Brundisium, since there was a fine harbor and for the traffic with Illyricum and Greece the town had an approach and landing-place of such a character that vessels would sometimes come to land and put out to sea wafted by the same wind. **B.C. 266**
(*a.u.* 488)

FRAG. 42They captured it and sent colonists to it and to other settlements as well. While the accomplishment of these exploits RAISED THEM TO A HIGHER PLANE OF PROSPERITY, THEY SHOWED NO HAUGHTINESS: ON THE CONTRARY THEY SURRENDERED TO THE APOLLONIATIANS ON THE IONIAN GULF QUINTUS FABIUS, A SENATOR, BECAUSE HE HAD INSULTED THEIR AMBASSADORS. BUT THESE ON RECEIVING HIM SENT HIM BACK HOME AGAIN UNHARMED.

B.C.

265

(*a.u.* 489)In the year of the consulship of Quintus Fabius and[Pg 157] Æmilius they went on a campaign to the Volsinii to secure the freedom of the latter, for they were under treaty obligations to them. These people were originally a branch of the Etruscans, and they gathered power and erected an extremely strong rampart; they enjoyed also a government guided by good laws. For these reasons once, when they were involved in war with the Romans, they offered resistance for a very long time. When they had been subdued, they deteriorated into a state of effeminacy, left the management of the city to their servants and let those servants, as a rule, also carry on their campaigns. Finally they encouraged them to such an extent that the servants possessed both spirit and power, and thought they had a right to freedom. In the course of time their efforts to obtain it were crowned with success. After that they were accustomed to wed their mistresses, to inherit their masters, to be enrolled in the senate, to secure the offices, and to hold the entire authority themselves. Indeed, it was usual, when insults were offered them by their masters, for them to requite the authors of them with rather unbecoming speed. Hence the old-fashioned citizens, not being able to endure them and yet possessing no power of their own to repress them, despatched envoys by stealth to Rome. The envoys urged the senate to convene with secrecy at night in a private house, so that no report might get abroad, and they obtained their request. The meeting accordingly deliberated under the idea that no one was listening: but a sick Samnite,

who was being entertained as a guest of the[Pg 158] master of the house, kept his bed unnoticed, learned what was voted, and gave information to those against whom charges were preferred. The latter seized and tortured the envoys on their return; when they found out what was on foot they killed the messengers and also some of the foremost men.

The above were the causes which led the Romans to send Fabius against them. He routed the body of the foe that met him, destroyed many in their flight, shut up the remainder within the wall, and made an assault upon the city. In that action he was wounded and killed, whereupon gaining confidence the enemy made a sortie. They were again defeated, retired, and had to submit to siege. When they began to feel the pangs of hunger, they surrendered. The consul delivered to outrage and death the men who had appropriated the honors of the ruling class and he razed the city to the ground; the native inhabitants, however, and many servants who had rendered valuable service to their masters he settled on another site.

[Pg 159]

(BOOK 11, BOISSEVAIN.)

VIII, 8.—From that time the Romans began struggles oversea: they had previously had no experience at all in naval matters. They now became seamen and crossed over to the islands and to other divisions of the mainland. The first people they fought against were the Carthaginians. These Carthaginians were no whit inferior to them in wealth or in the excellence of their land; they were trained in naval operations to a great degree of accuracy, were equipped with cavalry forces, with infantry and elephants, ruled the Libyans, and held possession of both Sardinia and the greater part of Sicily: as a result they had cherished hopes of subjugating Italy. Various factors contributed to increase their self-conceit. They were especially delighted with their position of independence: their king they elected under the title of a yearly office and not for permanent sovereignty. Animated by these considerations they were at the point of most zealous eagerness.

FRAG. 43¹THE REASONS ALLEGED FOR THE WAR WERE—ON THE PART OF THE ROMANS THAT THE CARTHAGINIANS HAD ASSISTED THE TARENTINI, ON THE PART OF THE CARTHAGINIANS THAT THE ROMANS HAD MADE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH HIERO. THE FACT WAS, HOWEVER, THAT THEY VIEWED EACH OTHER WITH JEALOUSY AND THOUGHT THAT THE ONLY SALVATION FOR THEIR OWN POSSESSIONS LAY IN THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING WHAT THE OTHER HELD. AT A TIME WHEN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD EACH OTHER[Pg 160] WAS OF THIS NATURE A SLIGHT ACCIDENT THAT BEFELL BROKE THE TRUCE AND PROVOKED A CONFLICT BETWEEN THEM. This is what happened.

The Mamertines, who had once conducted a colony from Campania to Messina, were now being besieged by Hiero, and they called upon the Romans as a nation of kindred blood. The latter readily voted to aid them, knowing that in case the Mamertines should not secure an alliance with them, they would have recourse to the Carthaginians; and then the Carthaginians would sweep all Sicily and from there cross over into Italy. For this island is such a short distance away from the mainland that the story goes that it was itself once a part of the mainland. **FRAG. 43**²SO THE ISLAND THUS LYING OFF ITALY SEEMED TO INVITE THE CARTHAGINIANS, AND IT APPEARED AS IF THEY MIGHT LAY CLAIM TO THE LAND OVER OPPOSITE, COULD THEY BUT OCCUPY IT. AND THE POSSESSION OF MESSANA GAVE TO ITS MASTERS THE RIGHT TO BE LORDS OF THE STRAIT ALSO.

Though the Romans voted to assist the Mamertines, they did not quickly come to their aid because of various hindrances that occurred. Hence the Mamertines, under the spur of necessity, called upon the Carthaginians. These brought about peace with Hiero both for themselves and for the party that had invoked their help, so as to prevent the Romans from crossing into the island; and under the leadership of Hanno they retained the guardianship of strait and city. **B.C. 264 (a.u. 490)** Meantime Gaius Claudius, military tribune, sent in advance with a few ships by Appius Claudius, had arrived at Rhegium. But to sail across was more than he dared, for[Pg 161] he saw that the Carthaginian fleet was far larger. So he embarked in a skiff and approached Messina, where he held a conversation, as extended as the case permitted, with the party in possession. When the Carthaginians had made reply, he returned without accomplishing anything. Subsequently he ascertained that the Mamertines were at odds (they did not want to submit to the Romans, and yet they felt uneasy about the Carthaginians), and he sailed over again. **FRAG. 43**³AMONG OTHER REMARKS WHICH HE MADE TO TEMPT THEM HE DECLARED THAT THE OBJECT OF HIS PRESENCE WAS TO FREE THE CITY, AND AS SOON AS HE COULD SET THEIR AFFAIRS IN ORDER, HE SHOULD SAIL AWAY. HE BADE THE CARTHAGINIANS ALSO EITHER TO WITHDRAW, OR, IF THEY HAD ANY JUST PLEA, TO OFFER IT. NOW WHEN NOT ONE OF THE MAMERTINES (BY REASON OF FEAR) OPENED HIS LIPS, AND THE CARTHAGINIANS SINCE THEY WERE OCCUPYING THE CITY BY FORCE OF ARMS PAID NO HEED TO HIM, HE SAID: "THE SILENCE ON BOTH SIDES AFFORDS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. IT SHOWS THAT THE ONE SIDE IS IN THE WRONG, FOR THEY WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED THEMSELVES IF THEIR PURPOSES WERE AT ALL HONEST; AND THAT THE OTHER SIDE COVETS FREEDOM, FOR THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE FREE TO SPEAK, IF THEY HAD ESPOUSED THE CAUSE OF THE CARTHAGINIANS." AND HE VOLUNTEERED TO AID THEM. At this a tumult of praise arose from the Mamertines. He then sailed back to Rhegium and a little later with his entire fleet forced his passage across. However, partly because of the numbers and skill of the Carthaginians, but chiefly because of the difficulty of sailing and a storm that suddenly broke **FRAG. 43**⁴HE LOST SOME OF HIS TRI[Pg 162]REMES AND WITH THE REMAINDER BARELY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING BACK TO RHEGIUM.

VIII, 9.—HOWEVER, THE ROMANS DID NOT SHUN THE SEA BECAUSE OF THEIR DEFEAT. Claudius proceeded to repair his ships, **FRAG. 43⁵**WHILE HANNO, WISHING TO THROW THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BREAKING THE TRUCE UPON THE ROMANS, SENT TO CLAUDIUS THE CAPTURED TRIREMES AND RESTORED THE CAPTIVES, URGING HIM TO AGREE TO PEACE. **FRAG. 43⁶**BUT WHEN THE OTHER WOULD ACCEPT NOTHING, HE THREATENED THAT HE WOULD NEVER PERMIT THE ROMANS EVEN TO WASH THEIR HANDS IN THE SEA. Claudius now having become acquainted with the strait watched for a time when the current and the wind both carried from Italy toward Sicily, and under those circumstances sailed to the island, encountering no opposition. **FRAG. 43⁷**HE DISCOVERED THE MAMERTINES AT THE HARBOR: HANNO HAD BEFORE BECOME SUSPICIOUS OF THEIR MOVEMENTS AND HAD ESTABLISHED HIMSELF IN THE ACROPOLIS, WHICH HE WAS GUARDING. THE ROMAN LEADER ACCORDINGLY CONVENED AN ASSEMBLY AND AFTER SOME CONVERSATION WITH THEM PERSUADED THEM TO SEND FOR HANNO. THE LATTER REFUSED TO COME DOWN, but filled with a subsequent fear that the Mamertines might allege injustice on his part and revolt he did enter the assembly. After many words had been spoken to no purpose by both sides, one of the Romans seized him and, with the approval of the Mamertines, threw him into prison.

Thus, under compulsion, Hanno left Messina entirely. The Carthaginians disciplined him and sent a herald to the Romans bidding them leave Messina and depart from all of Sicily by a given day; they also set[Pg 163] an army in motion. Since the Romans paid no heed, they put to death the mercenaries serving with them who were from Italy, and made an assault upon Messina, Hiero accompanying them. Then for a season they besieged the city and kept guard over the strait, to prevent any troops or provisions being conveyed to the foe. The consul was informed of this when he was already quite close at hand, and found a number of Carthaginians disposed at various points in and about the harbor under pretence of carrying on trade. In order to get safe across the strait he resorted to deception and did succeed in anchoring off Sicily by night. His point of approach was not far from the camp of Hiero and he joined battle without delay, thinking that his appearance in force would be most likely to inspire the enemy with fear. When they came out to withstand the attack, the Roman cavalry was worsted but the heavy-armed infantry prevailed. Hiero retired temporarily to the mountains and later to Syracuse.

When Hiero had retired, the Mamertines took courage because of the presence of Claudius. He therefore assailed the Carthaginians, who were now isolated, and their rampart, which was situated on a kind of peninsula. For on the one side the sea enclosed it and on the other some marshes, difficult to traverse. At the neck of this peninsula, the only entrance and a very narrow one, a cross wall had been built. In an attempt to carry this point by force the Romans fared badly and withdrew under a shower of weapons. **FRAG. 43⁹**THE LIBYANS[Pg 164] THEN TOOK COURAGE AND SALLIED OUT, PURSUING THE FUGITIVES, AS THEY THOUGHT THEM, BEYOND THE NARROW STRIP OF

LAND. THEREUPON THE ROMANS WHEELED, ROUTED THEM, AND KILLED A NUMBER, SO THAT THEY DID NOT ISSUE FROM THE CAMP AGAIN,—AT LEAST SO LONG AS CLAUDIUS WAS IN MESSANA. He, however, not daring to attack the approach in force, left a detachment behind in Messana and turned his steps toward Syracuse and Hiero. He personally superintended the assault upon the city, and now and then the inhabitants would come out to battle. Each side would sometimes be victorious and sometimes incur defeat. One day the consul got into a confined position and would have been caught, had he not, before being surrounded, sent to Hiero an invitation to agree to some terms. When the representative came with whom he was to conclude the terms, he kept falling back unobtrusively, while he conversed with him, until he had retired to safety. But the city could not easily be taken, and a siege, on account of scarcity of food supplies and disease in the army, was impracticable. Claudius accordingly withdrew; and the Syracusans following held discussions with his scattered followers and would have made a truce, if Hiero also had been willing to agree to terms. The consul left behind a garrison in Messana and sailed back to Rhegium.

B.C.

263

(*a.u.* 491)As Etruscan unrest had come to a standstill and affairs in Italy were perfectly peaceful, whereas the Carthaginian state was becoming ever greater, the Romans ordered both the consuls to make an expedition into Sicily. Valerius Maximus and Otacilius Crassus consequently crossed over and in their progress[Pg 165] through the island together and separately they won over many towns by capitulation. When they had made the majority of places their own, they set out for Syracuse. Hiero in terror sent a herald to them with offers: he expressed a readiness to restore the cities of which they had been deprived, promised money, and liberated the prisoners. On these terms he obtained peace, for the consuls thought they could subjugate the Carthaginians more easily with his help. After reaching an agreement with him, then, they turned their attention to the remaining cities garrisoned by Carthaginians. They were repulsed from all of them except Segesta, which they took without resistance. Its inhabitants because of their relationship with the Romans (they declare they are descended from Æneas) slew the Carthaginians and joined the Roman alliance.

VIII, 10.—On account of the winter the consuls embarked again for Rhegium. The Carthaginians conveyed most of their army to Sardinia in the intention of attacking Rome from that quarter. They would thus either rout them out of Sicily altogether or would render them weaker after they had crossed. Yet they achieved neither the one object nor the other. The Romans both kept guard over their own land and sent a respectable force to Sicily with Postumius Albinus and Quintus Æmilius.[\[15\]](#) **B.C. 262** (*a.u.* 492)On arriving in Sicily the consuls set out for Agrigentum and there besieged Hannibal the son of Gisco. The people of Carthage, when[Pg 166] apprised of it, sent Hanno, with a powerful support, to aid him in the warfare. This leader arrived at Heraclea, not far from Agrigentum, and was soon engaged in war. A number of battles,

but not great ones, took place. At first Hanno challenged the consuls to fight, then later on the Romans challenged him. For as long as the Romans had an abundance of food, they did not venture to contend against a superior force, and were hoping to get possession of the city by famine; when, however, they encountered a permanent shortage of grain, they displayed a zeal for taking risks, but Hanno showed hesitation; their eagerness led him to suspect that he might be ambushed. Everybody therefore was satisfied to revere the Romans as easy conquerors, and Hiero, who once coöperated with them sulkily, now sent them grain, so that even the consuls took heart.

Hanno now undertook to bring on a battle, expecting that Hannibal would fall upon the Romans in the rear, assailing them from the wall. The consuls learned his plan but remained inactive, and Hanno in scorn approached their intrenchments. They also sent some men to lie in ambush behind him. When toward evening he fearlessly and contemptuously led a charge, the Romans joined battle with him from ambush and from palisade and wrought a great slaughter of the enemy and of the elephants besides. Hannibal had in the meantime assailed the Roman tents, but was hurled back by the men guarding them. Hanno abandoned his camp and made good his escape to Heraclea. Hannibal then formed a plan to escape as runaways from Agrig[^{Pg 167}]gentum by night, and himself eluded observation; the rest, however, were recognized and were killed, some by the Romans and many by the Agrigentini. For all that the people of Agrigentum did not obtain pardon, but their wealth was plundered and they themselves were all sold into servitude.

On account of the winter the consuls retired to Messina. The Carthaginians were angry with Hanno and despatched Hamilcar the son of Barca in his stead, a man superior in generalship to all his countrymen save only Hannibal his son. **B.C. 261 (a.u. 493)** Hamilcar himself guarded Sicily and sent Hannibal as admiral to damage the coast sections of Italy and so draw the consuls to his vicinity. Yet he did not accomplish his aim, for they posted guards along both shores and then went to Sicily. They effected nothing worthy of record, however. And Hamilcar, becoming afraid that his Gallic mercenaries (who were offended because he had not given them full pay) might go over to the Romans, brought about their destruction. He sent them to take charge of one of the cities under Roman sway, assuring them that it was in course of being betrayed and giving them permission to plunder it: he then sent to the consuls pretended deserters to give them advance information of the coming of the Gauls. Hence all the Gauls were ambuscaded and destroyed; many of the Romans also perished.

After the consuls had departed home Hamilcar sailed to Italy and ravaged the land and won over some cities in Sicily. On receipt of this information the Romans[^{Pg 168}] **B.C. 260**

(a.u. 494) gathered a fleet and put one of the consuls, Gaius Duillius, in command of it, while they sent his colleague, Gaius[¹⁶] Cornelius, to Sicily. He, neglecting the war on land which had fallen to his lot, sailed with the ships that belonged to him to Lipara, on

the understanding that it was to be betrayed to him. Through treachery it had fallen into the hands of the Carthaginians. When, therefore, he put into Lipara, Bodes the lieutenant of Hannibal closed in upon him. As Gaius^[17] made preparations to defend himself, Bodes fearing the Romans' desperation invited them to discuss terms. Having persuaded them to do so he took the consul and military tribunes, who supposed they were to meet the admiral, on board his own trireme. These men he sent to Carthage: the rest he captured without their so much as lifting a weapon.

VIII, 11.—Then Hannibal continued the ravaging of Italy, while Hamilcar made a campaign against Segesta, where the Romans had most of their infantry force. Gaius Cæcilius, a military tribune, wanted to assist them, but Hamilcar waylaid him and slaughtered many of his followers. The people of Rome learning this at once sent out the prætor urbanus and incited Duillius to haste. On coming to Sicily he learned the fact that the ships of the Carthaginians were inferior to his own in stoutness and size, but excelled in the quickness of their rowing and variety of movement. Therefore he fitted out his triremes with mechanical devices,—anchors and grappling irons with long spikes and other such things,—in order that by laying hold of[Pg 169] the hostile ships with these they might pin them fast to their own vessels; then by crossing over into them they might have a hand to hand conflict with the Carthaginians and engage them just as in an infantry battle. When the Carthaginians began the fight with the Roman ships, they sailed round and round them using the oars rapidly and would make sudden dashes. So for the time the conflict was an evenly matched one: later the Romans got the upper hand and sank numbers of crews, retaining possession also of large numbers. Hannibal conducted the fight on a boat of seven banks, but when his own ship became entangled with a trireme, he feared capture, hastily left the seven banked affair, and transferring to another ship effected his escape.

This was the way, then, that the naval battle resulted, and much spoil was taken. **FRAG. 43**¹³THE CARTHAGINIANS WOULD HAVE PUT HANNIBAL TO DEATH ON ACCOUNT OF THE DEFEAT, IF HE HAD NOT IMMEDIATELY ENQUIRED OF THEM WHETHER, GRANTED THAT THE BUSINESS WERE STILL UNTOUCHED, THEY WOULD BID HIM RISK A SEA-FIGHT OR NOT. THEY AGREED THAT HE OUGHT TO FIGHT, FOR THEY PRIDED THEMSELVES UPON HAVING A SUPERIOR NAVY. HE THEN ADDED: "I, THEN, HAVE DONE NO WRONG, FOR I WENT INTO THE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE SAME HOPES AS YOU. IT WAS THE DECISION, BUT NOT THE FORTUNE OF THE BATTLE THAT HAPPENED TO BE WITHIN MY POWER." So he saved his life, but was deprived of his command.—Duillius after securing a reinforcement of infantry rescued the people of Segesta, and Hamilcar would not venture to come into close conflict with him. He strengthened the[Pg 170] loyalty of the other friendly settlements and returned to Rome at the close of autumn. Upon his departure Hamilcar took forcible possession of the place called Drepanum (it is a convenient roadstead), deposited there the objects of greatest value and transferred to it all the people of Eryx. The city of the latter, because it was a strong point, he razed to

the ground to prevent the Romans from seizing it and making it a base of operations for the war. He captured some cities, too, some by force, some by betrayal; and if Gaius Florus who wintered there had not restrained him, he would have subjugated Sicily entire.

B.C.

259

(a.u. 495) Lucius Scipio, his colleague, made a campaign against Sardinia and against Corsica. These islands are situated in the Tyrrhenian sea only a short distance apart,—so short a distance, in fact, that from a little way off they seem to be one. His first landing place was Corsica. There he captured by force Valeria, its largest city, and subdued the remainder of the region without effort. As he was sailing toward Sardinia he descried a Carthaginian fleet and directed his course to it. The enemy fled before a battle could be joined and he came to the city of Olbia. There the Carthaginians put in an appearance along with their ships, and Scipio being frightened (for he had no infantry worthy the mention) set sail for home.

These were the days when the Samnites with the coöperation of other captives and slaves in the city came to an agreement to form a conspiracy against Rome. Numbers of them had been brought there with [Pg 171] a view to their utilization in the equipment of the fleet. Herius Potilius, the leader of the auxiliary force, found it out and pretended to be of like mind with them, in order that he might fully inform himself in regard to what they had determined. As he was not able to give knowledge of the affair,—for all those about him were Samnites,—he persuaded them to gather in the Forum at a time when a senate meeting was being convened and denounce him with declarations that they were being wronged in the matter of the grain which they were receiving. They did this and he was sent for as being the cause of the tumult; and he then laid bare to the Romans the plot. For the moment they merely dismissed the protestants (after they had become quiet) but by night all of those who held slaves arrested some of them. And in this way the entire conspiracy was overthrown.

B.C.

253

(a.u. 496) The following summer the Romans and the Carthaginians fought in Sicily and Sardinia at once. Somewhat later Atilius Latinus [18] went to Sicily and finding a city named Mytistratus being besieged by Florus he made use of the latter's support. He made assaults upon the circuit of the wall which the natives with the help of the Carthaginians at first withstood vigorously, but when the women and children were moved to tears and laments they abandoned resistance. The Carthaginians passed out secretly by night and at daybreak the natives voluntarily swung the gates wide open. The Romans went in and proceeded to slaughter them all [Pg 172] till Atilius made proclamation that the remainder of the booty and the human beings belonged to him who might take them. Forthwith they spared the lives of the remaining captives and after pillaging the city burned it to the ground.

VIII, 12.—Thence they proceeded heedlessly against Camarina and came into a region where an ambushade had already been set. They would have perished utterly, had not Marcus Calpurnius, serving as military tribune, matched the catastrophe by his cleverness. He saw that one and one only of the surrounding hills had by reason of its steepness not been occupied and he asked of the consul three hundred heavy-armed men and with them he set out for that point. His purpose was to make the enemy turn their attention to his detachment so that then the rest of the Romans might make their escape. And so it happened; for when the adversaries saw his project, they were thunderstruck and left the consul and his followers as men already captured in order to make a united rush upon Calpurnius. A fierce battle ensued in which many of the opposing side and all the three hundred fell. Calpurnius alone survived. He had been wounded and lay unnoticed among the heaps of slain, being as good as dead by reason of his wounds; afterward he was found alive and his life was saved. While the three hundred were fighting, the consul got away; and after this escape he reduced Camarina and other cities, some by force and some by capitulation. Next Atilius set out against Lipara. But Hamilcar at night by stealth[Pg 173] occupied it in advance and by making a sudden sally killed many Romans.

Gaius Sulpicius overran the most of Sardinia and filled with arrogance as a result he set out for Libya. The Carthaginians, alarmed for the safety of their home population, also set sail with Hannibal, **FRAG. 43**¹⁴**BUT AS A CONTRARY WIND WAS ENCOUNTERED BOTH LEADERS TURNED BACK. SUBSEQUENTLY ATILIUS**[\[19\]](#)**BROUGHT ABOUT HANNIBAL'S DEFEAT THROUGH SOME FALSE DESERTERS** who pretended that Atilius[\[20\]](#) was going to sail to Libya again. Hannibal weighed anchor and came out with speed, whereupon Sulpicius sailed to meet him and sank the majority of his vessels, which, because of a mist, did not know for a long time what was taking place and were thrown into confusion; all that made their escape to land he seized, though minus their crews, for Hannibal who saw that the harbor was unsafe abandoned them and retired to the city of Sulci. There the Carthaginians engaged in mutiny against their leader and he came forth before them alone and was slain. The Romans in consequence overran the country with greater ease, but were defeated by Hanno. This is what took place that year. Also stones in great quantities at once, and in appearance something like hail, fell from heaven upon Rome continually. It likewise came to pass that stones descended upon Albanum and elsewhere.

B.C.

257

(a.u. 497)The consuls on coming to Sicily made a campaign against Lipara. Perceiving the Carthaginians lying in[Pg 174] the harbor below the height called Tyndaris they divided their expedition in two. One of the consuls with half the fleet surrounded the promontory, and Hamilcar thinking them an isolated force set sail. When the rest came up, he turned to flight and lost most of his fleet. The Romans were elated, and feeling that Sicily was already theirs they left it and ventured to make an attempt on Libya and

Carthage. **FRAG. 43**¹⁶THEIR LEADERS WERE MARCUS REGULUS AND LUCIUS MANLIUS, PREFERRED BEFORE OTHERS FOR THEIR EXCELLENCE. **B.C. 256 (a.u. 498)**These two sailed to Sicily, settled affairs there, and made ready for the voyage to Libya: the Carthaginians did not wait for their hostile voyage to begin, but after due preparation hastened toward Sicily. Off Heracleotis the opposing forces met. The contest was for a long time evenly balanced but in the end the Romans got the best of it. Hamilcar did not dare to withstand their progress, **FRAG. 43**¹⁷BUT SENT HANNO TO THEM PRETENDEDLY IN BEHALF OF PEACE, WHEREAS HE REALLY WISHED TO USE UP TIME; HE WAS IN HOPES THAT AN ARMY WOULD BE SENT TO HIM FROM HOME. WHEN SOME CLAMORED FOR HANNO'S ARREST, BECAUSE THE CARTHAGINIANS HAD ALSO TREACHEROUSLY ARRESTED CORNELIUS, the envoy said: "If you do this, you will be no longer any better than Libyans." He, therefore, by flattering them most opportunely escaped any kind of molestation: the Romans, however, again took up the war. And the consuls sailed from Messana, while Hamilcar and Hanno separated and studied how to enclose them from both sides. Hanno, however, would not stand before them when they approached, but sailed away betimes to the harbor of [Pg 175] Carthage and kept constant guard of the city. Hamilcar, apprised of this, stayed where he was. The Romans disembarked on land and marched against the city Aspis, whose inhabitants, seeing them approaching, slipped out quietly and in good season. The Romans thus occupied it without striking a blow and made it a base in the war. From it they ravaged the country and acquired cities, some of their own free will and others by intimidation. They also kept securing great booty, receiving vast numbers of deserters, and getting back many of their own men who had been captured in the previous wars.

VIII, 13.—Winter came on and Manlius sailed back to Rome with the booty, whereas Regulus remained behind in Libya. The Carthaginians found themselves in the depths of woe, since their country was being pillaged and their vassals alienated; but cooped up in their fortifications they remained inactive. (**FRAG. 43**^{18?})WHILE REGULUS WAS BESIDE THE BAGRADAS RIVER A SERPENT OF HUGE BULK APPEARED TO HIM, THE LENGTH OF WHICH IS SAID TO HAVE BEEN ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FEET. ITS SLOUGH WAS CARRIED TO ROME FOR EXHIBITION PURPOSES. AND THE REST OF ITS BODY CORRESPONDED IN SIZE. It destroyed many of the soldiers that approached it and some also who were drinking from the river. Regulus overcame it by a crowd of soldiers and hurling-engines. After thus destroying it he gave battle by night to Hamilcar, who was encamped upon a high, woody spot; and he slew many in their beds as well as many who had just risen. Any who escaped fell in with Romans guarding the roads, who despatched them. In this way a large [Pg 176] division of Carthaginians was blotted out and numerous cities went over to the Romans. **FRAG. 43**¹⁹THOSE IN THE TOWN BEING IN FEAR OF CAPTURE SENT HERALDS TO THE CONSUL TO THE END THAT HAVING BY SOME SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT INDUCED HIM TO GO AWAY THEY MIGHT AVOID THE DANGER OF THE MOMENT AND SO ESCAPE. BUT WHEN MANY UNREASONABLE DEMANDS

WERE MADE OF THEM, THEY DECIDED THAT THE TRUCE WOULD MEAN THEIR UTTER SUBJUGATION AND PREPARED RATHER TO FIGHT.

B.C.

255

(*a.u.* 499)Regulus, however, who up to that time was fortunate, became filled with boastfulness and conceit, so much so that he even wrote to Rome that he had sealed up the gates of Carthage with fear. His followers and the people of Rome thought the same way, and this caused their undoing. Allies of various sorts came to the Carthaginians, among them Xanthippus from Sparta. He assumed the general superintendence of the Carthaginians, for the populace was eager to entrust matters to his charge and Hamilcar together with the other officials stepped aside voluntarily. The new leader, then, disposed things excellently in every way, and particularly he brought the Carthaginians down from the heights, where they were staying through fear, into the level country, where their horses and elephants were sure to develop greatest power. For some time he remained inactive until at length he found the Romans encamped in a way that betokened their contempt. They were very haughty over their victorious progress and looked down upon Xanthippus as a "Græcus" (this is a name they give to Hellenes and they use this epithet as a reproach to them for their mean birth);[Pg 177] **B.C. 255** (*a.u.* 499)consequently they had constructed their camp in a heedless fashion. While the Romans were in this situation, Xanthippus assailed them, routed their cavalry with his elephants, cut down many and captured many alive, among them Regulus himself. This put the Carthaginians in high spirits. They saved the lives of the captives in order that their own citizens previously taken captive by the Romans might not be killed. All the Roman prisoners were treated with consideration except Regulus, whom they kept in a state of utter misery; they offered him only just food enough to maintain existence and they would repeatedly lead an elephant close up to him to frighten him, so that he might have peace in neither body nor mind. After afflicting him in this way for a good while they placed him in prison.

The manner in which the Carthaginians dealt with their allies forms a chapter of great ruthlessness in this story. They were not supplied with sufficient wealth to pay them what they had originally promised, and dismissed them with the understanding that they would pay them their wages before very long. To the men who escorted the allies, however, they issued orders to put them ashore on a desert island and quietly sail away. As to Xanthippus, one story is that they drowned him, attacking him in boats after his boat had departed: the other is that they gave him an old ship which was in no wise seaworthy but had been newly covered over with pitch outside, that it might sink quite of itself; and that he, aware of the fact, got aboard a[Pg 178] different ship and so was saved. Their reason for doing this was to avoid seeming to have been preserved by his ability; for they thought that once he had perished the renown of his deeds would also perish.

VIII, 14.—The people of Rome were grieved at the turn of events and more especially because they were looking for the Carthaginians to sail against Rome itself. For this reason they carefully guarded Italy and hastily sent to the Romans in Sicily and Libya the consuls Marcus Æmilius and Fulvius Pætinus.^[21] They after sailing to Sicily and garrisoning the positions there started for Libya, but were overtaken by a storm and carried to Cossura. They ravaged the island and put it in charge of a garrison, then sailed onward again. Meanwhile a fierce naval battle with the Carthaginians had taken place. The latter were struggling to eject the Romans entirely from their native land, and the Romans to save the remnants of their soldiers who had been left in hostile territory. In the midst of a close battle the Romans in Aspis suddenly attacked the Carthaginians in ships from the rear, and by getting them between two forces overcame them. Later the Romans also won an infantry engagement and took many prisoners, whose lives they saved because of Regulus and those captured with him. They made several raids and then sailed to Sicily. After encountering a storm, however, and losing many of their number, they sailed for home with the ships that remained.

B.C. **254**

(*a.u.* 500)The Carthaginians took Cossura and crossed over to[Pg 179] Sicily; and had they not learned that Collatinus^[22] and Gnæus Cornelius were approaching with a large fleet, they would have subjugated the whole of it. The Romans had quickly fitted out a first-class fleet, had made levies of their best men, and had become so strong that in the third month they returned to Sicily. It was the five hundredth year from the founding of Rome. The lower city of Panhormus they took without trouble, but in the siege of the citadel they fared badly until food failed those in it. Then they came to terms with the consuls. **FRAG. 43**²⁰THE CARTHAGINIANS KEPT WATCH FOR THEIR SHIPS HOMEWARD BOUND AND CAPTURED SEVERAL THAT WERE FULL OF MONEY.

B.C. **253**

(*a.u.* 501)The next event was that Servilius Cæpio and Gaius Sempronius, consuls, made an attempt upon Lilybæum (from which they were repulsed) and crossing over to Libya ravaged the coast districts. As they were returning homeward they encountered a storm and incurred damage. Hence the people, thinking that the damage was due to their inexperience in naval affairs, voted that they should keep away from the sea in general but with a few ships should guard Italy.

B.C. **252**

(*a.u.* 502)In the succeeding year Publius Gaius^[23] and Aurelius Servilius^[24] came to Sicily and subdued Himera besides some other places. However, they did not get possession of any of its inhabitants, for the Carthaginians conveyed them away by night. After this Aurelius secured some ships from Hiero and adding to his con[Pg 180]tingent all the Romans that were there he sailed to Lipara. Here he left the tribune Quintus Cassius,^[25] who was to keep a lookout but avoid a battle, and set sail for home. Quintus, disregarding orders, made an attack upon the city and lost many men. Aurelius,

however, subsequently took the place, killed all the inhabitants, and deposed Cassius from his command.

B.C.

251

(a.u. 503)The Carthaginians learned what the Romans had determined regarding the fleet and sent an expedition to Sicily hoping now to bring it entirely under their control. As long as both consuls, Cæcilius Metellus and Gaius Furius, were on the ground, they remained quiet; but when Furius set out for Rome, they conceived a contempt for Metellus and proceeded to Panhormus. Metellus ascertained that spies had come from the enemy, and assembling all the people of the city he began a talk with them, in the midst of which he suddenly ordered them to lay hold of one another. He was thus enabled to investigate who each one was and what was his business and so detected the enemy.—The Carthaginians now set themselves in battle array and Metellus pretended to be afraid. As he continued this pretence for several days the Carthaginians became filled with presumption and attacked him rather recklessly. Then Metellus raised the signal for the Romans. Forthwith they made an unexpected rush through all the gates, easily overcame resistance, and enclosed the enemy in a narrow place through which they could now no longer retreat. Being many in number and with many elephants along they were huddled together and thrown into confusion. Meanwhile the Libyan fleet approached the coast and became the prime cause of their destruction. The fugitives seeing the ships rushed toward them and made desperate exertions to climb aboard; some fell into the sea and perished, other were killed by the elephants, which got close to one another and to the human beings, still others were slain by the Romans; many also were captured alive, men as well as elephants. For since the beasts, bereft of the men to whom they were used, became furious, Metellus made a proclamation to the prisoners, offering preservation and forgiveness to such as would check them: accordingly, some keepers approached the gentlest of the animals, controlling them by the influence of their accustomed presence, and then won over the remainder. These, one hundred and twenty in number, were conveyed to Rome, and they were ferried across the strait in the following way. A number of huge jars, separated by pieces of wood, were fastened together in such a way that they were neither detached nor yet did they touch; then this framework was spanned by beams and on the top of all earth and brush were placed and the surface was fenced in round about so that it resembled a courtyard. The beasts were put on board this and were ferried across without knowing that they were moving on the water. Thus did Metellus win a victory: Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian leader, though he got away safe on this occasion was later summoned to trial by the Carthaginians at home and suffered impalement.[Pg 181] [Pg 182]

FRAG. 43²¹VIII, 15.—THE CARTHAGINIANS NOW BEGAN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ROMANS ON ACCOUNT OF THE GREAT NUMBER OF THE CAPTIVES (AMONG OTHER CAUSES); AND WITH THE ENVOYS THEY ALSO SENT REGULUS HIMSELF, THINKING THAT THROUGH HIM THEIR OBJECT HAD PRACTICALLY BEEN ALREADY GAINED BECAUSE OF

THE REPUTATION AND VALOR OF THE MAIN: AND THEY BOUND HIM BY OATHS TO RETURN WITHOUT FAIL. AND HE ACTED IN ALL RESPECTS LIKE ONE OF THE CARTHAGINIANS; FOR HE DID NOT EVEN GRANT HIS WIFE LEAVE TO CONFER WITH HIM NOR DID HE ENTER THE CITY ALTHOUGH REPEATEDLY INVITED TO DO SO; INSTEAD, WHEN THE SENATE WAS ASSEMBLED OUTSIDE THE WALLS, AS THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED TO DO IN TREATING WITH ENVOYS OF THE ENEMY, and he was introduced into the gathering, he said: "We, Conscript Fathers, have been sent to you by the Carthaginians. They it was who despatched me on this journey, since by the law of war I have become their slave. They ask, if possible, to conclude the war upon terms pleasing to both parties or, if not, to effect an exchange of prisoners." At the end of these words he withdrew with the envoys that the Romans might deliberate in private. When the consuls urged him to take part in their discussion, **FRAG. 43**²²HE PAID NO HEED UNTIL PERMISSION WAS GRANTED BY THE CARTHAGINIANS. For a time he was silent. Then, as the senators bade him state his opinion, he spoke:

[Pg 183]

(BOOK 12, BOISSEVAIN.)

"I am one of you, Conscript Fathers, though I be captured times without number. My body is a Carthaginian chattel, but my spirit is yours. The former has been alienated from you, but the latter nobody has the power to make anything else than Roman. As captive I belong to the Carthaginians, yet, as I met with misfortune not from cowardice but from zeal, I am not only a Roman, but my heart is in your cause. Not in a single respect do I think reconciliation advantageous to you."

After these words Regulus stated also the reasons for which he favored rejecting the proposals, and added: "I know, to be sure, that manifest destruction confronts me, for it is impossible to keep them from learning the advice I have given; but even so I esteem the public advantage above my own safety. If any one shall say: 'Why do you not run away, or stay here?' he shall be told that I have sworn to them to return and I would not transgress my oaths, not even when they have been given to enemies. There are various explanations for this, but the principal one is that if I abide by my oath I alone shall suffer disaster, but if I break it, the whole city will be involved."

But the senate out of consideration for his safety showed a disposition to make peace and to restore the captives. When he was made aware of this, he pretended, in order that he might not be the cause of their[Pg 184] letting slip their advantage, that he had swallowed deadly poison and was destined certainly to die from its effects. Hence no agreement and no exchange of prisoners was made. As he was departing in company with the envoys, his wife and children and others clung to him, and the consuls declared they would not surrender him, if he chose to stay, nor yet would they detain him if he was for departing. Consequently, since he preferred not to transgress the oaths, he was

carried back. He died of outrages, so the legend reports, perpetrated by his captors. They cut off his eyelids and for a time shut him in darkness, then they threw him into some kind of specially constructed receptacle bristling with spikes; and they made him face the sun; so that through suffering and sleeplessness,—for the spikes kept him from reclining in any fashion,—he perished. When the Romans found it out, they delivered the foremost captives that they held to his children to outrage and put to death in revenge.

B.C.

250

(a.u. 504)They voted that the consuls, Atilius Gaius, brother of Regulus, and Lucius Manlius, should make a campaign into Libya. On coming to Sicily they attacked Lilybæum and undertook to fill up a portion of the ditch to facilitate bringing up the engines. The Carthaginians dug below the mound and undermined it. As they found this to be a losing game because of the numbers of the opposing workmen, they built another wall, crescent-shaped, inside. The Romans ran tunnels under the circle, in order that when the wall settled they might rush in through the breach thus made. The[Pg 185] Carthaginians then built counter-tunnels and came upon many workers who were unaware of what the other side was doing. These they killed, and also destroyed many by hurling blazing firewood into the diggings. Some of the allies now, burdened by the strain of the siege and displeased because their superiors did not come down with their full wages, made propositions to the Romans to betray the place. Hamilcar discovered their plot but did not disclose it, for fear of driving them into open hostility. However, he supplied their leaders with money and in addition promised other supplies of it to the mass of them. In this way he won their favor, and they did not even deny their treachery but drove away the last envoys who returned. The latter then deserted to the consuls and received from them land in Sicily and other gifts.

The Carthaginians at home, hearing this, sent Adherbal with a very large number of ships carrying grain and money to Lilybæum. The leader waited for a time of storm and sailed in. Thereupon many others likewise ventured to attempt a landing, and some made it, others were destroyed.

As long as both the consuls were present, the conflicts were even. Pestilence and famine, however, came to harass them and these caused one of them with the soldiers of his division to return home. Hamilcar then took courage and made sorties in which he would set fire to the engines and slay the men defending them; his cavalry, starting from Drepanum, prevented the Romans from getting provisions and overran the territory[Pg 186] of their allies; and Adherbal ravaged the shores now of Sicily, now of Italy, so that the Romans fell into perplexity. **B.C. 249**
(a.u. 505)Meantime, however, Lucius Junius was making ready a fleet, and Claudius Pulcher made haste to reach Lilybæum, where he manned ships of war. With these he overhauled Hanno the Carthaginian as he was leaving harbor on a five-banked ship. The prize craft served the Romans as a model in shipbuilding.

The interests of their fleet were so frequently endangered that the Romans were disheartened by the constant destruction of their ships. In these they lost numbers of men and vast sums of money. Yet they would not give up; nay, they even executed a man who in the senate opened his mouth about reconciliation with the Carthaginians, and they voted that a dictator should be named. Collatinus[26] was therefore named dictator and Metellus became master of the horse, but they accomplished nothing worthy of remembrance. While Collatinus[27] was being named dictator, Junius had won over Eryx, and Carthalo had occupied Ægithallus and taken Junius alive.

B.C.

248

(a.u. 506) VIII, 16.—The next year Gaius Aurelius and Publius Servilius took office and spent their time in harrying Lilybæum and Drepanum, in keeping the Carthaginians off the land, and in devastating the region that was in alliance with them. Carthalo undertook many different kinds of enterprises against them, but, as he accomplished nothing, he started for Italy with the object of thus attracting the consuls to that country or,[Pg 187] in any case, of injuring the district and capturing cities. Yet he made no headway even there and on learning that the prætor urbanus was approaching sailed back to Sicily. His mercenaries now rebelled about a question of pay, whereupon he put numbers ashore on desert islands and left them there, and sent many more off to Carthage. When the rest heard this, they became indignant and were on the point of an uprising. Hamilcar, Carthalo's successor, cut down numbers of them one night and had numerous others drowned. In the meantime the Romans had concluded a perpetual friendship with Hiero and they furthermore remitted all the dues which they were accustomed to receive from him annually.

B.C.

247

(a.u. 507) Next year the Romans officially refrained from naval warfare because of their misfortunes and expenses, but some private individuals asked for ships on condition of restoring the vessels but appropriating any booty gained; and among other injuries that they inflicted upon the enemy they sailed to Hippo, a Libyan city, and there burned to ashes all the boats and many of the buildings. The natives put chains across the mouth of their harbor and the invaders found themselves encompassed but saved themselves by cleverness and good fortune. They made a quick dash at the chains, and just as the beaks of the ships were about to catch in them the members of the crew went back to the stern, and so the prows being lightened cleared the chains: and again, by their making a rush into the prows, the sterns of the vessels were lifted high[Pg 188] enough in the air. Thus they effected their escape, and later near Panhormus they conquered the Carthaginians with these ships.

Of the consuls Metellus Cæcilius was in the vicinity of Lilybæum, and Numerius Fabius was investing Drepanum, with additional designs upon the islet of Pelias. As this had been seized earlier by the Carthaginians, he sent soldiers by night who killed the garrison and took possession of the island. Learning this Hamilcar at dawn attacked the

party that had crossed to it. Fabius not being able to ward them off led an assault upon Drepanum that he might either capture the city while deserted or bring back Hamilcar from the island. One of these objects was accomplished, for Hamilcar in fear retired within the fortifications. So Fabius occupied Pelias, and by filling in the strait (which happened to be shallow) between it and the mainland he made a clear stretch of solid ground and thus conducted with greater facility his hostile operations against the wall, which was rather weak at that point. Incidentally the Carthaginians caused the Romans excessive annoyance by undertaking circuitous voyages to Sicily and making trips across into Italy.—They exchanged each other's captives man for man; those left over (since the numbers were not equal) the Carthaginians got back for money.

In the subsequent period various persons became consuls but effected nothing worthy of record. The Romans owed the majority of their reverses to the fact that they kept sending out from year to year different[Pg 189] and ever different leaders, and took away their office from them when they were just learning the art of generalship. It looked as if they were choosing them for practice and not for service.

The Gauls, who were acting in alliance with the Carthaginians and hated them because their masters treated them ill, abandoned to the Romans for money a position with the guarding of which they had been entrusted. The Romans secured for mercenary service the Gauls and other of the Carthaginian allies who had revolted from their service; never before had they supported foreigners in their army. Elated at this accession and furthermore by the ravaging of Libya on the part of the private citizens who were managing the ships, they were no longer willing to neglect the sea, and they again got together a fleet.

B.C.

241

(*a.u.* 513)VIII, 17.—And Lutatius Catulus was chosen consul and with him was sent out Quintus Valerius Flaccus as prætor urbanus. On coming to Sicily they assailed Drepanum both by land and by sea and demolished a section of the wall. They would have captured the town but for the fact that the consul was wounded and the soldiers were wholly engrossed in caring for him. During the delay which ensued they learned that a body of the enemy had come from home with a huge fleet commanded by Hanno, and they turned their attention to these new arrivals. When the forces had been marshaled in hostile array, a meteor like a star appeared above the Romans and after rising high to the left of the Carthaginians plunged into their ranks. The naval[Pg 190] combat was a vigorous one on the part of both nations, and for several reasons; especially were the Carthaginians anxious to drive the Romans into complete despair of naval success, and the Romans to retrieve their former disasters. In spite of everything the Romans carried off the victory, for the Carthaginian vessels were impeded by the fact that they carried freight,—grain and money and other things.

Hanno escaped and hastened at once to Carthage. The Carthaginians, seized with wrath and fear, crucified him and sent envoys to Catulus regarding peace. And he was disposed to end the war since his office was soon to expire and he could not hope to destroy Carthage in so short a time; nor, again, did he care to leave his successors the glory of his own efforts. Consequently they effected an armistice by giving him money, grain, and hostages; these preliminaries secured them the right of sending envoys to Rome and proposing as conditions that they retire from Sicily entire, yielding it to the Romans, as well as abandon all the surrounding islands, that they carry on no war with Hiero, and pay an indemnity, a part at the time of making the treaty and a part later, and that they return the Roman deserters and captives free of cost, but ransom their own.

Such were the terms agreed upon. Hamilcar succeeded only in having the disgrace of going under the yoke left out. After settling these conditions he led his soldiers out of the fortifications and sailed for home before the oaths were imposed. The people of Rome[Pg 191] soon learned of the victory and were greatly elated, feeling that their superiority was indisputable. Upon the arrival of envoys they could no longer restrain themselves and hoped to possess all of Libya. Therefore they would not abide by the terms of the consul: instead, they exacted from them a very much larger sum of money than had been promised. They forbade them also to sail past Italy or allied territory abroad in ships of war, or to employ mercenaries from such districts.

The first war between the Carthaginians and the Romans, then, ended this way in the twenty-fourth year. Catulus celebrated a triumph over its conclusion. Quintus Lutatius became consul and departed for Sicily, where with his brother Catulus he enforced order in all communities; and he deprived the islanders of arms. Thus Sicily, with the exception of Hiero's domain, was made a slave of Rome, and from this time its people were on a friendly footing with the Carthaginians.

Both soon were again involved in other wars outside. At Carthage the remnant of their mercenary force and the slave population in the city and a large proportion of their hostages (influenced by the disasters of the State) joined in an attack upon it. The Romans did not heed the invitations to aid the party that had assumed the offensive, but sent envoys in turn for discussion; and when they found themselves unable to reconcile the combatants, they released free of cost all the Carthaginian captives they were holding, sent grain to the city and permitted it to gather mercenaries from Ro[Pg 192]man allied territory. By this action they were seeking to gain a reputation for fairness rather than displaying a real interest in their own advantage, and this later caused them trouble. For the great Hamilcar Barca, after he had conquered his adversaries, did not dare to make a campaign against the Romans, much as he hated them; but he started for Spain contrary to the wishes of the magistrates at home.

VIII, 18.—This, however, took place later. At the time under discussion the Romans entered upon war with the Falisci, and Manlius Torquatus ravaged their country. In a

battle with them his heavy infantry was worsted but his cavalry conquered. In a second engagement with them he was victorious and took possession of their arms, their cavalry, their furniture, their slaves, and half their country. Later on the original city, which was set upon a steep mountain, was torn down and another one was built, easily reached by road. After this the Romans again waged wars upon the Boii and upon the Gauls that were neighbors of the latter, and upon some Ligurians. The Ligurians were conquered in battle and otherwise injured by Sempronius Gracchus: Publius Valerius in a conflict with the Gauls was at first defeated, but soon, learning that troops had come from Rome to his assistance, he renewed the struggle with the Gauls, determined either[Pg 193] to conquer by his own exertions or to die—he preferred that rather than to live and bear the stigma of disgrace; and by some fortune or other he managed to win the day.

B.C.

238

(*a.u.* 516)At this time these events befell the Romans as described. They also secured Sardinia from the Carthaginians and a new supply of money by charging them with harming Roman shipping. The Carthaginians, not having yet recovered strength, feared their threats.—Next year Lucius Lentulus and Quintus Flaccus made a campaign against the Gauls; and as long as they remained together, they were invincible, **B.C. 237** (*a.u.* 517)but when they began to pillage districts separately with the idea of getting greater booty, the army of Flaccus fell into danger, being surrounded by night. Temporarily the barbarians were beaten back, but having gained accessions of allies they proceeded anew with a huge force against the Romans. **B.C. 236** (*a.u.* 518)When confronted by Publius Lentulus and Licinius Varus, they hoped to overcome them by their numbers and prevail without a battle. So they sent and demanded the land surrounding Ariminum and commanded the Romans to remove from the city since it belonged to them. The consuls on account of their small numbers did not dare to risk a battle nor would they take the responsibility of releasing any territory, and accordingly they arranged a truce to confer with Rome. Gallic emissaries came before the senate with the aforementioned representations. As none of their demands was granted, the envoys returned to camp. There they found their cause was[Pg 194] ruined. Some of their allies had repented and regarding the Romans with fear had turned upon the Boii, and many had been killed on both sides. Then the remainder had gone home and the Boii had obtained peace only at the price of a large portion of their land.

The Gallic wars having now ceased, Lentulus conducted a campaign against the Ligurians. He drove off the attacking parties and gained possession of several fortresses.—Varus took Corsica as his objective point, and inasmuch as he lacked the necessary ships to carry him over, he sent a certain Claudius Clineas in advance with troops. The latter terrified the Corsicans, held a conference with them, and made peace as though he had full authority to do so. But Varus, paying no attention to the covenant,

fought against the Corsicans until he had subjugated them. **FRAG. 44**²THE ROMANS TO DIVERT THE BLAME FOR BREAKING THE COMPACT FROM THEMSELVES SENT TO THE PEOPLE OFFERING TO GIVE CLAUDIUS UP. WHEN HE WAS NOT RECEIVED, THEY DROVE HIM INTO EXILE. **FRAG. 45**¹THEY WERE ON THE POINT OF LEADING AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE CARTHAGINIANS ALLEGING THAT THE LATTER WERE COMMITTING OUTRAGES UPON THE MERCHANTS; BUT INSTEAD OF DOING THIS THEY EXACTED MONEY AND RENEWED THE TRUCE. Yet the agreements were not destined even so to be of long standing.—The case of the Carthaginians was accordingly postponed and they made an expedition against the Sardinians, who would not yield obedience, and conquered them. Subsequently the Carthaginians persuaded the Sardinians to plan a secret uprising against the Romans. Besides these the Corsicans also revolted and the Ligurians did not remain at rest.[Pg 195]

B.C.

234

(*a.u.* 520)The following year the Romans divided their forces into three parts in order that all the rebels, finding war waged upon them at once, might not render assistance to one another; and they sent Postumius Albinus into Liguria, Spurius Carvilius against the Corsicans, and Publius Cornelius, the *prætor urbanus*, into Sardinia. And the consuls not without trouble, yet with some speed, accomplished their missions. The Sardinians, animated by an immoderate amount of spirit, were vanquished by Carvilius in a fierce battle, for Cornelius and many of his soldiers had been destroyed by disease. When the Romans left their country, the Sardinians and the Ligurians revolted again. **B.C. 233** (*a.u.* 521)Quintus Fabius Maximus was accordingly sent to Ligurian territory and Pomponius Manius into Sardinia. The Carthaginians, as the cause of the wars, were adjudged enemies, and they sent to them and demanded money and ordained that they should remove their ships from all the islands, since these ports were hostile to them. In making known their attitude the Romans despatched to their rivals a spear and a herald's staff, bidding them choose one, whichever they pleased. But the Carthaginians without shrinking made a rather rough answer and declared that they chose neither of the articles sent them, but were ready to accept either that the challengers might leave there. Henceforth the two nations hated each other but hesitated to begin war.

B.C.

232

(*a.u.* 522)As there was again a hostile movement of the Sardinians against the Romans, both the consuls took the field, Marcus Malleolus and Marcus Æmilius. And they secured rich spoils, which, however, were taken[Pg 196] away from them by the Corsicans when they touched at their island. Hence the Romans next turned their attention to both. **B.C.**

231

(*a.u.* 523)Marcus Pomponius harried Sardinia, but could not find most of the inhabitants, who, as he learned, had slipped into caves of the forest, difficult to locate; therefore he sent for keen-scented dogs from Italy and with their aid he discovered the trail of both men and cattle and cut off many such parties. Gaius Papirius drove the Corsicans from

the plains, but in attempting to force his way to the mountains he lost numerous men through ambush and would have suffered loss of still more through lack of water, had not water after a great while been found; then he persuaded the Corsicans to come to terms.

VIII, 19.—About this time also Hamilcar the Carthaginian general was defeated by the Spaniards and lost his life. For, on the occasion of his being arrayed in battle against them, they led out in front of the Carthaginian army wagons full of pine wood and pitch and as they drew near they set fire to these vehicles, then hurried on with goads the animals that were drawing them. Forthwith their opponents were thrown into confusion, were disorganized and turned to flight, and the Spaniards pursuing killed Hamilcar and a very great number of others. He having reached the very highest pinnacle of fame thus met his end, and at his death his brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded him. The latter acquired a large portion of Spain and founded a city called Carthage, after his native town.

As the Boii and the rest of the Gauls were continually offering for sale many articles and an especially large[Pg 197] number of captives, the Romans became afraid that they might some day use the money against them, and accordingly forbade everybody to give to a Gaul either silver or gold coin.—**B.C. 230 (a.u. 524)** Soon after the Carthaginians, [28] learning that the consuls Marcus Æmilius and Marcus Junius had started for Liguria, made preparations to march upon Rome. The consuls became aware of this and proceeded toward them in force, whereupon the Carthaginians became frightened and met them with all appearances of friendliness. The consuls likewise feigned that they had not set out against them but were going through their country into the Ligurian territory.

Now the Romans crossed the Ionian Gulf and laid hands upon the Greek mainland. They found an excuse for the voyage in the following circumstances. **FRAG. 47¹**ISSA IS AN ISLAND SITUATED IN THE IONIAN GULF. ITS DWELLERS, KNOWN AS ISSÆANS, HAD OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL SURRENDERED THEMSELVES TO THE ROMANS because they were angry with their ruler Agro, king of the Ardiæans and of Illyrian stock. **FRAG. 47²**TO HIM THE CONSULS SENT ENVOYS. But he had died, leaving a son as his successor who was still a mere child, **FRAG. 47²**AND HIS WIFE, THE BOY'S STEPMOTHER, WAS ADMINISTERING THE DOMAIN OF THE ARDIÆANS. HER DEALINGS WITH THE AMBASSADORS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY A LACK OF MODERATION, AND WHEN THEY SPOKE FRANKLY SHE CAST SOME OF THEM INTO PRISON AND KILLED OTHERS. IMMEDIATELY THE ROMANS VOTED FOR WAR AGAINST HER, HOWEVER, SHE WAS PANIC-STRICKEN, PROMISED TO RESTORE THE AMBASSADORS THAT WERE LEFT ALIVE, AND DECLARED[Pg 198] THAT THE DEAD HAD BEEN SLAIN BY ROBBERS. WHEN THE ROMANS DEMANDED THE SURRENDER OF THE MURDERERS, SHE DECLARED THAT SHE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM UP AND DESPATCHED AN ARMY AGAINST ISSA. THEN SHE AGAIN GREW FEARFUL AND SENT A CERTAIN DEMETRIUS TO THE CONSULS, ASSURING THEM OF HER

READINESS TO HEED THEM IN EVERY DETAIL. A TRUCE WAS MADE WITH HER EMISSARY UPON THE LATTER'S AGREEING TO GIVE THEM CORCYRA. YET WHEN THE CONSULS HAD CROSSED OVER TO THE ISLAND, SHE, POSSESSING WOMAN-LIKE A LIGHT AND FICKLE DISPOSITION, FELT IMBUED WITH NEW COURAGE, AND SENT OUT AN ARMY TO EPIDAMNUS AND APOLLONIA. AT THE NEWS THAT THE ROMANS HAD RESCUED THE CITIES, THAT THEY HAD DETAINED SHIPS OF HERS LADEN WITH TREASURE WHICH WERE SAILING HOME FROM THE PELOPONNESUS, THAT THEY HAD DEVASTATED THE COAST REGIONS, THAT DEMETRIUS AS A RESULT OF HER CAPRICIOUSNESS HAD TRANSFERRED HIS ALLEGIANCE TO THE ROMANS BESIDES PERSUADING SOME OTHERS TO DESERT, SHE BECAME UTTERLY TERRIFIED AND WITHDREW FROM HER SOVEREIGNTY. Demetrius as destined guardian of the child was given charge of the ex-queen also. The Romans were thanked by the Corinthians for this action and took part in the Isthmian contest, Plautus winning the stadium race in it. Moreover they formed a friendship with the Athenians and took part in their government and in the Mysteries.

The name Illyricum was anciently applied to various regions, but later it was transferred to the upper mainland, that above Macedonia and Thrace, located this side of Hæmus and toward Rhodope: it lies between these mountains and the Alps, also between the river[Pg 199] Ænus and the Ister, extending as far as the Euxine Sea,—indeed, its boundaries at some points extend beyond the Ister.

(FRAG. 48?)AS AN ORACLE HAD ONCE COME TO THE ROMANS THAT GREEKS AND GAULS SHOULD OCCUPY THE CITY, TWO GAULS AND A COUPLE OF GREEKS, MALE AND FEMALE, WERE BURIED ALIVE IN THE FORUM, that in this way destiny might seem to have fulfilled itself and they be properly regarded, since buried alive, as possessing a part of the city.

After this the Sardinians, deeming it a calamity that a Roman prætor was forever set over them, made an uprising. They were again enslaved, however.

VIII, 20.—The Insubres, a Gallic tribe, having gained allies among their kinsmen beyond the Alps turned their arms against the Romans, and the latter accordingly made counter-preparations. The barbarians plundered some towns, but at last a great storm occurred in the night and they began to suspect that Heaven was against them. Consequently they lost heart and falling into a panic attempted to entrust their safety to flight. B.C.

225

(a.u. 529)Regulus pursued them and brought on an engagement with the rear guards in which he was defeated and lost his life. Æmilius occupied a hill and remained quiet. The Gauls in turn occupied another one and for several days were inactive; then the Romans through anger at what had taken place and the barbarians from arrogance born of the victory charged down from the heights and came to blows. For a long time the battle was evenly con[Pg 200]tested, but finally the Romans surrounded them with their horse, cut them down, seized their camp, and got back the spoils. After this Æmilius wrought havoc among the possessions of the Boii and FRAG. 49³CELEBRATED A

TRIUMPH, IN WHICH HE CONVEYED THE FOREMOST CAPTIVES CLAD IN ARMOR UP TO THE CAPITOL, MAKING JESTS AT THEIR EXPENSE FOR HAVING SWORN NOT TO REMOVE THEIR BREASTPLATES BEFORE THEY HAD MOUNTED THE CAPITOL. The Romans now secured control of the entire territory of the Boii and for the first time crossed the Po to take the offensive against the Insubres; and they continued to ravage their country.

Meanwhile portents had occurred which threw the people of Rome into great fear. A river in Picenum ran the color of blood, in Etruria a good part of the heavens seemed to be on fire, at Ariminum a light like daylight blazed out at night, in many portions of Italy the shapes of three moons became visible in the night time, and in the Forum a vulture roosted for several days. **B.C. 223 (a.u. 531)** Because of these portents and inasmuch as some declared that the consuls had been illegally chosen, they summoned them home. The consuls received the letter but did not open it immediately, since they were just entering upon war: instead, they joined battle first and came out victorious. After the battle the letter was read, and Furius was for obeying without discussion; but Flaminius was elated over the victory and pointed out that it had proved their choice to be correct, and he went on with vehement assertions that it was because they were jealous of him that the [Pg 201] influential men were even falsifying heavenly warnings. Consequently he refused to depart until he had settled the whole business in hand, and he said he would teach the people at home, too, not to be deceived by relying on birds or any other such thing. So he was anxious to remain on the ground and made repeated attempts to detain his colleague, but Furius would not heed him. But since the men who were going to be left behind with Flaminius dreaded lest in their isolation they might suffer some disaster at the hands of their opponents and begged him to stay by them for a few days, he yielded to their entreaties but did not take part in any action. Flaminius traveled about laying waste the country, subjugated a few forts, and bestowed all the spoils upon the soldiers as a means of winning their favor. At length the leaders returned home and were put on trial by the senate for their disobedience (on account of their anger towards Flaminius they subjected Furius also to disgrace); but the populace was against the senate and showed emulation in Flaminius's behalf, so that it voted them a triumph. After celebrating it they laid down their office.

B.C. 222 (a.u. 532) Other consuls, Claudius Marcellus and Gnæus Scipio, chosen in their stead, made an expedition against the Insubres, for the Romans had not complied with the latter's requests by voting for peace. Together at first they carried on the war and were in most cases victorious. Soon, learning that the allied territory was being plundered, they severed their [Pg 202] forces. Marcellus made a quick march against those plundering the land of the allies, but did not find them on the scene; he then pursued them as they fled and when they made a stand overcame them. Scipio remained where he was and proceeded to besiege Acerræ; he took it and made it a base for the war, since

it was favorably located and well walled. Starting from that point they subdued Mediolanum and another village-town. After these had been captured the rest of the Insubres also made terms with them, giving them money and a section of the land.

B.C. **221**
(*a.u.* 533)

B.C. **220**
(*a.u.* 534)

FRAG. 51 Thereafter Publius Cornelius and Marcus Minucius made a campaign to the Ister regions and brought into subjection many of the nations there, some by war and some on terms agreed upon. Lucius Veturius and Gaius Lutatius went as far as the Alps and without any fighting established Roman sovereignty over many people. The prince of the Ardiæans, however, DEMETRIUS, WAS, AS HAS BEEN STATED ABOVE, HATEFUL TO THE NATIVES AND INJURED THE PROPERTY OF NEIGHBORING TRIBES; AND IT APPEARED THAT IT WAS BY MISUSING THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE ROMANS THAT HE WAS ABLE TO WRONG THOSE PEOPLES. **B.C.** **219**

(*a.u.* 535) AS SOON AS THE CONSULS, ÆMILIUS PAULUS AND MARCUS LIVIUS, HEARD OF THIS THEY SUMMONED HIM BEFORE THEM. WHEN HE REFUSED COMPLIANCE AND ACTUALLY ASSAILED THEIR ALLIES, THEY MADE A CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISSA, WHERE HE WAS. And having received advance information that he was lying secretly at anchor somewhere in the vicinity of the landing-places they sent a portion of their ships to the other side of the island to bring on an engagement.[Pg 203] When the Illyrians accordingly fell upon the reconnoitering party, thinking them alone, the main body approached at leisure in their ships and after pitching camp in a suitable place repulsed the natives, who, angry at the trick, lost no time in attacking them. Demetrius made his escape to Pharos, another island, but they sailed to that, overcame resistance, and captured the city by betrayal, only to find Demetrius fled. He at this time reached Macedonia with large amounts of money and went to Philip, the king of the country. He was not surrendered by him, but on returning to the Illyrians was arrested by the Romans and was executed.

[Pg 204]

(BOOK 13, BOISSEVAIN.)

B.C. **218**

(*a.u.* 536) VIII, 21.—In the succeeding year the Romans became openly hostile to the Carthaginians, and the war, though of far shorter duration than the previous one, proved to be both greater and more baneful in its exploits and effects. It was brought on chiefly by Hannibal, general of the Carthaginians. This Hannibal was a child of Hamilcar Barca, and from his earliest boyhood had been trained to fight against the Romans. Hamilcar said he was raising all his sons like so many whelps to fight against them, but as he saw that this one's nature was far superior to that of the rest, he made him take an oath that he would wage war upon them, and for this reason he instructed the boy in

warfare above all else when only fifteen years old. On account of this youthfulness Hannibal was not able, when his father died, to succeed to the generalship. But when Hasdrubal was dead, he delayed no longer, being now twenty-six years of age, but at once took possession of the army in Spain and after being acclaimed as leader by the soldiers brought it about that his right to lead was confirmed also by those in authority at home. After effecting this he needed a plausible excuse for his enterprise against the Romans, and this he found in the Saguntines of Spain. These people, dwelling not far from the river Iber and a short distance above the sea, were dependents of the Romans, and the latter held them in honor and in the treaty[Pg 205] with the Carthaginians had made an exception of them. For these reasons, then, Hannibal began a war with them, knowing that the Romans would either assist the Saguntines or avenge them if they suffered injury. Hence for these reasons as well as because he knew that they possessed great wealth, which he particularly needed, and for various other causes that promised him advantages against the Romans he made an attack upon the Saguntines.

Spain, in which the Saguntines dwell, and all the adjoining land is in the western part of Europe. It extends for a considerable distance along the inner sea, beside the Pillars of Hercules, and along the ocean; furthermore it occupies the upper part of the mainland for a very great distance, as far as the Pyrenees. **FRAG. 53**THIS RANGE, BEGINNING AT THE SEA CALLED ANCIENTLY THE SEA OF THE BEBRYCES BUT LATER THE SEA OF THE NARBONENSES, REACHES TO THE GREAT OUTER SEA, AND CONFINES MANY DIVERSE NATIONALITIES; IT ALSO SEPARATES SPAIN FROM THE NEIGHBORING LAND OF GAUL. The tribes did not employ the same language nor carry on a common government. This resulted in their not having a single name. The Romans called them Hispanii, but the Greeks Iberians, from the river Iber.

These Saguntines, then, being besieged sent to those near them and to the Romans asking for aid. But Hannibal checked any local movement, and the Romans sent ambassadors to him bidding him not come near the Saguntines, and threatening in case he should not obey to sail to Carthage at once and lay accusations[Pg 206] against him. When the envoys were now close at hand, Hannibal sent some of the natives who were to pretend that they were kindly disposed to them and were instructed to say that the general was not there but had gone some distance away into parts unknown; they advised the enemy, therefore (they were to say), to depart as quickly as possible and before their presence should be reported lest in the disorder prevailing because of the absence of the general they should lose their lives. The envoys accordingly believed them and set off for Carthage. An assembly being called some of the Carthaginians counseled maintaining peace with the Romans, but the party attached to Hannibal affirmed that the Saguntines were guilty of wrongdoing and the Romans were meddling with what did not concern them. Finally those who urged them to make war won the day.

Meanwhile Hannibal in the course of his siege was conducting vigorous assaults. Many kept falling and many more were being wounded on Hannibal's side. One day the Carthaginians succeeded in shaking down a portion of the outer circuit and had been daring enough to enter through the breach, when the Saguntines made a sortie and scared them away. This gave the besieged strength and the Carthaginians fell back in dejection. They did not leave the spot, however, till they had captured the city, though the siege dragged on to the eighth month. Many unusual events happened in that time, one of which was Hannibal's being dangerously wounded. The place was taken in this[Pg 207] manner. They brought to bear against the wall an engine much higher than the fortification and carrying heavy-armed soldiers, some visible, some concealed. While the Saguntines, therefore, were quite strenuously fighting against the men they saw, thinking them the only ones, those hidden had dug through the wall from below and found their way inside. The Saguntines overwhelmed by the unexpectedness of the event ran up to the citadel and held a conference to see whether by any reasonable concessions they might be preserved. But as Hannibal held out no moderate terms and no assistance came to them from the Romans, they begged for a cessation of the assaults until they should deliberate a little about their position. During this respite they gathered together the most highly prized of their treasures and cast them into the fire; then such as were incapable of fighting committed suicide, and those who were in their prime advanced in a body against their opponents and in a desperate struggle were cut down.

VIII, 22.—For their sakes the Romans and the Carthaginians embarked upon war. Hannibal after gaining numerous allies was hastening toward Italy. The Romans on ascertaining this assembled in their senate-hall, and many speeches were delivered. Lucius Cornelius Lentulus addressed the people and said they must not delay but vote for war against the Carthaginians and separate consuls and armies into two detachments, and send the one to Spain and the other to Libya, in order that at one and the same time the land[Pg 208] of the enemy might be desolated and his allies injured; thus neither would he be able to assist Spain nor could he himself receive assistance from there. To this Quintus Fabius Maximus rejoined that it was not so absolutely and inevitably necessary to vote for war, but they could first employ an embassy, and then if the Carthaginians persuaded them that they were guilty of no wrong, they should remain quiet, but if the same people were convicted of wrongdoing, they might thereupon wage war against them, "in order," he said, "that we may cast the responsibility for the war upon them." **FRAG. 54⁹**THE OPINIONS OF THE TWO MEN WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THESE. THE SENATE DECIDED TO MAKE PREPARATIONS, TO BE SURE, FOR CONFLICT, BUT TO DESPATCH ENVOYS TO CARTHAGE AND DENOUNCE HANNIBAL; AND IF THE CARTHAGINIANS REFRAINED FROM APPROVING THE EXPLOITS, THEY WOULD ARBITRATE THE MATTER, OR IF ALL RESPONSIBILITY WERE LAID UPON HIS SHOULDERS, THEY WOULD DEMAND HIS EXTRADITION, AND IF HE WERE NOT GIVEN UP, THEY WOULD DECLARE WAR UPON THE NATION.

The envoys set out and the Carthaginians considered what must be done. And a certain Hasdrubal, one of those who had been primed by Hannibal, counseled them that they ought to get back their ancient freedom and shake off by means of money and troops and allies, all welded together, the slavery imposed by peace, adding: "If you only permit Hannibal to act as he wishes, the proper thing will be done and you will have no trouble." After such words on his part the great Hanno, opposing Hasdrubal's argument, gave it as his opinion that they ought not to draw war upon them[Pg 209]selves lightly nor for small complaints concerning foreigners, when it was in their power to settle a part of the difficulty and divert the rest of it upon the heads of those who had been active in the matter. With these remarks he ceased, and the elder Carthaginians who remembered the former war sided with him, but those in robust manhood and especially all the partisans of Hannibal violently gainsaid him. **FRAG. 54¹⁰**INASMUCH, THEN, AS THEY MADE NO DEFINITE ANSWER AND SHOWED CONTEMPT FOR THE ENVOYS, MARCUS FABIVS THRUSTING HIS HANDS BENEATH HIS TOGA AND HOLDING THEM WITH PALMS UPWARD SAID: "HERE I BRING TO YOU, CARTHAGINIANS, BOTH WAR AND PEACE: DO YOU CHOOSE WHICHEVER OF THEM YOU WISH." UPON THEIR REPLYING THAT THEY CHOSE NEITHER, BUT WOULD READILY ACCEPT EITHER THAT THE ROMANS SHOULD LEAVE, HE IMMEDIATELY DECLARED WAR UPON THEM.

In this way, then, and for these reasons the Romans and the Carthaginians became involved in war for the second time. And the Divinity beforehand indicated what was to come to pass. For in Rome an ox talked with a human voice, and another at the Ludi Romani threw himself out of a house into the Tiber and was lost, many thunderbolts fell, and blood in one case was seen coming from sacred statues whereas in another it dripped from the shield of a soldier, and the sword of another soldier was snatched by a wolf from the very midst of the camp. Many unknown wild beasts went before Hannibal leading the way, as he was crossing the Iber, and a vision appeared to him in a dream. He thought that the gods once, sitting in assembly, sent for[Pg 210] him and bade him march with all speed into Italy and receive from them a guide for the way, and that by this guide he was commanded to follow without turning around. He did turn around, however, and saw a great tempest moving and an immense serpent accompanying it. In surprise he asked his conductor what these creatures were; and the guide said: "Hannibal, they are on their way to help you in the sack of Italy."

[Pg 211]

(BOOK 14, BOISSEVAIN.)

VIII, 23.—These things inspired Hannibal with a firm hope, but threw the Romans into a state of profound terror. The Romans divided their forces into two parts and sent out the consuls,—Sempronius Longus to Sicily and Publius Scipio to Spain. Hannibal, desiring to invade Italy with all possible speed, marched on hurriedly and traversed without fighting the whole of Gaul lying between the Pyrenees and the Rhone. As far

as the Rhone river no one came to oppose him, but at that point Scipio showed himself although he had no troops with him. Nevertheless with the help of the natives and their nearest neighbors he had already destroyed the boats in the river and had posted guards over the stream. Hannibal therefore used up some time in building rafts and skiffs, some of them out of a single log of wood, but still with the help of a large corps of workers had everything in readiness that was needful for crossing before Scipio's own army could arrive. He sent his brother Mago accompanied by the horsemen and a few light troops to cross at a point where the river is scattered over considerable breadth, with branches separated by islands; he himself, of course, proceeded by way of the natural ford, his object being that the Gauls should be deceived and array themselves against him only, while they set their guards with less care at other points along the river. This object was accomplished. Mago had already got[Pg 212] across the river when Hannibal and his followers were crossing by the ford. On reaching the middle of the stream they raised a war cry and the trumpeters joined with the blare of their instruments, and Mago fell upon their antagonists from the rear. In this way the elephants and all the rest were ferried safely over. They had just finished crossing when Scipio's own force arrived. Both sides, then, sent horsemen to reconnoitre, after which they entered upon a cavalry battle with the same results as attended the war as a whole. The Romans, that is, after first seeming to get the worst of it and losing a number of men were victorious.

Then Hannibal, in haste to set out for Italy but suspicious of the more direct roads, turned aside from them and followed another, on which he underwent bitter hardships. The mountains there are exceedingly precipitous and the snow falling in great quantities was driven by the winds and filled the chasms, and the ice was frozen to a great thickness. These things conspired to cause them fearful suffering, and many of his soldiers perished through the winter cold and lack of food; many also returned home. There is a story to the effect that he himself would also have turned back but for the fact that the road already traversed was longer and more difficult than the portion left before him. For this reason he did not retrace his steps, but suddenly appearing south of the Alps spread astonishment and terror among the Romans.

So he advanced taking possession of whatever lay before him. Scipio sent his brother Gaius[29] Scipio, who was serving as a lieutenant under him, into Spain to[Pg 213] either seize and hold it or bring Hannibal back, but he himself marched against Hannibal. They waited a few days; then both moved into action. **FRAG. 56⁴**BEFORE BEGINNING OPERATIONS, HANNIBAL CALLED TOGETHER THE SOLDIERS AND BROUGHT IN THE CAPTIVES WHOM HE HAD TAKEN BY THE WAY: HE ASKED THE LATTER WHETHER THEY CHOSE TO UNDERGO IMPRISONMENT AND TO ENDURE A GRIEVOUS SLAVERY, OR TO FIGHT IN SINGLE COMBAT WITH ONE ANOTHER ON CONDITION THAT THE VICTORS SHOULD BE RELEASED WITHOUT RANSOM. WHEN THEY ACCEPTED THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, HE SET THEM TO FIGHTING. AND AT THE END OF THE CONFLICT HE ADDRESSED his own soldiers, encouraging them and whetting their eagerness for war.

Scipio also did this on the Roman side. Then the contest began and looked at the outset as if it would involve the entire armies: but Scipio in a preliminary cavalry skirmish was defeated, lost many men, was wounded and would have been killed, had not his son Scipio, though only seventeen years old, come to his aid; he was consequently alarmed lest his infantry should similarly meet with a reverse, and he at once fell back and that night withdrew from the field.

VIII, 24.—Hannibal did not learn of his withdrawal till daybreak and then went to the Po, and finding there neither rafts nor boats,—for they had been burned by Scipio,—he ordered his brother Mago to swim across with the cavalry and pursue the Romans, whereas he himself marched up toward the sources of the river and commanded that the elephants cross where the tributary streams converged. In this manner, while the water was temporarily dammed and torn piecemeal by the animals' bulk, he effected a crossing more easily below[Pg 214] them. Scipio overtaken stood his ground and would have offered battle but for the fact that by night the Gauls in his army deserted. Embarrassed by this occurrence and still suffering from his wound he once more broke up at night and located his entrenchments on high ground. He was not pursued, but subsequently the Carthaginians came up and encamped, with the river between the two forces.

Scipio on account of his wound and because of what had taken place was inclined to wait and send for reinforcements; and Hannibal after many attempts to provoke him to battle, finding that he could not do this and that he was short of food, attacked a fort where a large supply for the Romans was stored. As he made no headway he employed money to bribe the commander of the garrison, which thus came into his possession by betrayal. He hoped also to attain his other objects, partly by arms and partly by gold. Meanwhile Longus had entrusted Sicily to his lieutenant and had come in response to Scipio's call. Not much later influenced by ambition on the one hand and also by the fact of a victory over some marauders he presented himself in battle array. He lost the day by falling into an ambuscade, and when Hannibal appeared upon the scene with his infantry and elephants the followers of the Roman leader turned to flight and many were put to the sword, many also heedless of the river fell in and were choked. Only a few saved themselves with Longus. However, Hannibal though victorious was not happy, because he had lost many soldiers and all of his elephants, except one, as a result of the winter and from wounds.[Pg 215]

Accordingly, they arranged an armistice without any desire for peace implied and both sides retired to the territory of their allies and passed the winter in the cities there. Plenty of provisions kept coming to the Romans, but Hannibal, not satisfied with the contributions of the allies, made frequent raids upon the Roman villages and cities and sometimes would conquer, sometimes be repulsed. Once he was beaten by Longus with the cavalry and received a wound. Some of the Roman settlers encouraged by this came out by themselves to oppose him when he assailed them. These would-be warriors he

destroyed and received the capitulation of the place, which he razed to the ground. Of the captives taken he killed the Romans but released the rest. This he did also in the case of all those taken alive, hoping to conciliate the cities by their influence. And, indeed, many of the Gauls as well as Ligurians and Etruscans either murdered the Romans dwelling within their borders or surrendered them and then transferred their allegiance.

As Hannibal was advancing toward Etruria Longus attacked him in the midst of a great storm. Many fell on both sides and Hannibal entered Ligurian territory and delayed some time. He was suspicious of even his own men and was free to trust no one, but made frequent changes of costume, wore false hair, spoke different languages at different times (for he knew a number, including Latin) and both night and day he would frequently make the rounds of his camp. He was always listening to some conversations in the guise of an[Pg 216] entirely different person from Hannibal and occasionally he talked thus in character.

VIII, 25.—While this was going on in Italy the other Scipio, Gaius, had sailed along the coast to Spain, and had won over, partly by force and partly without opposition, all the districts to the Iber that border on the sea and considerable of the upper peninsula. He had also defeated Banno in battle and had taken him prisoner. Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, on learning this crossed the Iber and reduced some of the rebels, but at Scipio's approach he fell back.

B.C.

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(*a.u.* 537)The people of Rome again chose Flaminius and Geminus consuls. Just after the advent of spring Hannibal was apprised that Flaminius together with Servilius Geminus would march against him with a large force, and he devoted his attention to deceiving them. He pretended that he was going to spend his time and meet the issue where he was, and when the Romans, thinking that he was permanently located, began to show carelessness in their line of march, he started just after nightfall, leaving his cavalry behind at camp, noiselessly traversed the passes and hastened on toward Aretium; and the cavalry, after he had got far ahead, set out to follow him. When the consuls found out that they had been tricked, Geminus stayed behind to harass the revolted districts and prevent them from assisting the Carthaginians, and Flaminius alone pursued, eager that his alone should be the credit of the expected victory. He succeeded in occupying Aretium beforehand, for Hannibal in taking a shorter road had[Pg 217] encountered difficult marching, and had lost numerous men, many pack animals, and one of his eyes. It was late, then, before he reached Aretium and found there Flaminius, whom he regarded with contempt. He did not give battle, for the situation was unsuitable, but by way of testing his enemy's disposition he laid waste the country. At this the Romans made a sally and he retired, to give them the idea that he was afraid. During the night he broke up and found a satisfactory spot for battle, where he remained. He arranged that most of the infantry should form an ambush along the

mountain sides and ordered all the cavalry to lie in wait concealed from view outside the pass; he himself encamped with a few followers on the hilltop. Flaminius was in good spirits and when he saw him with but a few men on the high ground he believed that the rest of the army must have been sent to some distant point and hoped to take him easily thus isolated. So he carelessly entered the mouth of the pass and there (for it was late) pitched camp. About midnight, when they were sleeping unguarded through scorn of their enemies, the Carthaginians surrounded them on every side at once and by using from a distance javelins, slings, and arrows they killed some still in their beds, others just seizing their arms, without receiving any serious harm in return. The Romans, having no tangible adversaries and with darkness and mist prevailing, found no chance to employ their valor. So great was the uproar and of such a nature the disordered alarm that seized them, that they were not even aware of earthquakes then[Pg 218] prevailing, although many buildings fell in ruins and many mountains either were cleft asunder or collapsed so that they blocked up ravines, and rivers shut off from their ancient outlet sought another. Such were the earthquakes which overwhelmed Etruria, yet the combatants were not conscious of them. Flaminius himself and a vast number of others fell, though not a few managed to climb a hill. When it became day, they started to flee and being overtaken surrendered themselves and their arms on promise of free pardon. Hannibal, however, recking little of his oaths, imprisoned and kept under guard the Romans themselves, but released their subjects and allies among all the captives he had in his army. After this success he hastened toward Rome and proceeded as far as Narnia devastating the country and winning over the cities, save Spoletium; there he surrounded and slew the praetor Gaius Centenius who was in ambush. He made an attack upon Spoletium, but was repulsed, and as he saw that the bridge over the Nar had been torn down and ascertained that this had been done also in the case of the other rivers which he was obliged to cross, he ceased his headlong rush upon Rome. Instead, he turned aside into Campania, for he heard that the land was excellent and that Capua was a great city, and thought that if he should first occupy these he might acquire the rest of Italy in a short time.

The people of Rome when informed of the defeat were grieved and lamented both for themselves and for the lost. They were in sore straits and tore down the[Pg 219] bridges over the Tiber, save one, and proceeded hurriedly to repair their walls, which were weak in many places. **FRAG. 56⁹**WISHING TO HAVE A DICTATOR READY, THEY HAD PROCLAIMED ONE IN ASSEMBLY. SATISFIED IF THEY THEMSELVES ONLY SHOULD BE SAVED, THEY HAD DESPATCHED NO AID TO THE ALLIES. BUT NOW, LEARNING THAT HANNIBAL HAD SET OUT INTO CAMPANIA, THEY DETERMINED TO ASSIST THE ALLIES ALSO. To Hannibal they opposed the dictator Fabius and the master of horse Marcus Minucius. These leaders set out in his direction but did not come into close quarters with him. They followed and kept him in view in the hope that a favorable opportunity for battle might possibly befall. Fabius was unwilling to risk a conflict with cowed and beaten soldiers against a greater number who had been victorious. Furthermore he

hoped that the more his foes should injure the country, the sooner would they be in want of food. Calculating in this way he did not defend Campania nor any other district. For these reasons he confined hostilities entirely within Campania; unknown to the enemy he had surrounded them on every side and now kept guard over them. He himself secured an abundance of provisions both from the sea and from the territory of allies, but the invaders, he knew, had only the products of the land which they were devastating to depend upon. Therefore he waited and did not mind the delay. Hence also he was blamed by his fellow-citizens and was even given the name of The Delayer.

VIII, 26.—When it came to be nearly winter and Hannibal could not pass that season where he was owing to a lack of the necessities of life and had been[Pg 220] checked in many attempts to get out of Campania, he devised a plan of this kind. He first slew all the captives, that no one of them might escape and acquaint the Romans with what was being done. Then he gathered the cattle which were in camp, affixed torches to their horns, and went at nightfall to the mountains forming the boundary of Samnium, where he lighted the torches and threw the cattle into a fright. They, maddened by the fire and the driving, set fire to the forest in many places and consequently rendered it easy for Hannibal to cross the mountains. The Romans in the plain as well as those on the heights dreaded an ambushade and would not budge. Thus Hannibal got across and made his way into Samnium.

Fabius, ascertaining the next day what had been done, gave chase and routed those left behind on the road to hinder his men's progress, afterward defeating also troops that came to the assistance of the first party. He then encamped not far from the enemy, yet would not come into conflict with them. However, he prevented them from scattering and foraging, so that Hannibal in perplexity at first started for Rome. As Fabius would not fight, but quietly accompanied him, he again turned back into Samnium. **FRAG. 56¹⁰**AND FABIUS FOLLOWING ON CONTINUED TO BESIEGE HIM FROM A SAFE DISTANCE, BEING ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE ANY OF HIS OWN TROOPS, especially since he could obtain necessities in abundance, whereas he saw that his foe actually possessed nothing outside of his weapons and that no assistance was sent to him from home. **FRAG. 56¹¹**FOR THE CARTHAGINIANS WERE DISPOSED TO MAKE SPORT OF HIM IN THAT HE WROTE OF HIS SPLENDID PROGRESS AND HIS MANY SUCCESSES AND IN THE SAME BREATH ASKED SOLDIERS OF THEM AND MONEY. THEY SAID THAT HIS REQUESTS WERE NOT IN ACCORD WITH HIS SUCCESSES: CONQUERORS OUGHT TO FIND THEIR ARMY SUFFICIENT, AND TO FORWARD MONEY TO THEIR HOMES INSTEAD OF DEMANDING MORE.

As long as Fabius was in the field, no disaster happened to the Romans, but when he started for Rome on some public business, they met with a setback. Rufus, his master of horse, was only a young man and therefore full of empty conceit; he was not observant of the errors of warfare and was wearied by the delays of Fabius: hence, when he once held the leadership of the army alone, he disregarded the injunctions of the

dictator and hastened to bring on a set battle, in which at first he seemed to be victorious, but was soon defeated. Indeed, he would have been utterly destroyed, had not some Samnites arrived by chance to aid the Romans and impressed the Carthaginians with the idea that Fabius was approaching. When for this reason they retired he thought that he had vanquished them and sent messages to Rome magnifying his exploit and also slandering the dictator; he called Fabius timorous and hesitating and a sympathizer with the enemy.

The people of Rome believed that Rufus had really conquered, and in view of this unexpected encouragement they commended and honored him. They were suspicious of Fabius both because of the outcome and because he had not ravaged his own land in Campania, and it would have taken but little to make them depose[Pg 222] him from his command. However, as they believed him useful, **FRAG. 56¹⁴**THEY DID NOT DEPOSE HIM BUT THEY ASSIGNED EQUAL POWER TO HIS MASTER OF HORSE SO THAT BOTH HELD COMMAND ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. WHEN THIS HAD BEEN DECREED, FABIUS HARBORED NO WRATH AGAINST EITHER THE CITIZENS OR RUFUS; BUT RUFUS, WHO HAD NOT SHOWN THE RIGHT SPIRIT IN THE FIRST PLACE, WAS NOW ESPECIALLY PUFFED UP AND COULD NOT CONTAIN HIMSELF. HE KEPT ASKING FOR THE RIGHT TO HOLD SOLE SWAY A DAY AT A TIME, OR FOR SEVERAL DAYS ALTERNATELY. FABIUS, POSSESSED WITH DREAD THAT HE MIGHT WORK SOME HARM IF HE SHOULD GET POSSESSION OF THE UNDIVIDED POWER, WOULD NOT CONSENT TO EITHER PLAN OF HIS, BUT DIVIDED THE ARMY IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY EACH, THE SAME AS THE CONSULS, HAD A SEPARATE FORCE. AND IMMEDIATELY RUFUS ENCAMPED APART, IN ORDER TO ILLUSTRATE THE FACT THAT HE WAS HOLDING SWAY IN HIS OWN RIGHT AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE DICTATOR. Hannibal, accordingly, perceiving this came up as if to seize a position, and drew him into battle. He then encompassed him about by means of an ambushade and plunged him into danger, to such an extent, indeed, that he would have annihilated his entire army, if Fabius had not assailed Hannibal in the rear and prevented it.

After this experience **FRAG. 56¹⁶**RUFUS ALTERED HIS ATTITUDE, LED THE REMNANT OF THE ARMY IMMEDIATELY INTO FABIUS'S QUARTERS AND LAID DOWN HIS COMMAND. HE DID NOT WAIT FOR THE PEOPLE TO REVOKE IT, BUT VOLUNTARILY GAVE UP THE LEADERSHIP WHICH HE, A MERE MASTER OF THE HORSE, HAD OBTAINED FROM HIS SUPERIOR. AND FOR THIS ALL PRAISED HIM. AND FABIUS AT ONCE, NOTHING DOUBTING, ACCEPTED ENTIRE CONTROL AND THE PEOPLE[Pg 223] SANCTIONED IT. **FRAG. 56¹⁷**THEREAFTER AS HEAD OF THE ARMY HE AFFORDED GREATEST SECURITY, AND WHEN ABOUT TO RETIRE FROM OFFICE SENT FOR THE CONSULS, SURRENDERED THE ARMY TO THEM, AND ADVISED THEM VERY FULLY REGARDING ALL THE DETAILS OF WHAT MUST BE DONE. AND THEY WERE NOT UNDULY BOLD, BUT ACTED ENTIRELY ON THE SUGGESTION OF FABIUS, notwithstanding that Geminus had had some previous success. He had seen the Carthaginian fleet at anchor off Italy but not venturing to display any hostility because of the Roman ability to meet it, and he had started on a

retaliatory voyage, first making sure the good conduct of the Corsicans and Sardinians by a cruise past their coasts; he had then landed in Libya and plundered the shore district. In spite of this achievement he was not so puffed up by it as to risk a decisive engagement with Hannibal, but was willing to abide by the injunctions of Fabius. One consequence was that the cities were no longer found siding with the Carthaginians, as they had done; for they feared that Hannibal would be driven out of Italy and they themselves suffer some calamity at the hands of the Romans since they were their kinsmen. The majority were engaged in trying to read the future, but a few again espoused the Roman cause, and some sent them offerings. And though Hiero often sent grain (and also sent a statue of Victory), the Romans accepted it only once. Yet they were in such hard straits for money that the silver coinage which was previously unalloyed and pure was now mixed with copper.

IX, 1.—All this is what took place in Italy at that period. Some slaves also formed a conspiracy against Rome, but were apprehended in advance. And a spy[Pg 224] caught in the city had his hands cut off and was released that he might tell the Carthaginians his experience with his own lips.—In Spain in a sea-fight near the mouth of the Iber Scipio was victorious; for when the struggle proved to be too even, the sails were cut down in order that the men being placed in a desperate position might struggle more zealously. He also ravaged the country, got possession of numerous fortresses and through his brother Publius Scipio gained control of some Spanish cities. A Spaniard named Habelux affecting loyalty to the Carthaginians but in reality in the Roman service persuaded the Carthaginian guardian of the Spanish hostages to send them to their homes, in order that they might use their influence to bring their cities into friendly relations. Habelux naturally took charge of them, inasmuch as he had been the one to suggest the idea, but first sent to the Scipios and held a discussion about what he desired; then, while he was secretly taking the hostages away by night, he of course got captured. In this way it was the Romans who obtained possession of these men and acquired control of their native states by returning them to their homes.

[Pg 225]

(BOOK 15, BOISSEVAIN.)

B.C.

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(*a.u.* 538) Though in these matters they were fortunate, they encountered elsewhere a fearful disaster, than which they never suffered one more terrible either earlier or subsequently. It was preceded by certain portents and the solemn verses of the Sibyl which had prophesied the disaster to them so many years before. Remarkable was also the prediction of Marcius. He also was a soothsayer and it was his rede that, inasmuch as they were Trojans of old, they should be overthrown in the Plain of Diomed. This was in Daunian Apulia and took its name from the settlement of Diomed, which he made there in the course of his wanderings. In that plain is also Cannæ, where the

present misfortune occurred, close to the Ionian Gulf and near the mouths of the Aufidus. The Sibyl had urged them to beware of the spot, yet said it would avail them naught, even if they should keep it under strictest guard.

Such were the oracular utterances: now what befell the Romans was this. **FRAG. 56**²¹THE COMMANDERS WERE ÆMILIUS PAULUS AND TERENCE VARRO, MEN NOT OF SIMILAR TEMPERAMENT. FOR THE ONE WAS A PATRICIAN, POSSESSED OF THE GRACES OF EDUCATION, AND ESTEEMED SAFETY BEFORE HASTE: BUT TERENCE HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP AMONG THE RABBLE, WAS PRACTICED IN VULGAR BRAVADO, AND SO DISPLAYED LACK OF PRUDENCE IN NEARLY ALL RESPECTS, THINKING, FOR INSTANCE, THAT HE ALONE SHOULD HAVE THE LEADERSHIP IN VIEW OF THE QUIET BEHAVIOR OF HIS COLLEAGUE. NOW THEY BOTH REACHED THE CAMP AT A[Pg 226] MOST OPPORTUNE TIME: HANNIBAL HAD NO LONGER ANY PROVENDER; SPAIN WAS IN TURMOIL; THE AFFECTION OF THE ALLIES WAS BEING ALIENATED FROM HIM; AND IF THEY HAD WAITED FOR EVEN THE BRIEFEST POSSIBLE PERIOD, THEY WOULD HAVE CONQUERED. AS MATTERS WENT, HOWEVER, THE RECKLESSNESS OF TERENCE AND THE SUBMISSIVENESS OF PAULUS COMPASSED THEIR DEFEAT. Hannibal attempted to lead them into a conflict at once, and with a few followers drew near their stronghold: then, when a sortie was made, he purposely fell back to create the impression of being afraid and so drew them the more surely into a set battle. But, as Paulus restrained his own soldiers from pursuit, Hannibal simulated terror and that night packed up as if to depart; and he left behind him numerous articles lying within the palisade and ordered the rest of the baggage to be escorted with a considerable show of carelessness so as to make the Romans devote their attention to plundering it and give him thereby a chance to attack them. He would have translated his wish into fact, if Paulus had not held back his soldiers, in spite of their reluctance, and held back Terence as well.

So Hannibal, having failed in this essay also, came by night to Cannæ, and since he knew the place as one fit for ambuscades and for a pitched battle, he encamped there. And first he ploughed the whole site over, because it had a sandy subsoil and his object was to have a cloud of dust raised in the conflict; the wind generally springs up there in summer toward noon, and he contrived to get it behind his back. The consuls seeing at dawn that his stockade was empty of men at first waited, apprehending ambush, but later in[Pg 227] the broad daylight came to Cannæ. Each of the Roman leaders bivouacked apart beside the river, for since they were not congenial they avoided association together. Paulus remained quiet, but Terence was anxious to force the issue; when he saw, however, that the soldiers were rather listless, he gave up the idea. But Hannibal, who was determined to goad them into battle even against their will, shut them off from their sources of water, prevented their scattering into small parties, and threw the bodies of the slain into the stream above their intrenchments and in plain sight, in order to disgust them with the drinking supply. Then the Romans started to array themselves for battle. Hannibal anticipating this movement had planted

ambuscades at the foot of the hills but held the remainder of his army drawn up. He also ordered some men at a given signal to simulate desertion; they were to throw away their shields and spears and larger swords but secretly to retain their daggers, so that after his antagonists had received them as unarmed, they might attack them unexpectedly.

The Romans having had in view since early morning the troops arrayed about Hannibal were now arming themselves and taking their places. The trumpets incited both parties, the signals were raised, and then ensued the clash of battle and a contest which assumed a variety of aspects. Until noon the advantage had not fallen distinctly to either side. Then the wind came up and the false deserters were received as men destitute of arms and got behind the Romans, alleging the very natural reason that they wanted to be out of the way of the Carthaginian attack. At this moment the men rose from ambush on both sides, Hannibal with his cavalry charged the front ranks, the enemy confused the Romans on every hand, the wind and the dust cloud assailed their faces violently, causing perplexity, and interfered with their breathing, which was already growing quick and labored from exertion, so that deprived of sight, deprived of voice, they perished in a wild mêlée, preserving no semblance of order. So great a multitude fell that Hannibal did not even try to find out the number of the common people, and in regard to the number of the knights and members of the senate he did not write to the Carthaginians at home but indicated it by the finger-rings; these he measured off by the quart and sent away. Only the senators and the knights wore finger-rings. Yet after all a number made good their escape even on this occasion, among them Terentius; Paulus was killed. Hannibal did not pursue nor did he hasten to Rome. He might have set out at once for Rome with either his entire army or at least a portion of it and have quickly ended the war; yet he did not do so, although Maharbal urged him to do so. Hence he was censured as being able to win victories but not understanding how to use them. Since they had delayed this time, they could never again have an opportunity to make haste. Therefore Hannibal regretted it, feeling that he had committed a blunder, and was ever crying out: "Oh Cannæ, Cannæ!"

IX, 2.—The Romans, who had been in such imminent danger of being destroyed, won back their superiority through Scipio. He was a son of the Publius Scipio in Spain, and had saved the life of his father when the latter was wounded: **FRAG. 56**²⁴HE WAS AT THIS TIME SERVING IN THE ARMY, HAD FLED TO CANUSIUM, AND LATER ACHIEVED RENOWN. BY COMMON CONSENT OF THE FUGITIVES ASSEMBLED AT CANUSIUM HE RECEIVED THE LEADERSHIP, SET IN ORDER AFFAIRS AT THAT PLACE, SENT GARRISONS TO THE REGIONS IN PROXIMITY, AND BOTH PLANNED AND EXECUTED ALL MEASURES WELL.

The people of Rome heard of the defeat but did not believe it. When they at last came to believe it, they were filled with sorrow and met in the senate-house, but were ready to break up without accomplishing anything, when finally Fabius proposed that they send scouts to bring a report of what had really happened and what Hannibal was doing.

He advised them not to lament but to go about in silence that the necessary measures might be taken, and furthermore to collect as large a force as they might and to call upon adjoining settlements for aid. After this, upon learning that Hannibal was in Apulia and receiving a letter from Terentius stating that he was alive and what he was doing, they recovered a little of their courage. Marcus Junius was named dictator and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus master of the horse. Immediately they enrolled not only those of the citizens who were in their prime but also those even who were past the fighting age; they added to their forces prisoners on promise of pardon and slaves on promise of freedom and a brigand here and there; moreover they called on their allies to help, reminding them of any kindness ever shown them and promising in addition to give to some[Pg 230] of them grain, to others money, as they had never done before; they also sent emissaries to Greece to either persuade or hire men to serve as their allies.

Hannibal, learning that the Romans had united their troops and were engaged in preparations, still delayed at Cannæ despairing of a capture by assault. Of the captives he released the allied contingent without ransom as before, but the Romans he kept, hoping to dispose of them by sale, since this would make him better off but the Romans worse off. When no one came from Rome in quest of the captives, he ordered them to send some of their number home after ransom, provided they had first taken oath to return. When even then the Romans refused to ransom them, he shipped those who were of any value to Carthage, and of the rest he put some to death after maltreating them and forced the others to fight as gladiators, pitting friends and relatives against each other. Those who were sent for ransom returned in order to be true to their oaths, but later fled. They were disfranchised by the censors and committed suicide.

Hannibal sent his brother Mago to report the victory to the Carthaginians and to ask them for money and troops. He on his arrival counted over the rings and described the success naturally in even more glowing terms than it deserved; everything that he asked was voted and they would not listen to Hanno who opposed it and advised them to end the war while they seemed to have the upper hand. However, they never put their vote into effect, but delayed. Hannibal mean[Pg 231]while had advanced into Campania, had seized a Samnite fortress, and marched upon Neapolis. He sent before him a few soldiers with the booty and when the people of the city, thinking them alone, rushed out upon them, he unexpectedly appeared in person and slew a large number. He did not capture the city, nor did he lay siege to it for long. The reason will presently be plain. Of the Campanian inhabitants of Capua a part clung to Roman friendship, but others favored Hannibal. After his success at Cannæ and when some of their men taken captive had been released the populace was clamorous to revolt to Hannibal, but the men of rank waited for some time. Finally the crowd made a rush upon them as they were assembled in the senate-house and would have made away with them all but for the action of some one of the crowd who saw how great a misfortune this would be. This person denounced the senators as by all means deserving to perish, but said that they

ought first to choose others to fill their places, for the State could not endure without some men to concert measures for them. Having gained the assent of the Capuan people he ejected each one of them from the senate-house, asking the populace, as he did so, whom they chose in his place. Thus, as they found themselves unable to choose others on short notice, they let all the old senators go unharmed, because they appeared to be necessary. Later they became reconciled with one another and made peace with Hannibal. This is why he quickly retired from Neapolis and came to Capua. He[Pg 232] held a conference with the people and made many attractive offers, among other things promising to give them the supreme direction of Italy; for he was anxious that they should be animated by hope and, feeling that they would be working for themselves, develop greater zeal in the struggle.

At the revolt of Capua the rest of Campania also became restive, and the news of the town's secession troubled the Romans. As for Hannibal, he started on a campaign against the Nucerni. Under stress of siege and owing to lack of food they thrust out that portion of the population which was not available for fighting. Hannibal would not receive them, however, and gave them assurance of safety only in case they should go back to the city. **FRAG. 56²⁵**THEREFORE THE REST ALSO AGREED TO LEAVE THE CITY CARRYING ONE CHANGE OF CLOTHING. AS SOON, HOWEVER, AS HANNIBAL WAS MASTER OF THE SITUATION, HE SHUT THE SENATORS INTO BATH-HOUSES AND SUFFOCATED THEM, AND IN THE CASE OF THE OTHERS, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TOLD THEM TO GO AWAY WHERE THEY PLEASED, HE CUT DOWN ON THE ROAD MANY EVEN OF THEM. A NUMBER OF THEM SAVED THEIR LIVES ONLY BY TAKING REFUGE IN THE WOODS. THEREUPON THE REST BECAME AFRAID AND WOULD NO LONGER COME TO TERMS WITH HIM, BUT RESISTED WHILE THEY WERE ABLE. The people of Nola were planning to range themselves under his banner, but when they saw what had been done to their countrymen, they quietly let Marcellus in and later repulsed Hannibal when he assaulted their city. Repelled from Nola he captured the people of Acerræ by starving them out. **FRAG. 56²⁹**HE MADE THE SAME[Pg 233] TERMS WITH THEM AS WITH THE DWELLERS IN NUCERIA AND ALSO ACCORDED THEM THE SAME TREATMENT. After that he directed his forces against Casilinum in which Romans and about a thousand of the allies had taken refuge. These put to death the native citizens who were meditating how to betray them, repulsed Hannibal several times and held out nobly against hunger. When food was failing them they sent a man across the river on an inflated skin to inform the dictator. The latter put jars filled with wheat into the river at night and bade them keep their eyes on the current in the darkness. For a while he thus supplied them with nutriment without being discovered, but eventually a jar was dashed against some obstacle and shattered; then the Carthaginians became aware of what was going on and put chains across the river. After a number had perished of hunger and of their wounds, they abandoned one half of the city, cut down the bridge, and held out in the other half. They now threw turnip seed from the wall upon a spot outside, doing this in order to alarm the enemy and make them believe that they were likely to endure for a long time.

Hannibal, indeed, thinking that they must have plenty of food and astonished at their endurance invited them to capitulate and released them for money. The Romans outside were glad to ransom them, and more than that they showed them honor.

IX, 3.—While these events took place the messengers returned from Delphi saying that the Pythia admonished them to shake off sloth and devote themselves to the war. Then they were filled with new strength. They overtook Hannibal and encamped near him so as to watch his movements. Junius the dictator ordered the Romans to do exactly as the Carthaginians were commanded to do. So they took their food and sleep at the same time, visited the sentries in the same manner, and were doing everything else in similar fashion. When Hannibal understood the situation, he waited for a stormy night and announced to some of his soldiers a skirmish for after nightfall. Junius did the same thing. Thereupon Hannibal ordered different detachments to attack him in succession at different times in order that his opponent might be involved in constant labor as a result of sleeplessness and the storm. He himself rested with the troops not in action. When day was about to break, he recalled the army, as was expected, and the Romans put away their weapons and retired to rest; then all of a sudden he attacked them, with the result that he killed a number and captured the entrenchments, which were deserted.

Conditions in Sicily and Sardinia grew unsettled but did not receive any consideration at the hands of the Romans. **B.C. 215 (a.u. 539)** The consuls chosen were Gracchus, previously master of the horse, and Postumius Albinus. Albinus was ambuscaded and destroyed with his entire army by the Boii as he was traversing a wooded mountain. The barbarians cut off his head, scooped out the interior and after gilding it used it for a bowl in their sacred ceremonies.—Portents occurred at this time.[Pg 235] A cow brought forth a horse and fire shone out at sea. The consuls Gracchus and Fabius encamped and kept watch of Hannibal while he stayed in Capua, to see what he did. They spent their time in sending scouts in every direction, defending the allies, trying to win back the revolted and injuring their adversaries' interests. Hannibal, so long as he obtained a barely sufficient supply of food at the cost of encountering dangers, led a temperate life, as did his army; but after they had taken Capua and wintered there in idleness with ample provisions, they began to lose their physical strength by not laboring and their intellectual force by tranquillity, and in changing their ancestral habits they learned an accomplishment new to them,—that of being defeated in battle.—When the work of war finally became pressing, Hannibal transferred his quarters to the mountains and gave the army exercise. But they could not get strong in a short space of time. He was encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements from home, especially in the matter of elephants. He now set out against Nola intending to capture it or else to draw Marcellus, who was ravaging Samnium, away from that region. As he could accomplish nothing, he withdrew from the city and laid waste the country, until he suffered a decisive defeat in battle,—an event which

grieved him. Many Spaniards and even many Libyans now forsook him and deserted to the Romans,—a new experience for him. Consequently, despairing of his own and the soldiers' prospects he abandoned that entire region and retired to[Pg 236] Capua. Afterward he left there also to take up a different position.

B.C.

217

(a.u. 537)The Scipios had crossed the river Iber and were ravaging the country; they had secured control of various cities and when Hasdrubal for this reason hastened to oppose them, they had conquered him in battle. The Carthaginians learning this thought that Hasdrubal needed more assistance than did Hannibal, and fearing that the Scipios might attempt to cross into Libya also they sent only a small body of troops to Hannibal, but despatched the largest detachment with Mago to Spain with the utmost speed; and they bade him after the reduction of Spain to remain to guard their interests there, whereas Hasdrubal was to be sent with a body of troops against Italy. **B.C. 216**
(a.u. 538)The Scipios, made aware of the plan, no longer gave battle for fear that Hasdrubal perhaps might win a victory and then hasten to Italy. However, as the Carthaginians went on injuring the part of the country that was friendly to the Romans, Publius engaged in a struggle with such of his opponents as attacked him and won a victory; Gnæus intercepted the enemy who were retiring from this battle and annihilated them. As a result of this disaster and because numerous cities were transferring their allegiance to the Romans and some of the Libyans had gone over to their side, Hasdrubal remained there longer than he was intending. The Scipios sent their accessions at once to Italy, and they themselves continued to adjust affairs in Spain. They captured the subjects of Saguntum who[Pg 237] had caused them the war and their reverses, and they tore down the hostile settlement and sold the men. After this they took possession of Saguntum and restored it to its original inhabitants. They were so scrupulous in regard to the plunder that they sent nothing home. They allowed the partners of their campaign to do so, but for themselves they sent only some jackstones to their children. Hence the senate upon the request of Gnæus for leave of absence that he might go home and borrow a dowry for his daughter, who was of age to be married, voted that a dowry be given her from the public funds.

IX, 4.—In the course of the same period both Sicily and Sardinia had become openly hostile. But the disturbance in these regions soon subsided. **B.C. 215**
(a.u. 539)Hasdrubal, who was aiding them, was captured and Manlius Torquatus recovered almost the entire island. For the time being affairs in Sicily were quiet, but afterward disturbance reigned anew. King Philip of Macedonia showed himself a most open partisan of the Carthaginians. In his desire to add Greece to his possessions he made an agreement with Hannibal that they should conduct the war in common, and that the Carthaginians should get Italy but he should have Greece and Epirus together with the islands. The agreement was made on this basis, but through the capture of the herald who had been sent to Hannibal by Philip the Romans learned what was taking

place and forthwith despatched the prætor Marcus Valerius Lævinus[30][Pg 238] against him. They intended to make him anxious about internal affairs, so that he should stay at home. The plan worked. B.C. 214 (a.u. 540) Philip had progressed as far as Corcyca with the intention of sailing to Italy, but on learning that Lævinus was already at Brundisium he returned home. When Lævinus had sailed as far as Corcyca, Philip set out against the Roman allies; he had captured Oricum and was besieging Apollonia. Lævinus made an expedition against him anew, recovered Oricum and rescued Apollonia. Then Philip after burning the ships which he had used retired homewards overland.

The people of Rome chose Fabius and Marcellus consuls. Hannibal was then traveling about in what is called Calabria and in adjacent regions, and they assigned the care of him to Gracchus, who had held office before them. The latter routed Hanno (who had come from Bruttium and confronted him near Beneventum), and then going on he watched Hannibal closely, kept ravaging the possessions of rebels and won some cities safely back. The consuls themselves turned their steps toward Campania, for they were anxious to subdue it and so leave no element of hostility behind their backs when they should march against Hannibal. They then divided forces. Fabius overran the districts of Campania and Samnium. Marcellus crossed into Sicily and proceeded to besiege Syracuse. The town had submitted to him, but then had revolted again through the treachery of some men by the use of a false message. He would have subdued[Pg 239] it very speedily,—for he assaulted the wall by both land and sea at once,—had not Archimedes with his inventions enabled the citizens to resist an extremely long time. By his devices he suspended stones and heavy-armed soldiers in the air whom he would let down suddenly and soon draw up again. Even ships that carried towers he would dash one upon another; he would pull them up and (FRAG. 56³¹?) LIFTING THEM HIGH WOULD LET GO ALL IN A MASS so that when they fell into the water they were sunk by the impact. At last in an incredible manner he destroyed the whole Roman fleet by conflagration. By tilting a kind of mirror toward the sun he concentrated the sun's beams on it; and as the thickness and smoothness of the mirror coöperated to ignite the air from these beams he kindled a great flame, all of which he directed upon the ships that lay at anchor in the path of the fire, and he consumed them all. Marcellus, therefore, despairing of capturing the city on account of the inventiveness of Archimedes thought to take it by famine after a regular investment. This duty he assigned to Pulcher while he himself turned his attention to those who had participated in the revolt of Syracuse. Any who yielded were granted pardon, but those who resisted he treated harshly, and he captured a number of the cities by force, some also by betrayal. In the meantime Himilco had come from Carthage with an army, had occupied Agrigentum and Heraclea and had reached Syracuse. There he was first defeated, then was in turn victorious, and finally was beaten by a sudden assault on the part of Marcellus.[Pg 240]

IX, 5.—Thereafter Marcellus was still investing Syracuse. Hannibal was passing his time in Calabria. **B.C. 212**

(*a.u.* 542)The Romans, moreover, had again experienced many and disagreeable reverses. The consuls had received a setback near Capua, Gracchus had died in Lucania, Tarentum and other cities had revolted, Hannibal, previously cowed, remained in Italy and had marched upon Rome, and both the Scipios had perished. Elated by these events Hannibal undertook to render assistance to Capua. He went as far as Beneventum, then, ascertaining that Claudius had returned from Samnium into Lucania on account of the death of Gracchus, he became afraid that the Romans might secure control of parts of it, and he advanced no farther but turned to meet Claudius.—Upon the death of the Scipios the whole of Spain was thrown into disorder. Some towns voluntarily went over to the Carthaginians and others under compulsion, even if they did later swing back to the Roman side.

Marcellus, finding that he was accomplishing naught by assault on Syracuse, thought of the following scheme. There was a vulnerable spot in the Syracusans' wall, which they called Galeagra; it had never before been recognized as such, but the fact was at this time discovered. He waited till the whole town of Syracuse celebrated an all night festival to Artemis and then bade some soldiers scale the wall at that point. After that some gates were opened by them and, as soon as a few others had gone in, all, both inside and outside, at a given signal raised a shout and struck their[Pg 241] spears upon their shields, and the trumpeters blew a blast, with the result that utter panic overwhelmed the Syracusans, who were anyway somewhat the worse for drink, and the city was captured with the exception of Achradina and what is called the "island." Marcellus plundered the captured town and attacked the portions not yet taken, and with time and labor but after all successfully he conquered the remainder of Syracuse. The Romans when they became masters of these districts killed many persons, among them Archimedes. He was constructing a geometrical figure and hearing that the enemy were at hand he said: (**FRAG. 56^{32?}**)"Let them come at my head, but keep their distance from my figure!" He was little perturbed when a hostile warrior confronted him, and by his words, "Fellow, stand away from my figure," he irritated the man and was cut down.

B.C. 211
(*a.u.* 543)

cp. **FRAG. 32⁶**Marcellus for his capture of Syracuse and his conciliation of most of the rest of Sicily received high praise and was appointed consul. They had nominated Torquatus, who once had put his son to death. He declined, however, saying: "I could not endure your blunders, nor you my punctiliousness," whereupon they elected Marcellus and Valerius Lævinus.

IX, 6.—After Marcellus left Sicily, Hannibal sent a troop of cavalry there and the Carthaginians despatched another. They won several battles and acquired some cities.

And if the prætor Cornelius Dolabella had not come upon the scene, they would have subjugated all Sicily.[Pg 242]

Capua was at this time taken by the Romans. It availed nothing that Hannibal marched upon Rome in order to draw away from Capua the forces besieging it, although he traversed Latium, came to the Tiber, and laid waste the suburbs of the city. The people of Rome were frightened, but still they voted that one of the consuls[\[31\]](#) should remain at Capua while the other defended them. It was Claudius who remained at Capua, for he had been wounded: Flaccus hastened to Rome.

Hannibal kept making raids all the time before their eyes and doing a great amount of harm, but for some time they were satisfied to preserve their possessions within the walls. When, however, he reached the point of assaulting the city and their armies at once, they risked the proverbial cast of the die and made a sortie. They were already engaged in skirmishing when (**FRAG. 56³³?**)AN EXTRAORDINARY STORM ACCOMPANIED BY AN INCONCEIVABLY STRONG WIND AS WELL AS THUNDER, HAIL, AND LIGHTNING, BROKE FROM A CLEAR SKY, so that both were glad enough to flee as if by mutual consent back to the place from which they had set out. They were just laying aside their arms when the sky became clear. Although Hannibal concluded that the event mentioned, coming as it did precisely at the moment of conflict, had not occurred without divine ordering, yet he did not desist from his siege operations and even attempted again on a subsequent occasion to force the issue. But when the same phenomena were met for the second time, he became[Pg 243] terrified. What added to his alarm was that the enemy though in so great danger did not withdraw from Capua and were getting ready to send both soldiers and a prætor into Spain, and that being in need of funds they sold the spot where he was encamped, which was a piece of public property. In despair he retired, often crying aloud, "Oh, Cannæ, Cannæ!" And he no longer showed a disposition to render aid to Capua.

The people of that city although in extremities were nevertheless desperate, believing that they could not obtain pardon from the Romans, and they therefore held out and sent a letter to Hannibal begging him to assist them. The bearers of the letter were seized by Flaccus (Claudius had before this time died of his wound) and had their hands cut off. Seeing them the Campanians were terribly dismayed and took counsel as to what they should do. After considerable talk a certain Vibius Virius, one of the foremost men and most responsible for the revolt, spoke, saying: "Our only refuge and freedom lies in death. Escort me home. I have a poison made ready." So he took with him those who were willing to accept his advice and with them voluntarily gave up his life. The rest opened the gates to the Romans. Flaccus took possession of all their arms and money, killed some of the head men and sent others to Rome. The only ones that he left unmolested were the survivors of the common people, and he spared them only on condition that they receive a Roman governor, maintain no senate, and hold no assembly.

Later they subjected themselves to other disabilities[Pg 244] by daring to accuse Flaccus. **FRAG. 56**³⁴THE CAMPANIANS UNDERTOOK TO ACCUSE FLACCUS AND THE SYRACUSANS MARCELLUS, when the latter was already consul. And Marcellus made a defence, refusing to perform any of the duties of his office until he had defended himself. The Syracusans when given a hearing were rather sparing of their remarks and devoted themselves not to accusing Marcellus but to supplication and defence, showing that they had not of their own free will revolted from the Romans and begging that pardon be granted them. While uttering these words they fell upon the ground and bewailed their lot. When a decision was rendered, it was to the effect that Marcellus was not guilty; that the Syracusans, however, were deserving of a certain degree of kind treatment not for their acts but for their words and supplications. As Marcellus asked to be excused from returning to Sicily, they sent Lævinus. The Syracusans in this way obtained some consideration: the Campanians, however, were led by stupidity to deliver their accusation with too much audacity and were rebuked. Flaccus was not present, but one of his ex-lieutenants conducted his defence for him.

After the capture of Capua the other strongholds in the vicinity went over to the Romans, with the exception of Atellanæ. The dwellers in this town abandoned their city and went in a body to Hannibal. Also the rest of Italy that favored the Carthaginian cause was being gradually estranged and the consuls in their tours of the country were taking possession of it. The Tarentini did not as yet openly avow their allegiance to the Romans, but secretly they were getting tired of the Carthaginians.

[Pg 245]

(BOOK 16, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. 56³⁵THE ROMANS MADE PROPOSITIONS TO HANNIBAL THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD RETURN THEIR PRISONERS. THEY DID NOT EFFECT THE EXCHANGE BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT RECEIVE CARTHALO, AS BEING AN ENEMY, INSIDE OF THEIR WALLS. AND HE REFUSED TO HOLD ANY CONVERSATION WITH THEM, BUT IMMEDIATELY TURNED BACK IN A RAGE.

At this time, moreover, Lævinus made friends with the Ætolians, who were allies of Philip; and when Philip had advanced as far as Corcyra he scared him away again so that the king returned to Macedonia with speed.

B.C.

210

(*a.u.* 544)IX, 7.—The people of Rome sent Gaius Claudius Nero with soldiers into Spain. He followed the line of the coast with his fleet as far as the Iber, where he found the remainder of the Roman forces and confronted Hasdrubal before his presence had been made known. He enclosed the Carthaginians securely but was then cheated out of the advantage gained. Hasdrubal, seeing that he was cut off, sent heralds to Nero proposing to give up the whole of Spain and leave the country. Nero gladly accepted

the offer and his opponent postponed the settlement of the terms to the following day. That night Hasdrubal quietly sent out a number of his men to various parts of the mountains, and they got safely away because the Romans, in expectation of a truce, were not keeping any guard. The next day he held a conference with Nero but used up the whole time without fixing upon anything definitely. That night he sent off other men in like manner. This[Pg 246] he did similarly on several other days while disputing about some points in the treaty. When the entire infantry had gone in advance, he himself at last with the cavalry and elephants silently slipped away. He reached a place of safety and managed to make himself a source of anxiety to Nero subsequently.

On learning this the people of Rome condemned Nero and voted to entrust the leadership to somebody else. And they were at a loss whom to send, for the situation required no ordinary man and many were breaking away from allegiance on account of the untimely fate of the Scipios. **FRAG. 56**³⁷THEREUPON THE FAMOUS PUBLIUS SCIPIO, WHO SAVED HIS WOUNDED FATHER, OFFERED HIMSELF VOLUNTARILY FOR THE WORK OF THE CAMPAIGN. HE SURPASSED IN EXCELLENCE AND WAS ALSO RENOWNED FOR HIS EDUCATION. He was chosen forthwith, but his supporters not long after regretted their action because of his youth (he was in his twenty-fourth year) and because his house was in mourning for the loss of his father and uncle. Accordingly he made a second public appearance and delivered a speech; and his words put the senators to shame, so that they did not, to be sure, release him from his command, but sent Marcus Junius, an elderly man, to accompany him.

After these events matters progressed without catastrophes for the Romans and gradually grew better. Marcellus after his acquittal before the court had set out against Hannibal and was making nearly everything safe, though he was afraid to risk an engagement with men driven to desperation. At any time that he was forced into a combat he came out victorious as the result of prudence mingled with daring. Hannibal now[Pg 247] undertook to inflict injury upon those regions which he was unable to occupy, being influenced by the reasons aforementioned as also by the fact that the cities in his alliance had either abandoned him or were intending to do so, and by some other causes. He hurt a great many and several towns deserted to the Romans for this reason.

In the case of the city of Salapia the following incident occurred. Two men managed affairs there and were hostile to each other. Alinius[\[32\]](#) favored the Carthaginian cause, and Plautius[\[33\]](#) the Roman; and the latter talked with Alinius about betraying the place to the Romans. Alinius at once informed Hannibal of the fact and Plautius was brought to trial. While Hannibal was deliberating with the councilors as to how to punish him, Plautius dared in his presence to speak again to Alinius, who stood near, about betrayal. The latter cried out: "There, there, he's talking to me about this very matter now." Hannibal distrusted him on account of the improbability of the case and acquitted Plautius as a victim of blackmail. After his release the two men became harmonious

and brought in soldiers obtained from Marcellus, with whose aid they cut down the Carthaginian garrison and delivered the city to the Romans.

This was the state of Carthaginian interests in Italy. Not even Sicily retained its friendliness for them, but submitted to the consul Lævinus. The leader of the Carthaginians in Sicily was Hanno, and Muttines was[Pg 248] a member of his staff. The latter had been with Hannibal formerly and owing to the latter's jealousy of his great deeds of valor had been sent into Sicily. When there also he made a brilliant record as commander of the cavalry, he incurred the jealousy of Hanno as well, and as a consequence was deprived of his command. Deeply grieved at this he joined the Romans. First he accomplished the betrayal of Agrigentum for them and then he helped them in reducing other places, so that the whole of Sicily came again under their sway without any great labor.

B.C.

209

(*a.u.* 545)IX, 8.—Fabius and Flaccus subdued among other cities Tarentum, which Hannibal was holding. They gave orders to a body of men to overrun Bruttium in order that Hannibal might leave Tarentum and come to its assistance. When this had happened, Flaccus kept watch of Hannibal while Fabius by night assailed Tarentum with ships and infantry at once and captured the city by means of his assault aided by betrayal. Hannibal, enraged at the trick, was eager to find some scheme for paying Fabius back. So he sent him a letter, purporting to be from the dwellers in Metapontum, looking to a betrayal of the city; for he hoped that Fabius would advance carelessly in that direction and that he might set a trap for him on the way. But the Roman leader suspected the truth of the case and by comparing the writing with the letter which Hannibal had once written to the Tarentini, he detected the plot from the similarity of the two.

Scipio for the first part of the time, however much he may have longed to avenge his father and uncle and however much he yearned for glory in the war, never[Pg 249]theless showed no haste on account of the multitude of his opponents. But after he ascertained that they were passing the winter at a considerable distance, he disregarded them and marched upon Carthage,—the Spanish town. Moreover no one gained the slightest knowledge of his march till he had come close to Carthage itself. And by much exertion he took the city.

Following the capture of Carthage a very great **FRAG. 56³⁹**MUTINY OF THE SOLDIERS came very near TAKING PLACE. Scipio had promised to give a crown to the first one that set foot on the wall, and two men, the one a Roman, the other belonging to the allies, quarreled over it. Their continued dispute promoted a disturbance among the rest as well and they became inflamed to the utmost degree and were ready to commit some fearful outrage when Scipio settled the trouble by crowning both men. **FRAG. 56³⁹**AND HE DISTRIBUTED MANY GIFTS TO THE SOLDIERS, ASSIGNING MANY

ALSO TO PUBLIC USES; AND ALL THE HOSTAGES WHO WERE BEING DETAINED THERE HE GAVE BACK FREELY TO THEIR RELATIVES. AS A RESULT MANY TOWNS AND MANY PRINCES ESPOUSED HIS CAUSE, THE CELTIBERIAN RACE AMONG THE BEST. HE HAD TAKEN AMONG THE CAPTIVES A MAIDEN DISTINGUISHED FOR HER BEAUTY AND IT WAS THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD FALL IN LOVE WITH HER; BUT WHEN HE LEARNED THAT SHE WAS BETROTHED TO ONE OF THE CELTIBERIAN MAGISTRATES, HE SENT FOR HIM AND DELIVERED THE YOUNG GIRL TO HIM, BESTOWING UPON HIM FURTHERMORE THE RANSOM WHICH HER KINSFOLK HAD BROUGHT FOR HER. BY THIS PROCEDURE HE ATTACHED TO HIS CAUSE BOTH THEM AND THE REMAINDER OF THE NATION.

Next he learned that Hasdrubal the brother of Hannibal was approaching rapidly, still ignorant of the [Pg 250] capture of the city and expecting to meet no hostile force on his march. Scipio therefore confronted and defeated him, and afterward bivouacked in his camp and got control of many places in the vicinity. **FRAG. 56**⁴⁰FOR HE WAS CLEVER IN STRATEGY, AGREEABLE IN SOCIETY, TERRIFYING TO OPPONENTS, AND THOROUGHLY HUMANE TO SUCH AS YIELDED. AND ESPECIALLY THE RECOLLECTION THAT HE HAD MADE A PREDICTION, SAYING BEFOREHAND THAT HE WOULD ENCAMP IN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY, CAUSED ALL TO HONOR HIM. THE SPANIARDS ACTUALLY NAMED HIM "GREAT KING."

Hasdrubal, giving up all hope, was anxious to leave Spain for Italy. **B.C. 208 (a.u. 546)**So after packing everything for the march he started in winter. His fellow commanders held their ground and kept Scipio busy so that he could not pursue Hasdrubal nor lighten the burden of war for the Romans in Italy by going there, nor sail to Carthage. But, although Scipio did not pursue Hasdrubal, he sent runners through whom he apprised the people of Rome of his approach, and he himself gave attention to his own immediate concerns. As he saw that his opponents were spread over a goodly portion of the country, he dreaded that whenever he should begin an engagement with them, he should be the cause of their gathering in one place through a necessity of aiding one another. Accordingly, he conducted in person a campaign against Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and sent Silanus into Celtiberia against Mago, and also Lucius Scipio his brother into Bastitania. Lucius occupied the district after hard fighting, conquered Mago, kept close at his heels as he fled to Hasdrubal, and came to Scipio before the latter had accomplished anything as yet. [Pg 251]

Now that Mago had joined Hasdrubal and Lucius his brother Scipio, at first they would make descents into the plain and fight strenuously with their cavalry, and later they would array their whole army in line of battle but did not do any fighting. This went on for several days. When the clash finally came, the Carthaginians themselves and their allies were defeated, their stronghold was taken by the Romans, and the Romans made use of the provisions in it. This Scipio had prophesied, as the story goes, three days before. For when materials for food had failed them he predicted—by what prompting is unknown—: "On such and such a day we shall make use of the enemy's store."—

After this he left Silanus to take care of the surviving opponents and himself took his departure to the other cities, many of which he won over. When he had brought order into the newly acquired territory he took up his winter abode there. His brother Lucius he despatched to Rome to report the progress made, to convey the captives thither, and to investigate how the people of Rome felt toward him.

IX, 9.—The dwellers in Italy had suffered from disease and had encountered hardships in battles, for some of the Etruscans had rebelled. But what grieved them more than all else was the fact that they had lost Marcellus. They had been making a campaign against Hannibal, who chanced to be at Locri, and both the consuls had been surrounded by an ambuscade, Marcellus perishing instantly and Crispinus dying from a wound not long after. Hannibal found the body of Marcellus and taking his ring with which Marcellus was accustomed to seal his documents he would forward letters[Pg 252] to the cities purporting to come from him. He was accomplishing whatever he pleased until Crispinus became aware of it and sent them a warning to be on their guard. As a result of this the tables were turned upon Hannibal. He had sent a message to the citizens of Salapia through a fictitious deserter, and approached the walls in the guise of Marcellus, using the Latin language in company with other men who understood it, in order to be taken for Romans. The Salapini, informed of his artifice, were artful enough in turn to pretend that they believed Marcellus was really approaching. Then drawing up the portcullis they admitted as many as it seemed to them they could conveniently dispose of and killed them all. Hannibal withdrew at once on learning that Locri was being besieged by the Romans, who had sailed against it from Sicily.

Publius Sulpicius assisted by Ætolians and other allies devastated a large part of Achæa. But as soon as Philip the Macedonian formed an alliance with the Achæans, the Romans would have been driven out of Greece completely but for the fact that the helmet of Philip fell off and the Ætolians got possession of it. For in this way a report reached Macedonia that he was dead and a factional uprising took place; Philip, consequently, fearing that he should be deprived of his kingdom, hastened to Macedonia. Then the Romans stuck to their places in Greece and conquered a few cities.

B.C.

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(*a.u.* 547)The following year upon announcement of Hasdrubal's approach the people of Rome gathered their[Pg 253] forces, summoned their allies, and chose Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius consuls. Nero they sent against Hannibal, Livius against Hasdrubal. The latter met him near the city of Sena but did not immediately open engagement with him. For many days he remained stationary, and Hasdrubal was in no hurry for battle, either, but remained at rest awaiting his brother. Nero and Hannibal entered Lucania to encamp and neither hastened to array his forces for battle, but in other ways they had some conflicts. Hannibal kept constantly changing position and Nero kept careful watch of him. As he constantly had the advantage of him and ere long captured the letter sent to him by Hasdrubal, he began to despise Hannibal, but fearing that Hasdrubal might

overwhelm Livius through mere numbers he ventured upon a hazardous exploit. He left on the spot a portion of his force sufficient to check Hannibal in case the latter should make any movement, and he gave the men injunctions to do everything to create the impression that he was also there. He selected the flower of his army and started out apparently to attack some neighboring city, nor did any one know his true intentions. He hastened on, then, against Hasdrubal, reached his colleague at night, and took up his quarters in the latter's entrenchments. Both made ready for a sudden attack upon the invader. The situation did not go concealed, but Hasdrubal inferred what had happened from the fact that the word of command was given twice; for each consul issued orders to his own troops separately. Suspecting therefore that Hannibal[Pg 254] had been defeated and had perished,—for he calculated that if his brother were alive, Nero would never have marched against *him*,—he determined to retire among the Gauls and there find out definitely about his brother and so carry on the war at his convenience.

So after giving orders to the army to break up he started out that night, and the consuls from the noise suspected what was going on, yet they did not move immediately because of the darkness. At dawn, however, they sent the cavalry ahead to pursue the enemy and they themselves followed. Hasdrubal made a stand against the cavalry, deeming them an isolated troop, but the consuls came up and routed him and followed after the fugitives, of whom they slaughtered many. Even the elephants were of no help to the Carthaginians. Inasmuch as some of them that had been wounded did more harm to those in charge of them than had been done by the enemy, Hasdrubal gave orders to those seated upon them to slay the beasts as fast as they got wounded. And they killed them very easily by piercing them with an iron instrument under the ear. So they were destroyed by the Carthaginians, but the men by the Romans. So many fell that the Romans became surfeited with slaughter and did not wish to pursue the rest. They had destroyed Hasdrubal along with many others, they had secured huge quantities of spoil, they had found Roman captives to the number of four thousand in the camp, and thought they had sufficiently retrieved the disaster of Cannæ.

At the conclusion of these operations Livius stayed[Pg 255] where he was, but Nero returned to Apulia, reaching it on the sixth day; his absence up to that time had not been detected. Some of the prisoners he sent into Hannibal's camp to explain what had happened, and he fixed Hasdrubal's head on a pole nearby. Hannibal, learning that his brother was vanquished and dead, and that Nero had conquered and returned, lamented bitterly, often crying out upon Fortune and Cannæ. And he retired into Bruttium where he remained inactive.

B.C.

206

(*a.u.* 548)IX, 10.—Scipio was detailed to superintend Roman interests in Spain till what time he should reach a satisfactory adjustment of them all. First he sailed to Libya with two quinqueremes, and it so happened that Hasdrubal son of Gisco landed there at the same time as he did. Syphax, who was king of a portion of Libya and had enjoyed

friendly relations with the Carthaginians, entertained them both and endeavored to reconcile them. But Scipio said that he had no private enmity and he could not on his own responsibility arrange terms for his country.

Accordingly he went back again and began a war against the Iliturgitani because they had handed over to the Carthaginians the Romans who took refuge with them after the death of the Scipios. He did not make himself master of their city until he dared to scale the wall in person and got wounded. Then the soldiers, put to shame and fearing for his life, made a very vigorous assault. Having mastered the situation they killed the whole population and burned down the entire[Pg 256] city. As a result of the fear thus inspired many voluntarily ranged themselves on his side, whereas many others had to be subdued by force. Some when subjected to siege burned their cities and slew their kinsmen and finally themselves.

After subjugating the greater part of the country Scipio shifted his position to Carthage and there instituted funeral combats in full armor in honor of his father and his uncle. When many others had contended, there came also two brothers who continued at variance about a kingdom, though Scipio had made efforts to reconcile them. And the elder slew the younger in spite of the superior strength of the latter.

Subsequently Scipio fell sick, and that was the signal for a rebellion of the Spaniards. One of Scipio's legions that was in winter quarters near Sucro became restless. It had shown a lack of docility before this, but had not ventured upon open rebellion. Now, however, perceiving that Scipio was incapacitated and influenced further by the fact that their pay had been slow in coming they mutinied outright, drove away the tribunes, and elected consuls for themselves. Their number was about eight thousand. The Spaniards on ascertaining this revolted with greater readiness and proceeded to damage the territory belonging to the Roman alliance. Mago, who had intended to abandon Gades, consequently did not abandon it, but crossed over to the mainland and wrought considerable mischief.

Scipio learning this wrote and sent a letter to[Pg 257] apostate legion in which he affected to pardon them for revolting on account of the scarcity of the necessities of life, and did not seem to think it proper to view them with suspicion but conferred praise upon those who had accepted their leadership for the purpose of preventing any outrage due to lack of government being either suffered or committed. When Scipio had written to this effect and the soldiers had learned that he was alive and was not angry with them, they made no further demonstrations. Even after he recovered his health he did not use harsh threats in dealing with them, but sent a promise to supply them with food and invited them all to come to him either all together or only a part at a time. The soldiers, not daring to go in small squads, went in a body. Scipio arranged that they should bivouac outside the wall—for it was nearly evening—and furnished them provisions in abundance. So they encamped, but Scipio brought it about that the boldest spirits among

them should enter the city, and during the night he overpowered and imprisoned them. At daybreak he sent forth all his army as if to go on an expedition somewhere. Then he called the recent arrivals inside the wall without their weapons in order to join his undertaking after they had received their provision-money. As soon as they had accordingly entered he signaled the men who had gone forth to return just as they were. Thus he surrounded the rebels and heaped upon them many reproaches and threats, saying finally: **FRAG. 56⁴²**"YOU ALL DESERVE TO DIE: HOWEVER, I SHALL NOT PUT YOU ALL TO DEATH BUT I SHALL EXECUTE ONLY A FEW WHOM I HAVE ALREADY ARRESTED; THE REST I SHALL RELEASE." With[Pg 258] these words he set the prisoners in their midst, fixed them upon crosses, and after copious abuse killed them. Some of the soldiers standing by grew indignant and raised an outcry, whereupon he punished a number of them also. After this he gave the rest their pay and conducted a campaign against Indibilis and Mandonius. As they were too timid to offer him battle, he attacked and was victorious.

Following their capitulation most of the rest of Spain was again enslaved, Mago abandoned Gades, and Masinissa took the Roman side. The Carthaginians at news of the death of Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, had voted to give up Spain but to recover their prestige in Italy. And they sent money to Mago that he might gather a force of auxiliaries and lead a campaign against that country. He, setting out once more for Italy, reached the Gymnasian islands. The larger one escaped his grasp; the natives from a distance kept using their slings (in which art they were masters) against the ships, so that he could not effect a landing: but he anchored off the smaller one and waited there on account of the winter. **FRAG. 56⁴⁴**THESE ISLANDS ARE SITUATED CLOSE TO THE MAINLAND IN THE VICINITY OF THE IBER. THEY ARE THREE IN NUMBER AND THE GREEKS AND THE ROMANS ALIKE CALL THEM THE GYMNASIAN, BUT THE SPANIARDS THE BALEARES OR HYASOUSÆ,[\[34\]](#) or, separately, the first Ebusus, the second the "Larger,"[\[35\]](#) and the third the "Smaller,"[\[36\]](#) exceedingly well named.—Gades was occupied by the Romans.

[Pg 259]

(BOOK 17, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. 56⁴⁵IX, 11.—MASINISSA RANKED AMONG THE MOST PROMINENT MEN: IN FORCE AND IN PLANNING ALIKE HE DISPLAYED A SUPERIORITY, AS IT CHANCED, where warlike deeds were concerned. He had left the Carthaginians for the Romans as a result of circumstances now to be related. Hasdrubal the son of Gisco was a friend of his and had betrothed to him his daughter Sophonis. Hasdrubal, however, became acquainted with Syphax and perceiving that he favored the Romans did not keep his agreement with Masinissa any longer. He was so anxious to add Syphax, who was lord of a very great power, to the Carthaginian alliance that when his father about this time died he helped him to take possession of his domain, which properly belonged to Masinissa, and

furthermore gave him Sophonis in marriage. **FRAG. 56⁴⁶**SHE WAS CONSPICUOUS FOR BEAUTY, HAD BEEN TRAINED IN A LIBERAL LITERARY AND MUSICAL EDUCATION, WAS OF ATTRACTIVE MANNERS, COY, AND SO LOVABLE THAT THE MERE SIGHT OF HER OR EVEN THE SOUND OF HER VOICE VANQUISHED EVEN A PERSON QUITE DEVOID OF AFFECTION.

Syphax for these reasons attached himself to the Carthaginians, and Masinissa on the contrary took up with the Romans and from first to last proved very useful to them. **FRAG. 56⁴⁷**SCIPIO AFTER WINNING OVER THE WHOLE TERRITORY SOUTH OF THE PYRENEES, PARTLY BY FORCE, PARTLY BY TREATY, EQUIPPED HIMSELF TO JOURNEY TO LIBYA. THE PEOPLE OF ROME, HOWEVER, THROUGH JEALOUSY OF HIS SUCCESSES AND THROUGH FEAR THAT HE[Pg 260] MIGHT BECOME ARROGANT AND PLAY THE TYRANT SENT TWO OF THE PRÆTORS TO RELIEVE HIM AND CALLED HIM HOME.

THUS HE WAS DEPOSED FROM HIS COMMAND. BUT SULPICIUS TOGETHER WITH ATTALUS OCCUPIED OREUS BY TREACHERY AND OPUS BY MAIN FORCE. PHILIP WAS UNABLE TO SEND THEM SPEEDY AID AS THE ÆTOLIANS HAD SEIZED THE PASSES IN ADVANCE. BUT AT LAST HE DID ARRIVE ON THE SCENE AND FORCED ATTALUS BACK TO HIS SHIPS. PHILIP, HOWEVER, WISHED TO CONCLUDE A TRUCE WITH THE ROMANS. AND AFTER SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION THE PEACE PROPOSITION WAS WITHDRAWN, BUT HE MOVED THE ÆTOLIANS OUT OF THEIR POSITION OF ALLIANCE WITH THE ROMANS AND MADE THEM HIS OWN FRIENDS INSTEAD.

Hannibal for a time kept quiet, satisfied if he might only retain such advantages as were already his. And the consuls thinking that his power had slowly wasted away without a battle also waited.

B.C.

205

(a.u. 549)

FRAG. 56⁴⁸The succeeding year Publius Scipio and LICINIUS CRASSUS BECAME CONSULS. And THE LATTER STAYED IN ITALY, but Scipio had received orders to leave there for Sicily and Libya to the end that in case he should not capture Carthage he might at least eventually draw Hannibal from Italy. He did not succeed in securing an army of any real value nor in getting an expenditure for triremes, because the honors accorded to his prowess had made him an object of jealousy. The people would scarcely supply him with the necessities. While he set out with the fleet of the allies and a few volunteers drawn from the populace, Mago left the[Pg 261] island and after sailing along the Italian coast disembarked in Liguria. Crassus was in Bruttium lying in wait for Hannibal. Philip, however, had become reconciled with the Romans; for on ascertaining that Publius Sempronius had reached Apollonia with a large force he was glad to make peace.

(FRAG. 56⁵⁰?)Scipio the consul landed in Sicily and made ready to sail to Libya, but he could not do so because he did not have a complete force at his disposal and what he

had was undisciplined. Therefore he resided there for the entire winter, drilling his followers and enrolling others in addition. As he was on the point of making the passage, a message came to him from Rhegium that some of the citizens of Locri would betray the city. Having denounced the commander of the garrison and obtained no satisfaction from Hannibal they were now ready to go over to the Romans. Accordingly he sent a detachment there and with the aid of the traitors seized a good part of the city during the night. The Carthaginians were huddled together in the citadel and sent for Hannibal, whereupon Scipio also set sail with speed and by a sudden sally repulsed Hannibal when the latter was close to the city. Next he captured the acropolis and, after entrusting the entire city to the care of the military tribunes, sailed back again. He was unable, however, to consummate his voyage to Libya. The Carthaginians so dreaded his advance that they despatched money to Philip to induce him to make a campaign against Italy, and sent grain and soldiers to Hannibal and to Mago ships and[Pg 262] money that he might prevent Scipio from crossing. The Romans, led by certain portents to expect a brilliant victory, entrusted to Scipio the army of Libya and gave him permission to enroll as large an additional force as he should please. **B.C. 204 (a.u. 550)**Of the consuls they set Marcus Cethegus over against Mago and Publius Sempronius against Hannibal.

IX, 12.—The Carthaginians, fearing that Masinissa would join Scipio, persuaded Syphax to restore his domain to him, the giver receiving assurance that he would get the tract back again. Masinissa was suspicious of the transaction, yet agreed to peace, in order to win the confidence of the Carthaginians and so be able to plunge them into some great catastrophe. For he was more enraged over Sophonis than over the kingdom, and consequently worked for Roman interests while affecting to be for the Carthaginians. Syphax, who was a Libyan adherent, professed a friendliness for the Romans and sent to Scipio warning him against crossing over. Scipio heard this as a piece of secret information, and to prevent the knowledge of it from reaching the soldiers he sent the herald back post-haste before he had had time to meet anybody else. Then he called together the army and hastened forward the preparations for crossing; he declared that the Carthaginians were unprepared and that first Masinissa and now Syphax was calling for them and upbraiding them for lingering. After this speech he suffered no further delay but set sail. He brought his ships to anchor near the cape called[Pg 263] Apollonium, and **FRAG. 56**⁵¹PITCHED HIS CAMP, DEVASTATED THE COUNTRY, MADE ASSAULTS UPON THE CITIES AND CAPTURED A FEW. AS THE ROMANS WERE HARRYING THE COUNTRY, HANNO THE CAVALRY COMMANDER, WHO WAS A SON OF HASDRUBAL SON OF GISCO, WAS PERSUADED BY MASINISSA TO ATTACK THEM. SCIPIO ACCORDINGLY SENT SOME HORSEMEN AND WAS PLUNDERING SOME DISTRICTS THAT WERE SUITABLE FOR HIM TO OVERRUN, TO THE END THAT HIS MEN BY SIMULATED FLIGHT MIGHT DRAW UPON THEM THE PURSUERS. SO WHEN THEY TURNED TO FLEE, ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE CARTHAGINIANS FOLLOWED THEM UP, MASINISSA WITH HIS FOLLOWERS GOT IN THE REAR OF THE PURSUERS AND

ATTACKED THEM AND SCIPIO MAKING AN ONSET FROM HIS AMBUSH JOINED BATTLE WITH THEM. AND MANY WERE DESTROYED, MANY ALSO WERE CAPTURED, AMONG THEM HANNO HIMSELF. THEREFORE HASDRUBAL ARRESTED THE MOTHER OF MASINISSA, AND AN EXCHANGE OF THE TWO CAPTIVES WAS EFFECTED. SYPHAX NOW RENOUNCED EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF FRIENDSHIP FOR THE ROMANS AND OPENLY ATTACHED HIMSELF TO THE CARTHAGINIANS. AND THE ROMANS BOTH PLUNDERED THE COUNTRY AND RECOVERED MANY PRISONERS FROM ITALY WHO HAD BEEN SENT TO LIBYA BY HANNIBAL AND THEY WENT INTO WINTER QUARTERS WHERE THEY WERE.

B.C.

203

(*a.u.* 551)After this Gnæus Scipio[\[37\]](#) and Gaius Servilius became consuls, and during their year of office the Carthaginians, having got the worst of it in the struggle, felt a desire to arrange terms of peace and furthermore both Hannibal and Mago were driven out of[Pg 264] Italy. It was the consuls who made a stand against Hannibal and Mago, while Scipio was inflicting damage upon Libya and assailing the cities. Meantime **FRAG. 56**⁵²HE HAD CAPTURED A CARTHAGINIAN VESSEL, BUT RELEASED IT WHEN THEY FEIGNED TO HAVE BEEN COMING ON AN EMBASSY TO HIM. HE KNEW, TO BE SURE, THAT IT WAS ONLY A PRETEXT, BUT PREFERRED TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF IT BEING SAID AGAINST HIM THAT HE HAD DETAINED ENVOYS. AND IN THE CASE OF SYPHAX, WHO WAS STILL ENDEAVORING TO NEGOTIATE A RECONCILIATION ON THE TERMS THAT SCIPIO SHOULD SAIL FROM LIBYA AND HANNIBAL FROM ITALY, HE RECEIVED HIS PROPOSITION NOT IN A TRUSTFUL MOOD, BUT TO THE END THAT HE MIGHT RUIN HIM. For on the excuse afforded by the postponed truce he sent various bodies of soldiers at various times into the Carthaginian camp and into that of Syphax; and when they had carefully inspected everything on the side of their opponents, he put aside the treaty on a plausible pretext, which was the more readily found because Syphax had been detected in a plot against Masinissa. And Scipio went by night to where their two camps were located, not very far apart, and secretly set fire to Hasdrubal's camp at many points at once. It rapidly blazed up—for their tents had been made of corn-stalks and leafy branches—and the Carthaginians fared badly. The followers of Syphax in attempting to aid them encountered the Romans, who closed in the place, and were themselves destroyed; and their own camp was set on fire in addition, and in it many men and horses perished. The Romans escaped injury during the rest of the night[Pg 265] following the exploit, but just after daylight Spaniards who had lately arrived as an accession to the Carthaginian alliance fell upon them unexpectedly and killed a large number.

As a result of all this Hasdrubal straightway retired to Carthage and Syphax to his own country. Scipio set Masinissa and Gaius Lælius to oppose Syphax while he himself marched against the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians for their part sent ships toward the Roman stronghold, which the enemy were using as winter quarters and as a storehouse for all their goods. In this way they might either capture it or draw Scipio

away from themselves. Such also was the result. As soon as he heard of the manœuvre, he withdrew and hurried to the harbor, which he placed under guard. And on the first day the Romans easily repulsed their assailants, but on the next they had decidedly the worst of the encounter. The Carthaginians even went so far as to take away Roman ships by seizing them with grappling irons. They did not venture, however, to disembark but finally sailed homewards, after which they superseded Hasdrubal and chose a certain Hanno in his place. From this time Hanno was the general, but his predecessor privately got hold of some slaves and deserters whom he welded together into a fairly strong force; he then quietly persuaded some of the Spaniards who were serving in Scipio's army to help him and attempted one night to carry out a plot against the Roman's camp. Something would have come of it, had not the[Pg 266] soothsayers, dismayed by the actions of birds, and the mother of Masinissa, as a result of divinations, caused an investigation of the Spaniards to be made. So their treachery was anticipated and punished, and Scipio again made a campaign against Carthage; he was engaged in devastating their fields [IX, 13.] while Syphax was waging war upon the followers of Lælius. That prince offered successful resistance for some time, but eventually the Romans prevailed, slaughtered many, took many alive, and captured Syphax. They also acquired possession of Cirta, his palace, without a contest by displaying to the guardians within their king, now a prisoner.

It was there that Sophonis also was. Masinissa at once rushed toward her and embracing her said: "I hold Syphax that snatched thee away. I hold thee also. Fear not. Thou hast not become a captive, since thou hast me as an ally." After these words he married her on the spot, anticipating any action on the part of the Romans out of fear that he might somehow lose her, were she reckoned among the spoil. Then he assumed control of the rest of the cities of Syphax also. **FRAG. 56**⁵³AND THEY BROUGHT TO SCIPIO ALONG WITH THE OTHER PROPERTY SYPHAX HIMSELF. AND THE COMMANDER WOULD NOT CONSENT TO SEE HIM REMAIN BOUND IN CHAINS, BUT CALLING TO MIND HIS ENTERTAINMENT AT THE OTHER'S COURT AND REFLECTING ON HUMAN POSSIBILITIES HE LEAPED FROM HIS CHAIR, LOOSED HIM, EMBRACED HIM, AND TREATED HIM WITH RESPECT. Once he asked him: "What possessed you to go to war with us?" Syphax[Pg 267] excused himself skillfully and at the same time made himself secure against Masinissa by declaring that Sophonis had been responsible for his attitude. To please her father Hasdrubal she had ensnared him by witchcraft against his will to espouse the Carthaginian cause. "At any rate," he went on, "I have paid a proper penalty for being hoodwinked by a woman, and in the midst of my evils have at least one consolation,—that Masinissa has married her. For she will certainly bring about his utter ruin likewise."

Scipio feeling suspicious about this action of Masinissa called him and censured him for having so speedily married a woman taken captive from the enemy without the commanding officer's consent, and he bade him give her up to the Romans. Masinissa, thoroughly distracted, rushed into the tent where Sophonis was and cried out to her: "If

I might by my own death ensure thee liberty and freedom from outrage, I would cheerfully die for thee; but since this is impossible, I send thee before me whither I and all shall come." With these words he held out poison to her. And she uttered neither lament nor groan but with much nobility made answer: "Husband, if this is thy will, I am content. My soul shall after thee know no other lord: for my body, if Scipio require it, let him take it with life extinct." Thus she met her death, and Scipio marveled at the deed.

Laelius conducted to Rome Syphax and his son Vermina and some others of the foremost men; and the citizens gave Syphax an estate at Alba, where at his death[Pg 268] they honored him with a public funeral, and confirmed Vermina in the possession of his father's kingdom besides bestowing upon him the captured Nomads.

FRAG. 56⁵⁴THE CARTHAGINIANS WHILE MAKING PROPOSITIONS TO SCIPIO THROUGH HERALDS GAVE HIM MONEY AT ONCE AND GAVE BACK ALL THE PRISONERS, BUT IN REGARD TO THE REMAINING MATTERS THEY DESPATCHED AN EMBASSY TO ROME. HOWEVER, THE ROMANS WOULD NOT RECEIVE THE ENVOYS AT THAT TIME, DECLARING THAT IT WAS A TRADITION IN THE STATE NOT TO ADMIT AN EMBASSY FROM ANY PARTIES AND NEGOTIATE WITH THEM IN REGARD TO PEACE WHILE THEIR ARMIES WERE STILL IN ITALY. LATER, WHEN HANNIBAL AND MAGO HAD EMBARKED, THEY ACCORDED THE ENVOYS AN AUDIENCE AND VOTED THE PEACE. But Hannibal and Mago departed from Italy not on account of the tentative arrangements but through haste to reach the scene of war at home.

The Carthaginians in Libya were not thinking seriously of peace even before this and had made propositions about a truce only for the purpose of using up time and with a view to securing Hannibal's presence. When they heard that Hannibal was really drawing near, they took courage **FRAG. 56⁵⁵**AND ATTACKED SCIPIO BOTH BY LAND AND BY SEA. WHEN THE LATTER COMPLAINED TO THEM ABOUT THIS, THEY RETURNED NO PROPER ANSWER TO THE ENVOYS AND ACTUALLY PLOTTED AGAINST THEM WHEN THEY SAILED BACK; AND HAD NOT A WIND FORTUNATELY ARISEN TO HELP THEM, THEY WOULD HAVE PERISHED. HENCE SCIPIO, THOUGH AT THIS TIME THE VOTE REGARDING PEACE WAS BROUGHT TO HIM, REFUSED ANY LONGER TO MAKE IT. So the Carthaginians sent Mago back to[Pg 269] Italy, but deposed Hanno from his command and appointed Hannibal general with full powers. Hasdrubal they even voted to put to death, and finding that he had by poison intentionally compassed his own destruction they abused his dead body. Hannibal having secured complete leadership invaded the country of Masinissa, where he proceeded to do mischief and made ready to fight against the Romans. Counter-preparations were made by the followers of Scipio.

IX, 14.—The people of Rome were regretting that they had not prevented the return voyage of Hannibal, and when they learned that he was consolidating the opposition in Libya, they were again terrified beyond measure. **B.C. 202**

(a.u. 552)Accordingly they sent Claudius Nero, one of the consuls, to attend to him, and allotted to Marcus Servilius the protection of Italy. Nevertheless Nero was not able to reach Libya, being detained in Italy by stormy weather and again at Sardinia. After that he progressed no farther than Sicily, for he learned that Scipio had proved the victor. Scipio, indeed, was afraid that Nero might be so prompt as to appropriate the glory that properly was the fruit of his own toils, and so, at the very first glimmer of spring, he took up his march against Hannibal; he had already received information that the latter had conquered Masinissa. Hannibal, upon ascertaining the approach of Scipio, did not wait, but went out to meet him. They encamped opposite each other and did not at once come to blows, but delayed several days; and each commander addressed words to his own army and incited it to battle.[Pg 270]

When it seemed best to Scipio not to delay any further but to involve Hannibal in conflict whether he wished it or not, he set out for Utica, that by creating an impression of fear and flight he might gain a favorable opportunity for attack; and this was what took place. Hannibal, thinking that he was in flight and being correspondingly encouraged, pursued him with cavalry only. Contrary to his expectations Scipio resisted, engaged in battle and came out victorious. After routing this body he directed his next attentions not to pursuing them but to their equipment train, which chanced to be on the march, and he captured it entire. This behavior caused Hannibal alarm, an alarm increased by the news that Scipio had done no injury to three Carthaginian spies whom he had found in his camp. Hannibal had learned this fact from one of them, for the other two had chosen to remain with the Romans. Disheartened and confused he no longer felt the courage to carry on a decisive engagement with the Romans, but determined to make efforts for a truce as quickly as possible, in order that if this attempt should not be successful, it might at least cause a temporary delay and cessation of hostilities. So he sent to Masinissa, and through him as a man of the same stock asked for a truce. And he secured a conference with Scipio, but accomplished nothing. For Scipio avoided a definite answer as much as he did a harsh one, but throughout pursued a middle course, albeit preserving an agreeable tone, in order to lead Hannibal into careless behavior by pretending a willingness[Pg 271] to come to terms. Such was the result. Hannibal now gave no thought to battle, but concerned himself with a desire to change his camp to a more favorable location. Scipio, gaining this information from deserters, broke up beforehand by night and occupied the spot which was the goal of Hannibal's striving. And when the Carthaginians had reached a depressed part of the road unsuited for encampment he suddenly confronted them. Hannibal refused to fight and in his efforts to locate a camp there and to dig wells he had a hard time of it all night long. Thus Scipio forced the enemy, while at a disadvantage from weariness and thirst, to offer battle whether pleased or not.

Accordingly, the Romans entered the conflict well marshaled and eager, but Hannibal and the Carthaginians listlessly and in dejection, a dejection for which a total eclipse of

the sun at this time was largely accountable. From this combination of circumstances Hannibal suspected that this, too, foreboded to them nothing auspicious. In this frame of mind they stationed the elephants in front of them as a protection. Suddenly the Romans emitted a great, bloodcurdling shout, and smiting their spears against their shields advanced with determination and on a run against the elephants. Thrown into a panic by the onset most of the beasts did not await the enemy's approach, but turned to flee and receiving frequent wounds wrought greater turmoil among their keepers. Others entered the fray, and then the Romans would stand apart and the animals ran through the spaces in their ranks, getting[Pg 272] struck and wounded from close at hand as they passed along. For a time the Carthaginians resisted, but at length, when Masinissa and Lælius fell upon them from the rear with horsemen, they all fled. The majority of them were destroyed and Hannibal came very near losing his life. As he fled, Masinissa pursued him at breakneck speed, giving his horse free rein. Hannibal turned and saw him in mad career; he swerved aside just slightly, **FRAG. 56⁵⁷**AND CHECKED HIS FORWARD COURSE: Masinissa rushed by and Hannibal got behind and wounded him. Shortly after with a few attendants the Carthaginian leader made good his escape.

B.C.

201

(a.u. 553)

FRAG. 56⁶²Scipio followed up his victory by a rapid advance against Carthage and proceeded to besiege it by land and sea at once. The Carthaginians at first set themselves in readiness as though to endure the siege, but later, brought to the end of their resources, **THEY MADE OVERTURES TO SCIPIO FOR PEACE.** Scipio accepted their proposals and discussed with them the articles of the compact. **THE TERMS AGREED UPON WERE: THAT THE HOSTAGES AND THE CAPTIVES AND THE DESERTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN UP BY THE CARTHAGINIANS, THAT ALL THE ELEPHANTS AND THE TRIREMES (SAVE TEN) SHOULD BE DELIVERED OVER, AND THAT IN THE FUTURE THEY SHOULD NOT KEEP ELEPHANTS NOR MORE SHIPS OF WAR THAN TEN, NOR MAKE WAR UPON ANY ONE CONTRARY TO THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE ROMANS,** and a few other points.

WHEN AN AGREEMENT OF THIS NATURE HAD BEEN REACHED, THE CARTHAGINIANS DESPATCHED AMBASSADORS TO ROME. (FRAG. 56⁶³?)SO THEY WENT THEIR WAY, BUT THE SENATE DID NOT RECEIVE THE EMBASSY READILY; INDEED, ITS MEMBERS[Pg 273] DISPUTED FOR A LONG TIME, ONE PARTY BEING OPPOSED TO ANOTHER. **FRAG. 56⁶⁴**THE POPULAR ASSEMBLY, HOWEVER, UNANIMOUSLY VOTED FOR PEACE AND ACCEPTED THE AGREEMENT AND SENT TEN MEN THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH SCIPIO THEY MIGHT SETTLE ALL THE DETAILS. AND THE TREATY WAS ACCEPTED, THE TRIREMES WERE GIVEN UP AND BURNED, AND OF THE ELEPHANTS THE LARGER NUMBER WERE CARRIED OFF TO ROME, AND THE REST WERE PRESENTED TO MASINISSA. THE ROMANS NOW ABANDONED LIBYA, AND THE CARTHAGINIANS ITALY.

THE SECOND WAR, THEN, WITH THE CARTHAGINIANS RESULTED IN THIS WAY AT THE END OF SIXTEEN YEARS. BY IT SCIPIO HAD BEEN MADE ILLUSTRIOUS, AND HE WAS GIVEN THE TITLE OF AFRICANUS (AFRICA WAS THE NAME OF THAT PART OF LIBYA SURROUNDING CARTHAGE), AND MANY ALSO CALLED HIM "LIBERATOR" BECAUSE HE HAD BROUGHT BACK MANY CAPTIVE CITIZENS. HE THEREFORE ATTAINED GREAT PROMINENCE BY THESE DEEDS, BUT HANNIBAL WAS ACCUSED BY HIS OWN PEOPLE OF HAVING REFUSED TO CAPTURE ROME WHEN HE WAS ABLE TO DO SO, AND OF HAVING APPROPRIATED THE PLUNDER IN ITALY. HE WAS NOT, HOWEVER, CONVICTED, BUT WAS SHORTLY AFTER ENTRUSTED WITH THE HIGHEST OFFICE IN CARTHAGE.

FRAG. 57¹IX, 15.—THE ROMANS NOW BECAME INVOLVED IN OTHER WARS, which were waged against Philip the Macedonian and against Antiochus.

[Pg 274]

(BOOK 18, BOISSEVAIN.)

As long as the struggle with the Carthaginians was at its height they treated Philip with consideration even if his attitude toward them was not one of friendliness; for they wished to prevent him from consolidating with the Carthaginians or leading an expedition into Italy. But when the previous hostilities had come to a standstill, they did not wait a moment, but embarked upon open warfare with him, which they justified by the presentation of many complaints. Accordingly, the Romans sent envoys to him, and when he complied with none of their orders, voted for war. They used his descent upon the Greeks as a pretext, but their real reason was irritation at his general behavior and a determination to anticipate him, so that he should not be able to enslave Greece and conduct a campaign against Italy after the fashion of Pyrrhus. **B.C. 200 (a.u. 554)**As a consequence of their vote they made effective preparations in all departments and they associated with Sulpicius Galba Lucius Apustius as legatus in charge of the fleet. Galba after crossing the Ionian Gulf was sick for some time; accordingly the aforementioned legatus and the sub-lieutenant Claudius Cento assumed charge of his entire force. The second of these with the aid of the fleet rescued Athens, which was being besieged by the Macedonians, and sacked Chalcis, which was occupied by the same enemy. Philip returned just then, having finished his campaign against Athens, but Cento drove [Pg 275] him back at his first approach and repulsed him again on the occasion of a subsequent assault. Apustius, while Philip was busy with Greece, had invaded Macedonia, and was plundering the country as well as making garrisons and cities subject. For these reasons Philip found himself in a quandary, and for a time scurried about hither and thither, defending now one place, now another. This he did until Apustius proved himself a mighty menace to his country and the Dardanians were injuring the part of Macedonia close to their borders **FRAG. 57²**(THIS PEOPLE DWELL ABOVE THE ILLYRIANS AND THE MACEDONIANS) and some Illyrians together with Amynder king of the Athamanians, a Thessalian tribe, though they had

previously been his allies now transferred themselves to the Roman side. In view of these events he conceived a suspicion of Ætolian loyalty and began to fear for his interests at home, and he hastened thither with the larger part of his army. Apustius, apprised of his approach, retired, for by this time it was winter.

Galba on recovering from his illness made ready a still larger force and at the beginning of spring pushed forward into Macedonia. When the two leaders drew near each other they **FRAG. 57**³BOTH PITCHED CAMP AND CONDUCTED SKIRMISHES OF THE HORSE AND LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS. WHEN THE ROMANS TRANSFERRED THEIR CAMP TO A CERTAIN SPOT FROM WHICH THEY COULD GET FOOD MORE EASILY, PHILIP DECIDED THAT THEY HAD SHIFTED POSITION OUT OF FEAR OF HIM; THEREFORE HE ATTACKED THEM UNEXPECTEDLY WHILE THEY WERE ENGAGED IN PLUNDERING AND KILLED A FEW OF THEM. AND GALBA ON PERCEIVING THIS[Pg 276] MADE A SORTIE FROM THE CAMP, ATTACKED HIM AND SLEW MANY MORE IN RETURN. PHILIP, THEN, IN VIEW OF HIS DEFEAT AND THE FACT THAT HE WAS WOUNDED, WITHDREW JUST AFTER NIGHTFALL. GALBA, HOWEVER, DID NOT FOLLOW HIM UP BUT RETIRED TO APOLLONIA. APUSTIUS WITH THE RHODIANS AND WITH ATTALUS CRUISED ABOUT AND SUBJUGATED MANY OF THE ISLANDS.

About the same time **FRAG. 57**⁴HAMILCAR, A CARTHAGINIAN WHO HAD MADE A CAMPAIGN WITH MAGO IN ITALY AND REMAINED THERE UNNOTICED, AFTER A TERM OF QUIET CAUSED THE GAULS AS SOON AS THE MACEDONIAN WAR BROKE OUT TO REVOLT FROM THE ROMANS; THEN WITH THE REBELS HE MADE AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE LIGURIANS AND WON OVER SOME OF THEM ALSO. THEY FOUGHT WITH LUCIUS FURIUS THE PRÆTOR, WERE DEFEATED, AND SENT ENVOYS ABOUT PEACE. THE LIGURIANS OBTAINED THIS, but it was not granted to the others. Instead, Aurelius the consul, who was jealous of the prætor's victory, led a new campaign against them.

B.C. 199
(*a.u.* 555)The succeeding year a great deal of havoc was wrought by Hamilcar and the Gauls. They conquered the prætor Gnæus Bæbius, overran the territory which was in alliance with the Romans, besieged Placentia, and capturing it razed it to the ground.

IX, 16.—To return to the campaign in Greece and Macedonia—Publius Villius the consul was encamped opposite Philip, who had occupied in advance the passes of Epirus through which are the entrances to Macedonia. Philip had extended a wall across the entire mountain region in between and held a formidable position, **B.C. 198** (*a.u.* 556)but the consul Titus Flamininus[38] at the[Pg 277] conclusion of winter got around the circumvallation with a few followers by a narrow path. And appearing suddenly on higher ground he terrified Philip, who thought that the whole army of Titus had come up through the pass. Hence he fell back into Macedonia at once. The consul did not pursue him, but assumed control of the cities in Epirus. He also went into Thessaly and detached a good part of it from Philip and then retired into Phocis and

Bœotia. While he was besieging Elatea his brother Lucius Flamininus in company with Attalus and the Rhodians was subduing the islands. Finally, after the capture of Cenchræa, they learned that envoys had been sent to the Achæans to see about an alliance and they despatched some themselves in turn, the Athenians associating in the embassy. And at first the opinions of the Achæans were divided, some wanting to vote their alliance to Philip and some to the Romans; eventually, however, they voted assistance to the latter. And they joined in an expedition against Corinth, where they succeeded in demolishing portions of the wall, but retired after losses suffered through sallies of the citizens.

Then Philip, growing afraid that many cities might be taken, made overtures to the consul regarding peace. The latter accepted his representations and they and their allies met, but nothing was accomplished except that permission was granted Philip to send envoys to Rome. Nor was anything done there. For, when the Greeks insisted that he depart from Corinth and Chalcis and from Demetrias in Thessaly, the envoys of [Pg 278] Philip said they had received no instructions on this point and closed an ineffectual mission.

The people of Rome in voting to Flamininus the supreme direction in Greece for another year also committed to his charge the case of Philip as well. The Roman leader, since he was to remain at his post, prepared for war, and the more so because the Lacedæmonian tyrant Nabis, although a friend of Philip from whom he had received Argos, had made a truce with him. The Macedonian monarch being unable to administer many districts at once and fearing that the city might be seized by the Romans had deposited it with Nabis to be restored again.

In a campaign of the consul Ælius Pætus against the Gauls many perished on both sides in the stress of conflict and no advantage was achieved. And the Carthaginian hostages together with the slaves accompanying them and the captives who had been sold to various persons had the hardihood to take possession of the several cities in which they were living; and after slaughtering many of the native population were overthrown by the prætor Cornelius Lentulus before they had wrought any more mischief. The Gauls, however, elated by their successes and aware of the fact that it was only a secondary war the Romans were waging against them prepared as if to march upon Rome. **B.C. 197**

(a.u. 557) The Romans consequently became afraid and sent both the consuls, Cornelius Cethegus and Minucius Rufus, against the Gauls. They parted company and individually ravaged different tracts of country. The [Pg 279] enemy accordingly also divided forces to meet the consuls. One band under Hamilcar encountered Cethegus and was defeated; the rest when made aware of this showed the white feather and would no longer face Rufus; consequently the latter overran the country at will. Those who had fought against Cethegus then made peace; the remainder still continued under arms.

At this time Flaminius in company with Attalus reduced the whole of Bœotia. Attalus expired of old age in the midst of a speech which he was making to the people there. Flaminius went into Thessaly and came into collision with Philip. It was only a cavalry skirmish in which they engaged, for the ground was not suitable for a battle on a vaster scale; hence both withdrew. And having reached a certain hill, the top ridge of which is called Dog's Head (Cynoscephale), they bivouacked, one on one side, the other on the other. Here also they fought with their entire armies, and the outcome would have left both with equal honors if the Ætolians had not made the Romans superior. So **FRAG. 58** PHILIP WAS DEFEATED and fled, and afterward, learning that Larissa and the cities surrounding it had chosen to follow the fortunes of the victors, HE SENT HERALDS TO FLAMINIUS. AND HE MADE A TRUCE as soon as Philip had given money and hostages, among them his own son Demetrius, and had sent out envoys to Rome in regard to peace.

During the period of these transactions Androstenes also had been vanquished by the Achæans and had lost Corinth. And Lucius Flaminius who was in [Pg 280] charge of the fleet, when he could not persuade the Acarnanians to refrain from allying themselves with Philip, besieged and captured Leucas; later they became aware of Philip's defeat and he secured their submission with greater ease.

Thus was the Macedonian war terminated and the people of Rome very readily became reconciled with Philip upon the following terms. He should restore the captives and deserters; give up the elephants and triremes save five (including the flagship, a vessel of sixteen banks), pay an indemnity, part at once, the rest in definite installments; be king of Macedonia alone; not keep more than five thousand soldiers, nor make war with any person outside his own country. For the rest of the cities situated in Asia and Europe which were previously subservient to him they let go free.

The consuls waged once more with the Gauls a war not unfraught with difficulties, yet in spite of all they got the better of this people, too.

B.C.

195

(*a.u.* 559) IX, 17.—Porcius Cato being chosen consul won back Spain, which had been almost entirely alienated. He was a man who surpassed those of his age in every virtue. Now after the defeat inflicted upon the Romans at Cannæ a law had been passed to the effect that women should not wear gold nor be carried in chairs nor make use at all of variegated clothing; and the people were deliberating as to whether they ought to abolish this law. And on this subject Cato delivered a speech in which he made out that the law ought to prevail, and finally he added these words: "Let the [Pg 281] women, then, be adorned not with gold nor precious stones nor with any bright and transparent clothing, but with modesty, with love of husband, love of children, persuasion, moderation, with the established laws, with our arms, our victories, our trophies."—Lucius Valerius, a tribune, spoke in opposition to Cato, urging that the privilege of the

old-time ornament be restored to the women. After speaking at length in this vein to the people he then directed his discourse to a consideration of Cato, and said: "You, Cato, if you are displeased at women's ornaments and wish to do something magnificent and befitting a philosopher, clip their hair close all around and put on them short frocks and tunics with one shoulder; yes, by Jove, you go ahead and give them armor and mount them on horses and, if you like, take them to Spain; and let's bring them in here, so that they may take part in our assemblies." Valerius said this in jest, but the women hearing him (many of them were hanging about near the Forum inquisitive to know how the affair would come out) rushed into the assembly denouncing the law; and accordingly, as it was speedily repealed, they put on some ornaments right there in the assembly and went out dancing.

Cato sailed away and reached Spain. There he learned that all the dwellers as far as the Iber had united in order to wage war against him in a body. After organizing his army he attacked and defeated them and forced them to submit to him. They did so in the fear that otherwise they might lose the cities at a single[Pg 282] stroke. At the time he did them no harm, but later when some of them incurred his suspicion, he deprived them all of arms and made the natives themselves tear down their own walls. Letters were sent in every direction with orders that they should be delivered to everybody on the same day; and in these he commanded the people to raze the circuit of their fortifications instantaneously, threatening the disobedient with death. Those occupying official positions when they had read them thought in each case that the message had been written to them alone, and without taking time for deliberation they all threw down their walls.

Cato now crossed the Iber, and though he did not dare to contend with the Celtiberian allies of the enemy on account of their number, yet he handled them in marvelous fashion, now persuading them by a gift of larger pay to change front and join him, now admonishing them to return home, sometimes even announcing a battle with them for a stated day. The result of it all was that they broke up into separate factions and became so fearful that they no longer ventured to fight with him.

[Pg 283]

(BOOK 19, BOISSEVAIN.)

IX, 18.—At this time Flaminius, too, made a campaign against Argos, for the Romans seeing that Nabis was not loyal to them and was a source of terror to the Greeks treated him as an enemy. With an accession of allies from Philip Flaminius marched upon Sparta, crossed Taygetus without effort and advanced toward the city, meeting with no opposition. For Nabis, being afraid of the Romans and suspicious of the natives, did not rouse himself to the point of meeting Flaminius at a distance; but when the latter came nearer he made a hostile excursion from the town, thinking lightly of his opponent because of the fatigue of the journey and because Flaminius was kept employed by the

business of encamping; and he did cause a few flurries. The next day he came out to face the Romans when they assaulted, but as he lost large numbers he did not come out again. So Flamininus, leaving a portion of his army there to prevent a warlike demonstration anywhere, with the rest turned his attention to the country districts; these he ravaged with the aid of his brother and the Rhodians and Eumenes, son of Attalus. Nabis was consequently in despair and despatched a herald to Flamininus about peace. The latter listened to his proposals but did not immediately cease hostilities. For Nabis did not dare to refuse the arrangements which he was asked to make, nor yet would he consent to make them. And the populace[Pg 284] prevented him from coming to an agreement. So temporarily Nabis did not come to terms, but when the Romans attacked again and captured almost all of Sparta (it was in part destitute of a wall), he would wait no longer, but made a truce with Flamininus and by sending an embassy to Rome effected a settlement.

Flamininus hereupon set all the Greeks free; **B.C. 194 (a.u. 560)** later he convened them in session and after reminding them of the benefits they had received urged them to maintain a kindly attitude toward the Romans: he then withdrew all their garrisons and departed with his entire army.

Upon the arrival of Flamininus at Rome Nabis rebelled. And straightway the whole Greek world, so to speak, was thrown into a turmoil which the Ætolians did their best to increase. They were making ready for war and were sending embassies to Philip and Antiochus. They persuaded the latter to assume a position of hostility to the Romans, promising him that he should be king of both Greece and Italy. Roman interests were so upset that they had no hope of overcoming Antiochus, but were satisfied if they could preserve their former conquests. Antiochus was regarded as a mighty personage both in the light of his own power, through which he had performed distinguished exploits and above all had subjugated Media, **B.C. 193 (a.u. 561)** and he loomed far mightier still for having attached to his cause Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and Ariarathes, monarch of Cappadocia, as a kinsman by marriage.[Pg 285]

Antiochus being so esteemed, the Romans as long as they were at war with Philip were careful to court his favor, keeping up friendly relations with him through envoys and sending him gifts. But when they had vanquished their other enemy, they despised also this king whom they had formerly feared. Antiochus himself crossed over into Thrace and gained control of many districts. **B.C. 192 (a.u. 562)** He helped colonize Lysimachia, which had been depopulated, intending to use it as a base. It was Philip and Nabis who had invited his assistance. Hannibal, too, had been with him and had caused him to hope that he might sail to Carthage and from there to Italy, and further that he could subjugate the races along the Ionian Gulf and with them set out against Rome. Twice before, indeed, Antiochus had crossed into Europe and had reached Greece. This time he learned that Ptolemy was dead, and deeming it all important that he should obtain the sovereignty of Egypt he left his son Seleucus

with a force at Lysimachia and himself set out on the march. He found out, however, that Ptolemy was alive, and so kept away from Egypt and made an attempt to sail to Cyprus. Baffled by a storm he returned home. The Romans and he both despatched envoys to each other submitting mutual complaints that they might get an excuse for the war and inspect conditions on each side betimes.

Hannibal had obtained the most important office at Carthage and in his tenure of it had offended the most powerful nobles and incurred their hatred. Malicious[Pg 286] reports about him were conveyed to the Romans to the effect that he was rousing the Carthaginians to revolt and was negotiating with Antiochus. Learning that some men from Rome were at hand and fearing possible arrest he escaped from Carthage by night. He came then to Antiochus and paved the way for his own restoration to his native country and for war against the Romans by promising the king that he would secure to him the rulership of Greece and Italy. All went well until Scipio Africanus joined them. Scipio had been sent to Libya as arbitrator between Masinissa and the Carthaginians, who were at variance over some land boundaries, and had left their dispute still hanging in the air that they might continue to quarrel and neither of them be angry at the Romans on account of a definite decision. From there he crossed into Asia nominally as an envoy to Antiochus but in reality to smite both him and Hannibal with terror by his appearance and accomplish what was for the advantage of the Romans. After his arrival Antiochus no longer bestowed a similar degree of attention upon Hannibal. He suspected him of secret dealings with Scipio, and found him burdensome besides, because everybody ascribed every plan to Hannibal and all placed in him their hope for success in the war. For these reasons, then, he became both jealous and afraid of Hannibal, dreading that he might change his demeanor, should he get control of any power. So he neither supplied him with an army nor sent one to Carthage; and he did not favor him very[Pg 287] much with audiences but made it a practice not to sanction any of his proposals.

IX, 19.—The rumors about Antiochus occupied a large share of Rome's attention and caused the Romans no small degree of uneasiness. The name of Antiochus was in many mouths: some said that he already held the whole of Greece, others talked to the effect that he was hastening toward Italy. The Romans accordingly despatched envoys to Greece, among them Flamininus, who was on intimate terms with the people, in order to prevent them and Philip from creating any disturbance; and of the prætors they sent Marcus Bæbius to Apollonia, in case Antiochus should undertake to cross over into Italy that way, and Aulus Atilius to attend to Nabis. The second of these had no work to do, for Nabis had ere this perished, the victim of a plot on the part of the Ætolians, and Sparta had been captured by the Achæans: Bæbius and Philip confirmed the loyalty of many portions of Thessaly. The Macedonian king was true to his agreement with the Romans principally for the reason that Antiochus had attached some settlements belonging to him in Thrace.

Flamininus went about Greece, and some he persuaded not to revolt, others already revolted he won back, except the Ætolians and a few towns elsewhere. The Ætolian league had bound itself to Antiochus and was forming a union out of some states that were willing and others that were unwilling. Antiochus in spite of the winter time hastened forward to fulfill the hopes[Pg 288] of the Ætolians, and this explains why he did not bring along a respectable force. With what he had, however, he took Chalcis and gained control of the rest of Eubœa. Finding some Romans among the captives he released them all. Then he entered Chalcis to spend the winter, **FRAG. 59¹**WITH THE RESULT THAT HE HIMSELF AND HIS GENERALS AND HIS SOLDIERS HAD THEIR MENTAL ENERGIES RUINED BEFOREHAND; FOR BY HIS GENERAL INDOLENCE AND HIS PASSION FOR A CERTAIN GIRL HE DRIFTED INTO LUXURIOUS LIVING AND AT THE SAME TIME RENDERED THE BEST UNFIT FOR WARFARE.

The people of Rome learning that he was in Greece and had captured Chalcis took up the war in earnest. **B.C. 191 (a.u. 563)**Of the consuls they retained Scipio Nasica to guard Italy and sent Manius Glabrio with a large army into Greece. Nasica conducted a war against the Boii, and Glabrio drove Antiochus out of Greece. He also went to Thessaly and with the help of Bæbius and Philip gained control of many of the towns there. He captured Philip of Megalopolis and sent him to Rome, and drove Amynder out of his domain, which he then gave to the Macedonian ruler.

Antiochus meanwhile was staying at Chalcis and keeping quiet. Afterward he entered Bœotia and at Thermopylæ withstood the Romans who came to meet him. Considering the fewness of his soldiers he thought it best to seek an ally in the natural advantages of his position. And in order to avoid having himself such an experience as the Greeks had met who were arrayed there against the Persian he sent a division of the Ætolians up to the summit of the moun[Pg 289]tains to keep guard there. Glabrio cared little for the location and did not postpone a battle: however, he despatched his lieutenants Porcius Cato and Valerius Flaccus by night against the Ætolians on the summit and himself engaged in conflict with Antiochus just about dawn. As long as he fought on level ground he had the best of it, but when Antiochus fell back to a position higher up, he found himself inferior till Cato arrived in the enemy's rear. Cato had come upon the Ætolians asleep and had killed most of them and scattered the rest; then he hurried down and participated in the battle going on below. So they routed Antiochus and captured his camp. The king forthwith retired to Chalcis, but learning that the consul was approaching went back unobserved to Asia.

Glabrio at once occupied Bœotia and Eubœa, and proceeded to deliver assaults upon Heraclea, since the Ætolians were unwilling to yield to him. The lower city he captured by means of a siege and received the capitulation of those who had fled to the acropolis. Among the prisoners taken at this time was found Democritus the Ætolian general, who had once refused alliance to Flamininus, and when the latter asked for a decree that he

might send it to Rome, had said: "Don't worry. I will carry it there with my army and read it to you all on the banks of the Tiber."—Philip was engaged in besieging Lamia when Glabrio came against it and appropriated both victory and booty. Though the remainder of the Ætolians wanted to become reconciled, still they made no truce because[Pg 290] Antiochus sent them envoys and money; and they set themselves in readiness for war. Philip affected friendliness toward the Romans, but his heart was with Antiochus. Meantime Glabrio was besieging Naupactus which belonged to the Ætolians, and Flamininus coming to them persuaded the inhabitants to make peace, for he was well known to them. They as well as the Epirots despatched envoys to Rome. Philip for sending a triumphal crown to Capitoline Jupiter received in return among other presents his son Demetrius, who was living at Rome a hostage. A truce was not made with the Ætolians, for they would not submit to any curtailment of privilege.

B.C.

190

(*a.u.* 564)IX, 20.—The Romans set against Antiochus the Scipios, Africanus and his brother Lucius. They granted the Ætolians a respite for the purpose of once more conducting an embassy to Rome regarding peace, and hurried on against Antiochus. On reaching Macedonia they secured allies from Philip and marched on to the Hellespont. After crossing into Asia they occupied most of the coast districts which had previously been occupied by the Romans who had gone there first, as well as by Eumenes and the Rhodians; the latter had also conquered Hannibal in the region of Pamphylia, as he was taking some ships out from Phœnicia. Eumenes and his brother Attalus proceeded to injure the country of Antiochus, and cities kept coming over, some under compulsion, some voluntarily, to the Romans, with the ultimate result that Antiochus was obliged to abandon Europe en[Pg 291]tirely and to recall his son Seleucus from Lysimachia. When this son had accomplished the return journey, he sent him with troops against Pergamum. Inasmuch, however, as his investment of the town proved ineffectual and the Scipios soon reached his vicinity, Antiochus lost no time in concluding a truce with them; for he expected to obtain terms since **FRAG. 59**²HE HAD GOT POSSESSION OF THE SON OF AFRICANUS AND WAS ACCORDING HIM THE KINDEST TREATMENT. AND FINALLY, THOUGH HE FAILED OF SECURING PEACE, HE RELEASED HIM WITHOUT RANSOM. The peace project, however, came to nothing, because Antiochus would not agree to accede to the Roman demands.

Still, for a long time their attitude was marked by inaction. Finally they fell to fighting again. The following may serve as a general description of the contest. Antiochus put the chariots in front, with the elephants next, and behind these the slingers and the archers. But the Romans anticipated the charge of the chariots by a charge of their own and with a great clamor they rushed straight at them and repulsed them, so that most of these vehicles turned in the direction of the elephants. In their backward career they threw their own contingent into confusion,—for their erratic course terrified and dispersed the men marshaled close to them,—and a heavy rain which now came up

rendered weak the detachment of archers and slingers. A heavy, all-enveloping mist succeeded, which was of no hindrance to the Romans, who had the upper hand and were fighting at close range; but in[Pg 292] the case of their opponents, who were in dread and employed cavalry and archers for the most part, it made it out of the question to see which way to shoot their arrows and caused them to stumble over one another, like men in the dark. Nevertheless Antiochus developed sufficient power, by means of his armored cavalry, to rout the antagonists directly confronting him and to advance in pursuit of them as far as their camp. Indeed, he would have taken it, had not Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, who was charged with guarding it, killed the first Romans that came in after they had refused to heed his exhortations to check their flight. As a result the rest of the party turned back and the commander himself made a sortie with members of the garrison who were free from the prevailing demoralization, and their united efforts repulsed Antiochus. While this action was taking place, Zeuxis had assailed the ramparts in another quarter, had succeeded in getting within them, and continued to pillage until Lepidus became aware of it and came to the rescue of his own interests. At the same time Scipio captured the camp of Antiochus, wherein he found many human beings, many horses, baggage animals, silver and gold coins, elephants, and a number of precious objects besides. Antiochus after this defeat at once retired into Syria, and the Asiatic Greeks made common cause with the Romans.

After this, upon overtures made by Antiochus, an armistice was arranged. Africanus was well disposed toward him for his son's sake, and the consul, too, did[Pg 293] not want to leave the victory to be grasped by his successor, now approaching; consequently they laid upon Antiochus conditions no more severe than those they had originally set, before the battle. **B.C. 189**

(*a.u.* 565) Indeed, Gnæus Manlius who succeeded them in office was not pleased with the agreement reached, and he made additional demands upon the king, requiring him besides to give hostages, one of whom should be his son Antiochus, and to deliver up all the deserters, among whom was Hannibal. Antiochus reluctantly yielded obedience on all points: to give up Hannibal, however, was out of his power, since that prince had taken seasonable refuge with Prusias, king of Bithynia. On these terms Antiochus was able to send envoys to Rome and effect a cessation of hostilities. Lucius Scipio received praise for his victory, and it gave him the title of Asiaticus in the same way as his brother had been called Africanus for conquering Carthage, which had possessed the most considerable power in Africa.

These brothers who had proved themselves men of such valor and as a result of excellence had attained such a height of reputation were not long afterward brought to court and handed over to the populace. Lucius was condemned on the suspicion of his having appropriated no inconsiderable share of the spoil, and Africanus nominally for having made the conditions lighter out of gratitude for kindness shown his son; (the true cause of his conviction was jealousy). **FRAG. 60** THAT THEY COULD NOT JUSTLY BE

CHARGED WITH WRONGDOING IS MADE PLAIN BOTH BY OTHER EVIDENCE AND MOST OF[Pg 294] ALL BY THE FACT THAT WHEN THE PROPERTY OF ASIATICUS WAS CONFISCATED IT WAS FOUND TO CONSIST MERELY OF HIS ORIGINAL INHERITANCE, AND THAT THOUGH AFRICANUS RETIRED TO LITERNUM AND ABODE THERE TO THE END, NO ONE EVER AGAIN PASSED SENTENCE OF CONDEMNATION UPON HIM.

Manlius all this time was engaged in winning over Pisidia, Lycaonia, and Pamphylia, and a large district of Galatia in Asia. For there exists in that region too a race of Gauls which broke off from the European stock. Years ago with their king, Brennus, at their head they overran Greece and Thrace, and crossing thence to Bithynia they detached certain portions of Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Mysia adjacent to Olympus, and Cappadocia, and took up their residence in them; and they constitute to-day a separate nation bearing the name of Gauls. This people caused Manlius trouble, but he managed to overcome them too, capturing their city Ancyra by assault and gaining control of the rest of the towns by capitulation. This effected, he set sail for home after he had received a large price for peace from Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia.

IX, 21.—The Ætolians when they had sent ambassadors to Rome the second time in regard to peace themselves raised the standard of rebellion. Hence the Romans immediately dismissed the ambassadors and referred the conduct of affairs in Greece to Marcus Fulvius. He set out first for the large city of Ambracia (it had once been the royal residence of Pyrrhus and was now occupied by the Ætolians) and pro[Pg 295]ceeded to besiege it. So the Ætolians held a conference with him about peace, but finding him disinclined to a truce they sent a part of their army into Ambracia. The Romans undertook to capture the town by an underground passage and pushed their mine straight forward, temporarily eluding the notice of the besieged party; but the latter began to suspect the true state of affairs when the excavated earth attained some dimensions. As they were not aware in what direction the trench was being dug, they kept applying a bronze shield to the surface of the ground all about the circuit of the walls. By means of the resonance they found out the place and went to work in their turn to dig a tunnel from inside and approached the Romans, with whom they battled in obscurity. Finally they devised the following sort of defence. They filled a huge jar with feathers and put fire in it. To this they attached a bronze cover that had a number of holes bored in it. Then, after carrying the jar into the mine and turning the mouth of it toward the enemy, they inserted a bellows in the bottom, and by blowing this bellows with vigor they caused a tremendous amount of unpleasant smoke, such as feathers would naturally create, to pour out, so that not one of the Romans could endure it. Hence the Romans in despair of succeeding made a truce and raised the siege. When they had agreed to treat, the Ætolians also changed their course and secured an armistice. Subsequently they obtained a peace from the People by the gift of considerable money and many hostages.[Pg 296] Fulvius induced Cephallenia to capitulate and reduced to order the Peloponnesus, which was in a state of factional turmoil.

B.C.

187

(a.u. 567)

B.C.

183

(a.u. 571)After a little, in the consulship of Gaius Flaminius and Æmilius Lepidus, Antiochus died and his son Seleucus succeeded him. Much later, at the demise of Seleucus, the Antiochus who spent some time as a hostage in Rome became king. And Philip had courage enough to revolt because he had been deprived of some towns in Thessaly and of Ænus and Maronea besides, but he was unable to do so on account of his age and what had happened to his sons.—Some Gauls crossed the Alps and desired to found a city to the south of the mountains. Marcus Marcellus took away their arms and everything that they had brought: the Romans in the capital, however, upon receiving an embassy from them restored everything on condition that they should at once retire.

These years also saw the death of Hannibal. Envoys had been sent from Rome to Prusias, monarch of Bithynia, and a part of their errand was to make him give up Hannibal, who was at his court. The Carthaginian had advance information of the facts and being unable to escape committed suicide. **cp. FRAG. 64.**AN ORACLE HAD ONCE ANNOUNCED TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD DIE IN THE LAND OF LIBYSSA, AND HE WAS EXPECTING TO DIE IN LIBYA, HIS NATIVE COUNTRY, BUT, AS IT HAPPENED, HIS DEMISE OCCURRED WHILE HE CHANCED TO BE STAYING IN A CERTAIN PLACE CALLED LIBYSSA. Scipio Africanus also died at this time.

[Pg 297]

(BOOK 20, BOISSEVAIN.)

B.C.

179

(a.u. 575)IX, 22.—Philip, king of Macedonia, had put to death his son Demetrius and was about to slay his other son Perseus, when death overtook him. Because Demetrius had gained the affection of the Roman people through his sojourn as hostage and because he himself and the rest of the Macedonian people hoped that he would secure the kingdom after Philip was done with it, Perseus, who was his elder, became jealous of him and falsely reported him to be plotting against his father. Thus Demetrius was forced to drink poison and perished. Philip not long after ascertained the truth and desired to take measures against Perseus; he did not, however, possess sufficient strength and death overtook him. Perseus succeeded to the kingdom. The Romans confirmed his claims to it and renewed the compact of friendship enjoyed by his father.

In the period immediately following some events of importance took place, yet they were not of so vital a character that one should deem them worthy of record. Still later Perseus put himself in the position of an enemy to the Romans, and in order to delay actual warfare until he should reach a state of preparation he sent envoys to Rome presumably to make a defence on the charges which were being pressed against him.

These messengers the Romans would not receive within the wall, but they transacted business with them in the space before the city; and no other[Pg 298] answer was vouchsafed them than that they would send a consul with whom he might confer on whatever topics he pleased. They also caused them to depart the same day, having given them guides to prevent their associating with anybody. And Perseus was forbidden in the future to set foot on the soil of Italy.

The Romans next sent out Gnæus Sicinius, a prætor, with a small force (they had not yet made ready their greater armament) and Perseus made a tentative invasion of Thessaly in which he won over the greater part of that country. **B.C. 171 (a.u. 583)** When spring opened they sent Licinius Crassus against him as well as a prætor, Gaius Lucretius, in charge of the fleet. The latter first encountered Perseus near Larissa and was worsted in a cavalry skirmish: later, though, he got the best of him and Perseus accordingly retreated into Macedonia. As for Crassus, he assailed the Greek cities which were held in subjection by Philip and was repulsed from the majority of them, although he did get possession of a few. Some he razed to the ground and sold the captives. When the inhabitants of Rome learned these details, they became indignant and later they imposed a money fine on Crassus, liberated the captured cities, and bought back from the purchasers such of their inhabitants as had been sold and were then found in Italy.

So fared the Romans in these undertakings, but in the war against Perseus as a whole they suffered many great reverses and their fortunes at many points were at a low ebb. Perseus occupied the greater part of[Pg 299] Epirus and Thessaly, having gathered a large body of troops. As a measure of defence against the Romans' elephants he had trained a phalanx of heavy-armed warriors whose shields and helmets he had taken care should be studded with sharp iron nails. Also, in order to make sure that the beasts should not prove a source of terror to the horses he constructed images of elephants that were smeared with some kind of ointment to give them a fearful odor and were frightful both to see and to hear (for a mechanical device enabled them to emit a roar resembling thunder); and he kept continually leading the horses up to these representations until they took courage. Perseus, then, as a result of all this had acquired great confidence and entertained hope that he might surpass Alexander in glory and in the size of his domain; the people of Rome **B.C. 169 (a.u. 585)** when they learned this sent out with speed Marcius Philippus, who was consul. He, on reaching the camp in Thessaly, drilled the Romans and the allies so that Perseus, becoming afraid, remained quietly in Dium of Macedonia and close to Tempe, and continued to keep watch of the pass. Philippus, encouraged by this behavior of his, crossed the mountain range in the center and occupied some possessions of Perseus. But as he was progressing toward Pydna he fell short of provisions and turned back to Thessaly. Perseus gained boldness anew, recovered the places that Philippus had occupied, and with his fleet damaged the Romans at numerous points. He also secured

allies **FRAG. 65¹**AND HOPED TO EJECT THE ROMANS FROM GREECE ALTOGETHER, BUT[Pg 300] THROUGH HIS EXCESSIVE AND INOPPORTUNE PARSIMONY AND THE CONSEQUENT CONTEMPT OF HIS ALLIES HE BECAME WEAK ONCE MORE. SO SOON AS ROMAN INFLUENCE WAS DECLINING SLIGHTLY AND HIS OWN WAS INCREASING, HE WAS FILLED WITH SCORN AND THOUGHT HE HAD NO FURTHER NEED OF HIS ALLIES, AND WOULD NOT GIVE THEM THE MONEY WHICH HE HAD OFFERED. THE ZEAL OF SOME ACCORDINGLY BECAME BLUNTED AND OTHERS ABANDONED HIM ENTIRELY, WHEREUPON HE WAS SO OVERWHELMED BY DESPAIR AS ACTUALLY TO SUE FOR PEACE. AND HE WOULD HAVE OBTAINED IT THROUGH EUMENES BUT FOR THE PRESENCE OF RHODIANS ALSO IN THE EMBASSY. THEY, BY ADOPTING A HAUGHTY TONE WITH THE ROMANS, PREVENTED HIM FROM OBTAINING PEACE.

B.C.

168

(*a.u.* 586)IX, 23.—At this point the war waged against him was entrusted to Æmilius Paulus, now for the second time consul. He rapidly traversed the distance separating him from Thessaly and having first set the affairs of the soldiers in order forced his way through Tempe, which was being guarded by only a few men, and marched against Perseus. The latter had ere this erected breastworks along the river Elpeus which intervened, had occupied and rendered impassable by means of stone walls and palisades and buildings all the ground between Olympus and the sea, and was encouraged by the lack of water in the place. Yet even so the consul sought to effect a passage and found a means of overcoming the prevailing drought. By piercing the sand bed at the foot of Olympus he found water that was delicious as well as drinkable.—Meanwhile envoys of the Rhodians reached him animated by the same insolence which they had displayed on their former em[Pg 301]bassy to Rome. He would make no statement to them beyond saying that he would return an answer in a few days, and dismissed them.—Since he could accomplish nothing by direct assault, but learned that the mountains were traversable here and there, he sent a portion of his army toward that pass across them which was the more difficult of approach, to seize opportune points along the route (on account of its difficulty of access it had an extremely small guard); and he himself with the remainder of his army attacked Perseus that the latter might not entertain any suspicion which might lead to his guarding the mountains with especial care. After this, when the heights had been occupied, he set out by night for the mountains and by passing unnoticed at some points and employing force at others he crossed them. Perseus on learning it became afraid that his enemy might assail him from the rear or even get control of Pydna before he could (for the Roman fleet was simultaneously sailing along the coast), and he abandoned his fortification near the river and hastening to Pydna encamped in front of the town. Paulus, too, came there, but instead of immediately beginning an engagement they delayed for a number of days. Paulus had found out prior to the event that the moon was about to suffer an eclipse, and after collecting his army on the evening when the eclipse was due to occur gave the men notice of what would happen and warned them not to let it disturb them at all. So

the Romans on beholding the eclipse looked for no evil to come from it, but it made an impression of terror upon the Macedonians and they thought that the prodigy had a bearing on the cause[Pg 302] of Perseus. While each side was in this frame of mind an entirely accidental occurrence the next day threw them into a fierce conflict and put an end to the war. One of the Roman pack-animals had fallen into the water from which a supply was being drawn, and the Macedonians laid hold of him, while the water-carriers in turn tightened their grasp. At first they fought by themselves; then the remainder of the forces gradually issued from the respective camps to the assistance of their own men and everybody on both sides became engaged. A disordered but sharp conflict ensued in which the Romans were victorious and pursuing the Macedonians as far as the sea slaughtered numbers of them by their own efforts and allowed the fleet, which was drawing inshore, to slay numbers more. Not one of them would have been left alive but for the timely succor of night (for the battle had raged during the late afternoon).

Perseus consequently made his escape to Amphipolis, where he intended to rally the survivors and reorganize the campaign; but as nobody came to him save Cretan mercenaries and he learned that Pydna and other cities had espoused the Roman cause, he removed thence, and after putting aboard some vessels all the money that he was carrying he sailed away by night to Samothrace. Before long he ascertained that Octavius was approaching at the head of his fleet and that Paulus was in Amphipolis; so he sent him a letter requesting permission to confer about terms. Since, however, he described himself in the letter as "king", he did not get any answer. Subsequently he despatched a letter without any such appellation con[Pg 303]tained in it and was granted a conference to consider the question of peace, but the victor declared that he would not sanction any conditions that did not include Perseus's surrender of his person and all his possessions to the Romans' keeping. Hence they failed to come to an agreement. **FRAG. 65³**AFTER THIS A DEMAND WAS MADE UPON PERSEUS BY THE ROMANS FOR THE SURRENDER OF ONE EVANDER, A CRETAN, WHO HAD ASSISTED HIM IN MANY SCHEMES AGAINST THEM AND WAS MOST FAITHFUL TO HIM. THE PRINCE, FEARING THAT HE MIGHT DECLARE ALL THE INTRIGUES TO WHICH HE HAD BEEN PRIVY, DID NOT DELIVER HIM BUT SECRETLY SLEW HIM AND HAD IT RUMORED THAT THE MAN HAD PERISHED BY HIS OWN HAND. THEN THE ASSOCIATES OF PERSEUS, FEARING HIS TREACHERY (for they were not ignorant of what had occurred), BEGAN TO DESERT HIS STANDARD. Perseus, then, being afraid that he should be delivered up to the Romans tried one night to escape by flight and might have taken himself away unobserved to Cotys, a Thracian potentate, but for the fact that the Cretans abandoned him. They placed the money in boats and weighed anchor for home. So he remained there for some days with Philip, one of his sons, hidden from sight, but on ascertaining that the rest of his children and his retinue had fallen into the hands of Octavius **FRAG. 65⁴**HE ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE FOUND. UPON HIS BEING BROUGHT TO AMPHIPOLIS PAULUS DID HIM NO INJURY, BUT BOTH ENTERTAINED HIM AND HAD HIM SIT AT HIS TABLE, KEEPING HIM,

LIKEWISE, ALTHOUGH A PRISONER, UNCONFINED, AND SHOWING HIM COURTESY. After this Paulus returned through Epirus to Italy.

IX, 24.—About the same time Lucius Anicius, a[Pg 304] prætor sent to conduct operations against Gentius, both conquered those who withstood him and pursued Gentius, when he fled, to Scodra (where his palace was located) and shut him up there. The place was built on a spur of the mountain and had deep ravines containing boiling torrents winding about it, besides being girt by a steadfast wall; and so the Roman commander's siege of it would have come to naught, if Gentius presuming greatly upon his own power had not voluntarily advanced to battle. This act gave the control of his entire domain to Anicius, who then proceeded, before Paulus could arrive, to Epirus and tamed the quarrelsome pride of that district as well.

The Romans of the capital by some vague report heard of the victory of Paulus on the fourth day after the battle, but they placed no sure confidence in it. Then letters were brought from Paulus regarding his success and they were mightily pleased and plumed themselves not merely upon having vanquished Perseus and acquired Macedonia but upon having beaten the renowned Philip of old time and Alexander himself together with all that empire which he had held. When Paulus reached Rome many decrees in his honor were passed and the celebration of his triumph proved a most brilliant event. He had in his procession all the booty which he had captured, and he had also Bithys, the son of Cotys, besides Perseus and his wife and three children altogether in the garb of captives. Fearing that Heaven might wax envious of the Romans on account of their excess of good fortune he prayed, as Camillus had done before, that no ill to the State might result from it all but rather to him if it[Pg 305] should be unavoidable: and, indeed, he lost two sons, one a little before the celebration and the other during the triumphal festival itself. **FRAG. 66**HE WAS NOT ONLY GOOD AT GENERALSHIP, BUT HE LOOKED DOWN UPON MONEY. OF THIS THE FOLLOWING IS A PROOF. THOUGH HE HAD AT THAT TIME ENTERED FOR A SECOND TERM UPON THE CONSULSHIP AND HAD GAINED POSSESSION OF UNTOLD SPOILS, HE CONTINUED TO LIVE IN SO GREAT INDIGENCE THAT WHEN HE DIED THE DOWRY WAS WITH DIFFICULTY PAID BACK TO HIS WIFE.

Of the captives Bithys was returned to his father without ransom, but Perseus with his children and attendants was settled in Alba. There he endured so long as he still hoped to recover his sovereignty, but when he despaired of doing so he despatched himself. His son Philip and his daughter also died shortly after: only the youngest son survived for a time and served in the capacity of under-secretary to the magistrates of Alba. Thus Perseus, who boasted of tracing his descent through twenty kings and often had Philip and still oftener Alexander in his mouth, lost his kingdom, became a captive, and marched in the procession of triumph wearing chains as well as his diadem.

FRAG. 67¹THE RHODIANS, WHO IN THEIR EARLIER DEALINGS WITH THE ROMANS DISPLAYED SELF-ESTEEM, NOW BEGGED THE LATTER NOT TO BEAR ILL-WILL TOWARD

THEM: **FRAG. 67**²AND WHEREAS THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE TITLE OF ROMAN ALLIES, THEY WERE NOW ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS TO SECURE IT; and they obtained the object of their eagerness, but only after long delay. The Romans harbored resentment against the Cretans, too, but in response to a number of embassies on the part[Pg 306] of this nation they eventually relaxed their anger. Their behavior was similar **FRAG. 68**IN THE CASE OF PRUSIAS AND EUMENES. THE FORMER CAME PERSONALLY TO THE CITY AND ENTERED THE SENATE-HOUSE, COVERED THE THRESHOLD WITH KISSES, AND WORSHIPPED THE SENATORS; THUS HE OBTAINED PITY and was held guiltless: Eumenes through Attalus his brother secured himself against any continuation of malice on their part.

At this time, too, the affairs of Cappadocia were settled in the following manner. The monarch of that country, Ariarathes, had a legitimate son Ariarathes. But since for a long time before she had this son his wife had failed to conceive, she had adopted a child whom she called Orophernes. When the true son was later born the position of the other was detected and he was banished. Naturally after the death of Ariarathes he headed an uprising against his brother. Eumenes allied himself with Ariarathes, and Demetrius the king of Syria with Orophernes. Ariarathes after sustaining a defeat found an asylum with the Romans and was appointed by them to share the kingdom with Orophernes. But the fact that Ariarathes had been termed "friend and ally" by the Romans enabled him subsequently to make the entire domain his own. Attalus soon succeeded Eumenes (who died) and drove Orophernes and Demetrius out of Cappadocia altogether.

IX, 25.—Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, passed away leaving two sons and one daughter. When the brothers began to quarrel with each other about the supreme office, Antiochus the son of Antiochus the Great sheltered the younger, who had been driven out,[Pg 307] in order that under the pretext of defending him he might interfere in Egyptian politics. In a campaign directed against Egypt he conquered the greater part of the country and spent some time in besieging Alexandria. As the unsubdued sought refuge with the Romans, Popilius was sent to Antiochus and bade him keep his hands off Egypt; for the brothers, comprehending the designs of Antiochus, had become reconciled. When the latter was for putting off his reply, Popilius drew a circle about him with his staff and demanded that he deliberate and answer standing where he was. Antiochus then in fear raised the siege. The Ptolemies (such was the name of both princes) on being relieved of foreign dread fell into renewed disputing. Then they were reconciled again by the Romans on the condition that the elder should have Egypt and Cyprus, and the other one the country about Cyrene, which was likewise part of Egypt at that time. The younger one was vexed at having the inferior portion and came to Rome where he secured from the government a grant of Cyprus in addition. Then the elder once more effected an arrangement with the younger son by giving him some cities in exchange for Cyprus and being rated to contribute money and grain.

(*a.u.* 590) Antiochus subsequently died, leaving the kingdom to a child of the same name whom the Romans confirmed in possession of it and sent three men (with sufficient show of reason, for he was a minor) to act as his guardians. They on finding elephants and triremes contrary to the compact ordered the elephants all to be slain and administered everything else in the in[Pg 308]terest of Rome. Therefore Lysias, who had been entrusted with the surveillance of the king, incited the populace to cast out the Romans and also kill Gaius[39] Octavius. When these plans had been carried out Lysias straightway despatched envoys to Rome to offer a defence for what had been done. Demetrius the son of Seleucus son of Antiochus, who was staying in Rome as a hostage at the time of his father's death and had been deprived of the kingdom by his uncle Antiochus, asked for his ancestral domain when he learned of the death of Antiochus, but the Romans would neither help him to get it nor permit him to set out from Rome. In spite of his dissatisfaction he remained quiet. But when the affair of Lysias came up, he no longer delayed but escaped by flight and sent a message to the senate from Lycia saying that his objective was not his *cousin* Antiochus (the children of brothers were so termed by the ancients) but Lysias, and his purpose was to avenge Octavius. Hastening to Tripolis in Syria he won over this town also, pretending that he had been sent out by the Romans to take charge of the kingdom. No one at this time had any idea of his secret flight, and so after conquering Apamea and gathering a body of troops he marched to Antioch. There he destroyed Lysias and the boy, who came to meet him in the guise of friends (through fear of the Romans they had offered no opposition), **B.C. 162** (*a.u.* 592) and he recovered the kingdom, whereupon he for[Pg 309]warded to Rome a crown and the assassins of Octavius. The citizens, being enraged at him, would accept neither the one nor the other.

Next the Romans made a campaign against the Dalmatians. This race consists of Illyrians who dwell along the Ionian Gulf, some of whom the Greeks used to call Taulantii, and part of them are close to Dyrrachium. The cause of the war was that they had been abusing some of their neighbors who were in a league of friendship with the Romans, and when the Romans joined an embassy in their behalf the Dalmatians returned an answer that was not respectful, and even arrested and killed the envoys of the other nations. **B.C. 155**

(*a.u.* 599) Scipio Nasica subdued this race in a campaign against them. He captured their towns and several times sold the captives.—Other events, too, took place in those days,—not, however, of a kind to deserve mention or historical record.

[Pg 310]

(BOOK 21, BOISSEVAIN.)

(*a.u.* 601) IX, 26.—The rattling of dice in the box of Circumstance now announced the

final cast in the struggle with Carthage,—the third of the series. The Carthaginians could not endure their subordinate position, but contrary to the treaty were setting their fleet in readiness and making alliances as measures of preparation for war with the Nomads: **B.C. 152**

(*a.u.* 602)and the Romans, having settled other questions to their own satisfaction, did not remain at rest, but by the mouth of Scipio Nasica their commissioner they charged their rivals with this breach of faith and ordered them to disband their armament. The Carthaginians found fault with Masinissa and on account of the war with him declined to obey the command. The Romans then arranged terms for them with Masinissa and prevailed upon him to retire from some territory in their favor. **B.C. 150** (*a.u.* 604)Since they showed themselves no more tractable than before, the Romans waited a bit, and as soon as information was received that the Carthaginians had been worsted in a great battle by Masinissa they voted for war against them. The Carthaginians, who were feeling the effects of their defeat, became frightened on learning this and sent envoys to Rome to secure an alliance; for other neighboring tribes were also beginning to attack them. They feigned a readiness to yield to the Romans on all points, and their very intention of not remaining true to their agreements rendered them all the more ready to promise anything.[Pg 311]

B.C.

149

(*a.u.* 605)When the senate called a meeting to consider the matter, Scipio Nasica advised receiving the Carthaginian embassy and making a truce with them, but Marcus Cato declared that no truce ought to be arranged nor the decree of war rescinded. The senators accepted the supplication of the envoys, promised to grant them a truce, and asked for hostages as an earnest of these conditions. These hostages were sent to Sicily and Lucius Marcius and Marcus Manilius went there, took charge of them, and sent them on to Rome. They themselves made haste to occupy Africa. After encamping they summoned the magistrates of Carthage to appear before them. When these officials arrived they did not unmask all their demands at once, for they feared that if the Carthaginians understood them in season they would plunge into war with resources unimpaired. So first they asked for and received grain, next the triremes, and after that the engines; and then they demanded the arms besides. They secured the entire visible supply (but the Carthaginians had a great deal of other equipment safely hidden) and at length ordered them to raze their city and to build in its place an unwalled town inland, eighty stades distant from the sea. At that the Carthaginians were dissolved in tears, acknowledged that they were trapped, and bewailed their fate, begging the consuls not to compel them to act as the assassins of their country. They soon found that they could accomplish nothing and had to face the repeated command either to execute the order or to cast the die of war. Many of the people then remained there on the[Pg 312] Roman side, tacitly admitting their success: the remainder withdrew, and after killing some of their rulers for not having chosen war in the first place and after murdering such Romans as were discovered within the fortification they turned their attention to war. Under these

circumstances they liberated all the slaves, restored the exiles, chose Hasdrubal once more as leader, and made ready arms, engines, and triremes. With war at their doors and the danger of slavery confronting them they prepared in the briefest possible time everything that they needed. They spared nothing, but melted down the statues for the sake of the bronze in them and used the hair of their women for ropes. The consuls at first, thinking them unarmed, expected to overcome them speedily and merely prepared ladders, with which they expected to scale the wall at once. As the assault showed their enemies to be armed and they saw that they possessed means for a siege, the Romans, before approaching close to the city again, devoted themselves to the manufacture of engines. The construction of these machines was fraught with danger, since Hasdrubal set ambuscades for those who were gathering the wood and annoyed them considerably, but in time they were able to assail the town. Now Manilius in his assault from the land side could not injure the Carthaginians at all, but Marcius, while delivering an attack from marshy ground on the side where the sea was, managed to shake down a part of the wall, though he could not get inside. The Carthaginians repulsed those who attempted to force their way in, and at night issued[Pg 313] through the ruins to slay numerous men and burn up a very large number of engines. Hasdrubal and the cavalry, however, did not allow them to scatter over any considerable territory and Masinissa lent them no aid. He had not been invited at the opening of the war, and, though he had promised Hasdrubal that he would fight now, they gave him no opportunity of doing so.

IX, 27.—The consuls in view of the outcome of their attempts and because their fleet had been damaged by its stay in the lake raised the siege. Marcius endeavored to achieve some advantage by sea or at least to injure the coast districts, but not accomplishing anything he sailed for home, then turned back and subdued Ægimurus: and Manilius started for the interior, but upon sustaining injuries at the hands of Himilco, commander of the Carthaginian cavalry, whom they called also Phameas, he returned to Carthage. There, while the outside forces of Hasdrubal troubled him, the people in the city harassed him by excursions both night and day. In fact, the Carthaginians came to despise him and advanced as far as the Roman camp, but being for the most part unarmed they lost a number of men and shut themselves up in their fortifications again. Manilius was particularly anxious to get into close quarters with Hasdrubal, thinking that, if he could vanquish him, he should find it easier to wage war upon the remainder. His wish to get into close quarters with him was eventually realized. He followed Hasdrubal to a small fort whither the latter was retiring, and before he knew[Pg 314] it got into a narrow passage over rough ground and there suffered a tremendous reverse. He would have been utterly destroyed, had he not found a most valuable helper in the person of Scipio the descendant of Africanus, **FRAG. 69**WHO EXCELLED IN APPREHENDING AND DEVISING BEFOREHAND THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS MOVEMENTS, BUT EXCELLED ALSO IN EXECUTING THEM. IN BODILY FRAME HE WAS STRONG; HE WAS AMIABLE, TOO, AND MODERATE; AND FOR THESE REASONS HE ESCAPED ENVY. HE

CHOSE TO MAKE HIMSELF LIKE TO HIS INFERIORS, NOT BETTER THAN HIS EQUALS (he served as military tribune), AND WEAKER THAN GREATER MEN. Manilius both reported what Scipio had done and sent a letter to the people of Rome concealing nothing, but including among other matters an account of the proceedings of Masinissa and Phameas. These were as follows.

Masinissa on his death-bed was at a loss to know how he should dispose of his kingdom, his dilemma being due to the number of his sons and the variety of their family ties on their mothers' side. Therefore he sent for Scipio to advise him, and the consul let Scipio go. But the demise of Masinissa occurred before Scipio arrived, and he gave his ring to his son Micipsa and delivered and committed all the other interests pertaining to his kingdom to Scipio, so soon as the latter should arrive. Scipio being aware of the preferences of Masinissa's sons assigned the kingdom to no one of them singly; but whereas there were three most distinguished, the eldest Micipsa, the youngest Gulussa, and intermediate in age Mastanabal, he appointed these to have charge of affairs, though separately. To the eldest, who was versed in business and [Pg 315] fond of wealth, he entrusted the fiscal administration, to the second son, who possessed the critical faculty, he granted the right to decide disputes, and to Gulussa, who chanced to be of a warlike temperament, he delivered the troops. They had also numerous brothers on whom he bestowed certain cities and districts. He took Gulussa along with him and introduced him to the consul.

Now at the beginning of spring they made a campaign against the allies of the Carthaginians and brought many of them to terms forcibly while inducing many others to capitulate. Scipio was especially active in the work. **FRAG. 70** WHEN PHAMEAS, DESPAIRING OF CARTHAGINIAN SUCCESS, went over to the Romans and held a conference with Scipio, then they all set out against Hasdrubal. For several days they assailed his fortress, but as necessities failed them they retired in good order. During the siege Phameas had attacked them and made a show of fighting, and in the progress of the action he had deserted together with some of the cavalry. Then Manilius went to Utica and remained quiet, while Scipio took Phameas back to Rome, where he himself received commendation and Phameas was honored to the extent of being allowed to sit with the senate in the senate-house.

IX, 28.—It was at this time, too, that the episode occurred in which Prusias figured. The latter being old and of an irritable disposition became possessed by a fear that the Bithynians would expel him from his kingdom, choosing in his stead his son Nicomedes. So on some pretext he sent his son to Rome, with orders to make that his home. But since he plotted against [Pg 316] the younger man even during the sojourn in Rome and labored to kill him, some Bithynians made visits to Rome, took Nicomedes away secretly and conveyed him to Bithynia, and after slaying the old man designated him king. This act vexed the Romans, but did not incense them to the point of war.

A certain Andriscus, who was a native of Atramyttium and resembled Perseus in appearance, caused a wide area of Macedonia to revolt by pretending to be his son and calling himself Philip. First he went to Macedonia and tried to upheave the country, but as no one would yield him allegiance he took his way to Demetrius in Syria to obtain from him the aid which relationship might afford. Demetrius arrested him and sent him to Rome, where he met with general contempt, both because he stood convicted of not being the son of Perseus and because he had no other qualities that were worthy of attention. On being released he gathered a band of revolutionists, drew after him a number of cities, and finally, assuming the kingly garb and mustering an army, he reached Thrace. There he added to his army numbers of the independent lands as well as numbers of princes who disliked the Romans, invaded Macedonia (which he occupied), and setting out for Thessaly made not a little of that territory his own.

The Romans at first scorned Andriscus and then they sent Scipio Nasica to effect some peaceful settlement in those parts. On reaching Greece and ascertaining what had occurred he despatched a letter to the Romans explaining the case; then after collecting troops from allies there he gave attention to the business in hand and advanced as far as Macedonia. The people of Rome when informed of the doings of Andriscus sent an army and Publius Juventius, a prætor. Juventius had just reached the vicinity of Macedonia, when Andriscus gave battle, killed the prætor, and would have annihilated his entire force but for its withdrawal by night. Next he invaded Thessaly, damaged a very great extent of it, and ranged Thracian interests on his side. Consequently the people of Rome once more despatched a prætor, Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, with a strong body of troops: he proceeded to Macedonia and enjoyed the assistance of the fleet of Attalus. The fleet inspired Andriscus with some alarm for the coast districts so that he did not venture to advance farther but moved up to a point slightly beyond Pydna. There he had the best of it in a cavalry encounter but out of fear of the infantry turned back. His elation was such that he divided his army into two sections, and with one remained on the watch where he was, while he sent the other to ravage Thessaly. Metellus in derision of the forces confronting him joined battle, and by overpowering those with whom he first came into conflict he got control of the remainder with greater ease; for they made terms with him readily, inasmuch as they had erred. Andriscus fled to Thrace and after assembling a body of fighters gave battle to Metellus as the latter was advancing on his track. His vanguard, however, was routed first; then his contingent of allies was scattered; and Andriscus himself was betrayed by Byzes, a Thracian prince, and executed.

One Alexander, that also declared himself to be a son of Perseus and collected a band of warriors, had occupied the country round about the river which is called the Mestus:[\[40\]](#) but he now took to flight, and Metellus chased him as far as Dardania.

B.C.

148

(*a.u.* 606)IX, 29.—The Romans put Piso the consul in the field against the

Carthaginians. Piso did not try conclusions with Carthage and Hasdrubal, but devoted himself to the coast cities. He was repulsed from Aspis, captured and razed Neapolis, and in his expedition against the town of Hippo merely used up time without accomplishing anything. The Carthaginians took heart both for the reasons indicated and because some allies had joined their cause. Learning this the Romans in army and city alike had recourse to Scipio and created him consul in spite of the fact that his age would not properly let him hold the office. **Cp. FRAG. 71**own deeds and the excellence of his father Paulus and of his grandfather Africanus implanted in the breasts of all a firm hope that through him they should vanquish their enemies and utterly root out Carthage.

B.C.

147

(a.u. 607) While Scipio was en route to Libya, Mancinus was sailing along the coast of Carthage. He noticed a point called Megalia which was inside the city wall and was located on a cliff having a sheer descent into the sea. This point was a long distance away from the rest of the town and had but few guards because of the natural strength of its position. Suddenly Mancinus applied ladders to it from the ships and ascended. Not till he was safely up did some of the [Pg 319] Carthaginians hastily gather, but even so they were unable to repulse him from his vantage ground. He then sent to Piso an account of his exploit and a request for assistance. Piso, however, being far in the interior, proved of no aid to Mancinus, but Scipio happened along at nightfall just after the receipt of the news and immediately sent him help. The Carthaginians would have either captured or destroyed Mancinus, if they had not seen Scipio's vessels skirting the shore: then they grew discouraged, but would not fall back. So Scipio sent them some captives to tell them that he was at hand, upon receipt of which information they no longer stood their ground, but retired to send for Hasdrubal and fortify with trenches and palisades the cross-wall in front of the residences. Scipio now left Mancinus to guard Megalia and himself set out to join Piso and the troops so as to have their support in his conduct of operations. He made a rapid return journey with the lightest equipped portion of the army and found that Hasdrubal had entered Carthage and was attacking Mancinus fiercely. The arrival of Scipio put an end to the attack. When Piso too had come there, Scipio bade him take up his position outside the wall opposite certain gates, and he sent other soldiers around to a little gate a long distance away from the main force, with orders as to what they must do. He himself about midnight took the strongest portion of the army, got inside the circuit (using deserters as guides) and moving quietly to a point inside the little gate he hacked the bar in two, let in the men who were [Pg 320] on the watch outside and destroyed the guards. Then he hastened to the gate opposite which Piso had his station, routing the intervening guards (who were only a few in each place), so that Hasdrubal by the time he found out what had happened could see that nearly the entire body of Roman troops was inside. For a while the Carthaginians withstood them: then they abandoned the city, all but the Cotho and Byrsa, in which they took refuge. Next Hasdrubal killed all the Roman captives in order

that his people in despair of pardon might show the greater fortitude in resistance. He also made away with many of the natives on the charge that they wanted to betray their own cause. And Scipio encircled them with trench and palisade and intercepted them by a wall, yet it was some time before he took them captive. The walls were strong and the men within being many in number and confined in a small space fought with vehemence. They were well off for food, too, for Bithias from the mainland opposite the city sent merchantmen, amid wind and wave into the harbor to them so often as there was a heavy gale blowing. To overcome this obstacle Scipio conceived and executed a startling operation, namely, the damming of the narrow entrance to the harbor. The work was difficult and toilsome, for the Carthaginians undertook to check them, yet he accomplished it by the number of laborers at his disposal. Many battles took place in the meantime, but the enemy were unable to prevent the filling of the channel.

IX, 30.—So when the mouth of the harbor had been[Pg 321] filled up, the Carthaginians were terribly oppressed by the scarcity of food; some of them deserted, others endured it and died, and still others ate the dead bodies. Hasdrubal, accordingly, in dejection sent envoys to Scipio with regard to truce, and would have obtained immunity, had he not desired to secure both preservation and freedom for all the rest as well. After he had failed for this reason to accomplish his purpose he confined his wife in the acropolis because she had made propositions to Scipio for the safety of herself and her children, and behaved in other ways more boldly on account of his despair. He, therefore, and some others, mastered by frenzy, fought both night and day; and sometimes they would be defeated and sometimes gain advantage; and they devised machinery to oppose the Roman engines. Bithias, who held a high-perched fortress and scoured wide stretches of the mainland, did what he could to help the Carthaginians and damage the Romans. Hence Scipio also divided his army, assigning one half of it to invest Carthage while he sent the other half against Bithias, placing at the head of it his lieutenant Gaius Lælius. He himself spent his time in passing from one division to the other for inspection. Then the fortress was taken, and the siege of Carthage was once more conducted by an undivided force.

B.C.

146

(*a.u.* 608)The Carthaginians despairing consequently of being any longer able to save both walls betook themselves to the enclosure of the Byrsa, since it was higher up, at the same time transferring thither all the objects[Pg 322] that they could. By night they burned the dockyard and most of the other structures in order to deprive the enemy of any benefit from them. When the Romans became aware of their action, they occupied the harbor and advanced against Byrsa. Occupying the houses on each side of it some of the besiegers walked straight along on top of the roofs by successively stepping to those immediately adjacent, and others by digging through the walls pushed onward below until they reached the very citadel. When they had got so far, the Carthaginians

offered no further opposition, but all except Hasdrubal sued for clemency. He together with the deserters (for Scipio would not grant them a truce) was crowded into the temple of Æsculapius, as were also his wife and children, and there he defended himself against assailants until the deserters set fire to the temple and climbed to the roof to await the last extremity of the flames. Then, beaten, he came to Scipio holding the suppliant branch. His wife, who witnessed his entreaty, after calling him by name and reproaching him for securing safety for himself when he had not allowed her to obtain terms threw her children into the fire and likewise cast herself in.

Thus did Scipio take Carthage, and he forwarded to the senate a letter in these terms: "Carthage is taken. What are your orders?" This being read they held a session to consider what should be done. Cato advanced the opinion that they ought to raze the city and blot out the Carthaginians, whereas Scipio Nasica still[Pg 323] advised sparing the Carthaginians. From this beginning the senate became involved in great dispute and contention until some one said that if for no other reason it must be considered necessary to spare them for the Romans' own sake. With this nation for antagonists they would be sure to practice excellence and not turn aside to pleasures and luxury; for if those who were able to compel them to practice warlike pursuits should be removed from the scene, they might become inferior from want of practice, for a lack of worthy competitors. As a result of these words all became unanimous in favor of demolishing Carthage, since they felt sure that that people would never remain entirely at peace. The whole town was therefore overthrown from pinnacle to foundation and it was decreed that for any person to settle upon its site should be an accursed act. The majority of the population captured were thrown into prison and there perished, and some few (still excepting the very foremost men) were sold. These leaders and the hostages and Hasdrubal and Bithias lived to the end of their lives in different parts of Italy as prisoners, yet free from bonds. Scipio secured both glory and honor and was called Africanus not after his grandfather but from his own achievements.

IX, 31.—This year likewise saw the ruin of Corinth. The head men of the Greeks had been deported to Italy by Æmilius Paulus, whereupon their countrymen at first through embassies kept requesting the return of the men, and when their prayers were not[Pg 324] granted some of the exiles in despair of ever effecting a return to their homes committed suicide. The Greeks took this situation with a very bad grace and made it a matter of public lamentation, besides evincing anger at any persons dwelling among them that favored the Roman cause; yet they displayed no open symptoms of hostility until they got back the remnants of those hostages. **B.C. 149 (a.u. 605)**

FRAG. 72 Then those that had been wronged and those that had obtained a hold upon the goods of others fell into strife and began a real warfare. THE QUARREL BEGAN BY THE ACTION OF THE ACHÆANS IN BRINGING CHARGES AGAINST THE LACEDÆMONIANS AS BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO THEM. THE MEDIATORS WHOM THE

ROMANS DESPATCHED TO THEM THEY WOULD NOT HEED: they rather set their faces toward war, acting under the supervision of Critolaus. Metellus was consequently afraid that they might lay hands on Macedonia,—B.C. 148 (a.u. 606) they had already appeared in Thessaly,—and so he went to meet them and routed them.

At the fall of Critolaus the Greek world was split asunder. Some of them had embraced peace and laid down their weapons, whereas others had committed their interests to the care of Diæus and were still involved in factional turmoil. B.C. 146 (a.u. 608) On learning this the people of Rome sent Mummius against them. He got rid of Metellus and gave his personal attention to the war. Part of his army sustained a slight reverse through an ambushade and Diæus pursued the fugitives up to their own camp, but Mummius made a [Pg 325] sortie, routed him, and followed to the Achæan entrenchments. Diæus now gathered a larger force and undertook to give battle to them, but, as the Romans would make no hostile demonstration, he conceived a contempt for them and advanced to a depressed piece of ground lying between the camps. Mummius seeing this secretly sent horsemen to assail them on the flank. After these had attacked and thrown the enemy into confusion, he brought up the phalanx in front and caused considerable slaughter. As a consequence Diæus in despair killed himself, and of the survivors of the battle the Corinthians were scattered over the country, while the rest fled to their homes. Hence the Corinthians within the wall believing that all their citizens had been lost abandoned the city, and it was empty of men when Mummius took it. After that he won over without trouble both that nation and the rest of the Greeks. He now took possession of their arms, all the offerings that were consecrated in their temples, the statues, paintings, and whatever other kind of ornament they had; and as soon as he could send his father and some other men to arrange terms for the vanquished he caused the walls of some of the cities to be taken down and declared them all to be free and independent except the Corinthians. The dwellers in Corinth he sold, and confiscated their land and demolished their walls and all their houses besides, out of fear that some states might again unite with them, since they constituted the greatest state. To prevent any of them from remaining hidden and any of the [Pg 326] other Greeks from being sold as Corinthians he assembled everybody present before he had disclosed his determination, and after having his soldiers surround them in such a way as not to attract notice he proclaimed the enslavement of the Corinthians and the liberation of the remainder. Then he instructed them all to take hold of any Corinthians standing beside them. In this way he arrived at an accurate distinction.

Thus was Corinth overthrown. The rest of the Greek world suffered temporarily from murders and levies of money, but afterward came to enjoy such immunity and prosperity that it used to be said: "If they had not been taken captive as early as they were, they could not have been preserved."

So this end simultaneously befell Carthage and Corinth, famous, ancient cities: but at a much later date they received colonies of Romans, became again flourishing, and regained their original position.

The exploits of the Romans up to this point, found by me in ancient books that record these matters, written by men of old time, I have drawn thence in a condensed form and have embodied in the present history. As for what comes next in order,—the transactions of the consuls and dictators, so long as the government of Rome was still conducted by these officials,—let no one censure me as having passed this by through contempt or indolence or antipathy and having left the history as it were incomplete. The gap has not been overlooked by me through sloth, nor have I of my own[Pg 327] free will left my task half finished, but through lack of books to describe the events. I have frequently instituted a search for them, yet I have not found them, and I do not know whether the cause is that the passage of time has destroyed them, and so they are not preserved, or whether the persons to whom I entrusted the errand perhaps did not search for them with sufficient diligence; for I was living abroad and passing my life on an islet far from the city. And because it has not been my lot to gain access to these books in this instance, my history turns out to be only half complete for the acts of the consuls and even for those of the dictators. Hence, passing over them, though reluctantly, I will record the deeds of the emperors, with some brief introductory remarks to make clear to those who shall read my history by what steps the Romans passed from aristocracy (or democracy) to the rule of one man, and to impart, in addition, coherence to the narrative.

[Pg 329]

NOTE.—NO SUMMARY EXISTS OF THE MISSING BOOKS TWENTY-TWO TO THIRTY-FIVE INCLUSIVE, AND WE ARE DRIVEN TO RELY ON SCATTERED AND INCONSEQUENTIAL FRAGMENTS (THAT HAVE SOMEHOW ESCAPED THE WRECK OF SEASONS) AS THE BASIS FOR WHATEVER MENTAL IMAGE WE MAY CHOOSE TO FORM OF THE LOST NARRATIVE. THESE BITS POSSESS THE SAME VALUE FOR DIO'S HISTORY AS DO THE UNRELATED PIECES OF MARBLE AND CLAY FROM EXCAVATIONS IN ENABLING US TO GAIN A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF ANTIQUE SCULPTURE AND POTTERY. FOR AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF THESE FRAGMENTS SEE THE INTRODUCTION, UNDER THE CAPTION ENTITLED [THE WRITING](#).

FRAG. LXXIII¶Viriathus was a Lusitanian, of very obscure origin, as some think, who enjoyed great renown through his deeds, for from a shepherd he became a robber and later on also a general. He was naturally adapted and had trained himself to be very quick in pursuing and fleeing, and of great force in a stationary conflict. He was glad to get any food that came to hand and whatever drink fell to his lot; he lived most of his life under the open sky and was satisfied with nature's bedding. Consequently he was superior to any heat or any cold, and neither was he ever troubled by hunger nor did he suffer from any other disagreeable condition; since he found all his wants met quite sufficiently by whatever he had at hand, which seemed to him unexcelled. While he possessed such a physical constitution, as the result of nature and training, he surpassed still more in spiritual endowment. He was swift to perceive and do whatever was requisite,—he could tell what must be done and at the same time he understood the proper occasion for it,—and he was clever at pretending not to know the most evident facts and to know the most hidden secrets. Furthermore he was not only general but his own assistant in every business equally, and was seen to be neither humble nor pompous, but in him obscurity of family and reputation for strength were so mingled that he seemed to be neither inferior nor superior to any one. And, in fine, he carried on the[Pg 332] war not for the sake of personal gain or power nor through anger, but because of the opportunity for action; therefore he was regarded as most thoroughly a lover of war and a successful warrior. (Valesius, p. 614.)

FRAG. LXXIV**B.C.****143**

(*a.u.* 611)1. ¶Claudius, the colleague of Metellus, impelled by pride of birth and jealousy of Metellus, when he had had Italy allotted to his command and found no sign of war, was eager to secure by any means some pretext for a triumph; hence without taking the trouble to lodge any formal complaint he set the Salassi, a Gallic tribe, at war with the Romans. He had been sent to reconcile them, because they were disputing with their neighbors about the water necessary for the gold mines, and he overran their entire country ... the Romans sent him two of the ten priests. (Valesius, p. 617.)

2. ¶Claudius, even if he understood thoroughly that he had not conquered, nevertheless even then displayed such arrogance as not to say a word in either the senate or the popular assembly about the triumph; but acting as if the right were indisputably his, even if no one should vote to that effect, he asked for the requisite expenditures. (Valesius, *ib.*)

FRAG. LXXV**B.C.****142**

(*a.u.* 612)¶As regards character Mummius and Africanus differed vastly from each other

in every respect. The latter ruled with a view to the greatest uprightness and with exactitude, not esteeming one influence above another; he called to account many of the senators and many of the knights, as well as other individuals. Mummius, on the other hand, was more urbane and humane in his behavior; he imputed no dishonor to any[Pg 333] one, and abolished many of the regulations framed by Africanus, so far as was possible. To such an extent of amiability did his nature lead him, that he lent some statues to Lucullus for the consecration of the temple of Felicitas (material for which he had gathered in the Spanish war), and then, when that general was unwilling to return them on the ground that they had been made sacred by the dedication, he showed no anger, but permitted his own spoils to lie there offered up in another's name. (Valesius, p. 618.)

FRAG. LXXVI

B.C.

140

(*a.u.* 614)¶Pompeius[41] received many setbacks and incurred great disgrace. There was a river flowing through the country of the Numantini that he wished to turn aside from its ancient channel and let in upon their fields; and after tremendous exertions he did accomplish this. But he lost many soldiers, and no advantage from turning it aside came to the Romans, nor harm to the enemy.... (Valesius, *ib.*)

FRAG. LXXVII¶Cæpio[42] effected nothing worthy of mention against the foe, but brought much serious harm to his own men, so that he ran the risk of being killed by them. He treated them all, but especially the cavalry, with such harshness and cruelty that a vast number of most unseemly jokes and stories passed current about him during the nights; and the more he grew vexed at it, the more jests did they make and endeavor to infuriate him. When what was going on became known and no one could be found guilty—though he suspected it was the doing of the cavalry—as he could fix the responsibility upon no one single man he became angry[Pg 334] at all of them, and commanded them, six hundred in number, accompanied only by their grooms, to cross the river by which they were encamped and bring wood from the mountain on which Viriathus was bivouacking. The danger was manifest to all, and the tribunes and lieutenants begged him not to destroy them. The cavalry waited for a little to see if he would listen to the others, and when he would not yield, they deemed it unworthy to supplicate him, as he was most eager for them to do, but choosing rather to perish utterly than to speak a respectful word to him, they started on the mission assigned. The horsemen of the allies and other volunteers accompanied them. They crossed the river, cut the wood, and threw it in all around the general's quarters, intending to burn them down. And he would have perished in the flames, if he had not fled away in time. (Valesius, p. 618.)

FRAG. LXXVIII

B.C.

139

(*a.u.* 615)¶Popilius so terrified Viriathus that the latter sent to him about peace

immediately and before they had tried any battle at all, killed some of the leaders of the rebels whose surrender had been demanded by the Romans—among these his father-in-law, though commanding his own force, was slaughtered—and delivered up the rest, all of whose hands the consul cut off. And he would have agreed to a complete truce, if their weapons had not been demanded in addition: with this condition neither he nor the rest of the throng would comply.[\[43\]](#) (Ursinus, p. 383.)

[Pg 335]

(BOOK 23, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. LXXIX

B.C.

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(*a.u.* 618)¶The Romans received the Numantine ambassadors on their arrival outside the walls, to the end that their reception might not seem to imply a ratification of the truce. However, they sent gifts of friendship notwithstanding, not wishing to deprive them of the hope of possibly coming to terms. Mancinus and his followers told of the necessity of the compact made and the number of the saved, and stated that they still held all of their former possessions in Spain. They besought their countrymen to consider the question not in the light of their present immunity, but with reference to the danger that then encompassed the soldiers, and to think not what ought to have been done, but what might have been the outcome. The Numantini brought forward many statements about their previous good-will toward the Romans and considerable about the latter's subsequent injustice, by reason of which they had been forced into the war, and the perjury of Pompeius: and they asked for considerate treatment in return for the preservation of Mancinus and the rest. But the Romans both dissolved the truce and decided that Mancinus should be given up to the Numantini. (Ursinus, p. 383.)

FRAG. LXXX¶Claudius[\[44\]](#) through his harshness would have committed many outrageous acts, had he not been re[\[Pg 336\]](#)strained by his colleague Quintus.[\[45\]](#) The latter, who was amiable and possessed exactly the opposite temperament, did not oppose him with anger in any matter and, indeed, occasionally yielded to him, and by gentle behavior so manipulated him that he found very few opportunities for irritation. (Valesius, p. 621.)

FRAG. LXXXI¶Furius[\[46\]](#) led out among his lieutenants both Pompeius and Metellus though they were hostile both to him and to each other; for, expecting to achieve some great success, he wished to have in them sure witnesses to his deeds and to receive the evidence of his prowess from their unwilling lips. (Valesius, *ib.*)

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FRAG. LXXXIII1. ¶Tiberius Gracchus caused an upheaval of the Roman state,—and this in spite of the fact that he belonged to one of the foremost families (his grandfather being Africanus), that he possessed a natural endowment worthy of the latter, that he had gone through a most thorough course of education, and had a high spirit. In proportion to these great gifts of his was the allurements that they offered to follow his ambitions: and when once he had turned aside from what was best he drifted even involuntarily into what was worst. It began with his being refused a triumph over the Numantini: he had hoped for this honor because he had previously had the management of the business, but so far from obtaining anything of the kind he incurred the danger of being delivered up; then he decided that deeds were estimated not on the basis of goodness or truth but according to mere chance. And this road to fame he abandoned as not safe, but since he desired by all means to become prominent in some way and expected that he could accomplish this better through the popular than through the senatorial party, he attached himself to the former. (Valesius, p. 621.)

2. ¶Marcus Octavius on account of an hereditary feud with Gracchus willingly made himself his opponent. **B.C. 133 (a.u. 621)** Thereafter there was no semblance of moderation: striving and quarreling as they were, each to[Pg 338] survive the other rather than to benefit the community, they committed many acts of violence as if they were in a principality instead of a democracy, and suffered many unusual calamities proper for war but not for peace. In addition to their individual conflicts, there were many who, banded together, instituted grievous abuses and battles in the senate-house itself and the popular assembly as well as throughout the rest of the city: they pretended to be executing the law, but were in reality making in all things every effort not to be surpassed by each other. The result was that the authorities could not carry on their accustomed tasks, courts came to a stop, no contract was entered into, and other sorts of confusion and disorder were rife everywhere. The place bore the name of city, but was no whit different from a camp. (Valesius, p. 622.)

3. ¶Gracchus proposed certain laws for the benefit of those of the people who served in the army, and transferred the courts from the senate to the knights, bedeviling and disturbing all established customs in order that he might be enabled to lay hold on safety in some wise. And after he found not even this of advantage to him, but his term of office was drawing to a close, when he would be immediately exposed to the attacks of his enemies, he attempted to secure the tribuneship also for the following year (in company with his brother) and to appoint his father-in-law consul: to obtain this end he would make any statement or promise anything what[Pg 339]ever to anybody. Often, too, he put on a mourning garb and brought his mother and children, tied hand and foot, into the presence of the populace. (Valesius, ib.)

FRAG. LXXXIII**B.C.****129**

(*a.u.* 625)¶Scipio Africanus had more ambition in his makeup than was suitable for or compatible with his general excellence. And in reality none of his rivals took pleasure in his death, but although they thought him a great obstacle in their way even they missed him. They saw that he was valuable to the State and never expected that he would cause them any serious trouble. When he was suddenly taken away all the possessions of the powerful class were again diminished, so that the promoters of agrarian legislation ravaged at will practically all of Italy. And this seems to me to have been most strongly indicated by the mass of stones that poured down from heaven, falling upon some of the temples and killing men, and by the tears of Apollo. **B.C. 131** (*a.u.* 623)For the god wept copiously[47] for three days, so that the Romans on the advice of the soothsayers voted to cut down the statue and to sink it in the deep. (Valesius, p. 625.)

[Pg 340]

(BOOK 25, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. LXXXIV¶Gracchus had a disposition like his brother; only the latter drifted from excellence into ambition and then to baseness whereas this man was naturally intractable and played the rogue voluntarily and far surpassed the other in his gift of language. For these reasons his designs were more mischievous, his daring more spontaneous, and his self-will greater in all junctures alike. He was the first to walk up and down in the assemblies while he harangued and the first to bare his arm; hence neither of these practices has been thought improper, since he did it. And because his speaking was characterized by great condensation of thought and forcefulness of words and he consequently was unable to restrain himself easily but was often led to say what he did not wish, he used to bring in a flute-player, and from him, playing a low accompaniment, he would take his rhythm and time, or if even so he in some way fell out of measure, he would stop. This was the sort of man that attacked the government, and, by assuming no speech or act to be forbidden, in the briefest time became a great power among the populace and the knights. All the nobility and the senatorial party if he had lived longer[48] ... **B.C. 121** (*a.u.* 633)but as it was his great authority made him envied even by the members of his faction, and he was ruined by his own devices. (Valesius, ib.)

[Pg 341]

(BOOK 26, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. LXXXV**B.C.****114**

(*a.u.* 640)1. ¶The priestesses for the most part incurred destruction and shame

themselves, and proved the source of great evils to numerous others as well, while the entire city because of them was thrown into an uproar. For the people, in view of the fact that what was immaculate by law and sacred by the dictates of religion and decent through fear of vengeance had been polluted, were ready to believe that anything most shameful and unholy might be done. For this reason they visited punishment not only on the convicted, but also on all the rest who had been accused, to show their hatred of what had occurred. Hence the whole episode in which the women were concerned seemed now to be due not so much to their feminine incontinence[49] as to a kind of madness inspired by supernatural powers. (Valesius, p. 626.)

2. ¶Three altogether had had intercourse with men; and of them Marcia had acted individually, granting her favors to one single knight[50] and would never have been discovered, had not the investigation into the cases of the others spread and overtaken her besides. Æmilia and Licinia had a multitude of lovers and carried on their wanton behavior with each other's help. At first they surrendered themselves to some few privately and secretly, telling each man that he[Pg 342] was the only one admitted. Later they themselves bound every one who could suspect and inform against them to certain silence in advance by the price of intercourse with them, and those who had previously enjoyed their conversation, though they saw this, yet endured it in order not to be detected by a show of vexation. So after holding commerce with many, now singly, now in groups, now privately, now publicly, Licinia enjoyed the society of the brother of Æmilia, and Æmilia that of Licinia's brother. These doings were hidden for a great period of time, and though many men and many women, both free and slaves, were in the secret, it was hidden for a very long period, until one Manius,[51] who seems to have been the first to assist and coöperate in the whole evil, gave information of the matter because he had not obtained freedom nor any of the other objects of his hope. He was, indeed, very skillful not only at leading women into prostitution, but also in slandering and ruining some of them. (Valesius, p. 626.)

FRAG. LXXXVI

B.C.

112

(*a.u.* 642)¶This was calculated to bring him [sc. Marcus Drusus] glory first of itself and second in the light of Cato's disaster; and because he had shown great amiability toward the soldiers and seemed to have made success of more importance than truth, he also secured a renown greater than his deeds deserved. (Valesius, p. 629.)

FRAG. LXXXVII

B.C.

108

(*a.u.* 646)1. ¶When Jugurtha sent to Metellus about peace the latter made separate demands upon him as if each[Pg 343] were to be the last, and in this way got from him hostages, arms, the elephants, the captives, and the deserters. All of these last he killed but did not grant a truce because Jugurtha, fearing to be arrested, refused to come to him and because Marius and Gnæus[52] prevented. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

2. ¶For he [sc. Marius] was in general seditious and turbulent, wholly friendly to the rabble from which he had sprung and wholly ready to overthrow the nobility. He risked with perfect readiness any statement, promise, lie, or false oath in any matter where he hoped to gain a benefit. Blackmailing one of the foremost citizens or commending some rascal he thought child's play. And let no one be surprised that such a man could conceal his villanies for a very long time: for, as a result of his exceeding cunning and the good fortune which he enjoyed all through his early life, he actually acquired a reputation for virtue. (Valesius, p. 629.)

3. ¶Marius was the more easily able to calumniate Metellus for the reason that the latter was numbered among the nobles and was managing military concerns excellently, whereas he himself was just beginning to come forward from a very obscure and doubtful origin into public notice:—the populace was readily inclined to overthrow Metellus through envy, and favored Marius increasingly for his promises:—of great assistance, too, was the report that Metellus had said to Marius (who was just then coming forward[Pg 344] for election): "You ought to be satisfied if you get to be consul along with my son" (who was a mere lad). (Valesius, p. 630.)

4. ¶Gaudas was angry at Metellus because in spite of requests he had received from him neither the deserters nor a garrison of Roman soldiers, or else because he could not sit near him,—a privilege ordinarily vouchsafed by the consuls to princes and potentates. (Valesius, ib.)

B.C. **107**
(a.u. 647)5. ¶When Cirta was captured by capitulation Bocchus sent a herald to Marius and first demanded the empire of Jugurtha as the price for his defection, but later, as he did not obtain it, simply asked him to make terms. So he sent envoys to Rome, but Jugurtha while this was taking place retired to the most desolate portions of his own territory. (Ursinus, p. 385.)

B.C. **106**
(a.u. 648)6. ¶Marius entertained the envoys of Bocchus but said he would make no compact with him unless he should receive Jugurtha's prisoners from his hands; and this was done. (Ursinus, p. 386.)

[Pg 345]

(BOOK 27, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. LXXXVIII¶Tolosa, which was formerly at peace with the Romans but had revolted, under the influence of hope in the Cimbri, to the extent of imprisoning the garrison, was occupied by them at night: they were admitted unexpectedly by friends and plundered the temples, obtaining much other money besides, for the place had been wealthy from of old, containing among other offerings those of which the Gauls under

the leadership of Brennus had once despoiled Delphi. Nothing of importance, however, reached the Romans in the capital, but the victors themselves confiscated the most of it. For this a number were called to account. (Valesius, p. 630.)

FRAG. LXXXIX

B.C.

105

(*a.u.* 649)1. ¶Servilius by reason of his jealousy of his colleague[53] became the cause of many evils to the army; for, though he had in general equal powers, his repute was naturally diminished by the fact that the other was also consul. And ... after the death of Scaurus[54] he [Manlius?] sent for Servilius: but the latter replied that each of them ought to keep his position. Then, apprehending that Manlius might gain some success by his own resources, he grew jealous of him, fearing that he might secure individual glory, and went to him: yet he did not bivouac on the same ground nor make him the partaker of any plan, but took up a dis[Pg 346]tinct position with the evident intention of joining battle with the Cimbri before him and winning all the glory of the war. At the outset they still inspired the enemy with dread, as long as their quarrel was concealed, so much so as to lead the foe to desire peace, but when the Cimbri sent a herald to Manlius as consul Servilius became indignant that they had not directed their embassy to him, refused to agree to any reconciliation, and came near slaying the envoys. (Valesius, p. 630.)

2. ¶The soldiers forced Servilius to go to Manlius and consult with him about the emergency. But so far from coming into accord they became as a result of the meeting even more hostile than before: they fell into strife and abuse and parted in a disgraceful fashion. (Valesius, p. 633.)

FRAG. XC

B.C.

104

(*a.u.* 650)¶After Gnæus Domitius obtained leave to bring suit against Scaurus, one of the slaves then came forward and offered to bring any damaging charges against his master: but he refused to become involved in such despicable business, and arresting the fellow delivered him over to Scaurus. (Valesius, *ib.*)

FRAG. XCII. ¶Publius Licinius Nerva, who was prætor in the island, on learning that the slaves were not being justly treated in some respects, or else because he sought an occasion of profit (for he was not inaccessible to bribes), circulated the announcement that all who had any charges to bring against their masters should come to him, for he would assist them. Accordingly, many of them banded together, and some de[Pg 347]clared they were being wronged and others made known some other grievances against their masters, thinking they had secured an opportunity for accomplishing without bloodshedding all that they wished. The freeborn, after consultation, resisted them and would not yield to them on any point. Therefore Licinius, inspired with fear by the united front of both sides and dreading that some great mischief might be done

by the defeated party, would not admit any of the slaves but sent them away thinking that they would suffer no harm or that at any rate they would be scattered and so could cause no more disturbance. But they, fearing their masters because they had dared to raise their voices at all against them, organized a force and by common consent turned to robbery. (Valesius, p. 633.)

B.C. 103

(*a.u.* 651)2. ¶The Messenians, believing that they would suffer no abuse, had deposited in that place for safe keeping all their most valuable and highly prized possessions. Athenio, who as a Cilician held the chief command of the robbers, on learning this attacked them while they were celebrating a public festival in the suburbs, killed many of them as they were scattered about, and almost took the city by storm. After building a wall to fortify Macella,[\[55\]](#) a strong position, he did serious injury to the country. (Valesius, p. 634.)

FRAG. XCII

B.C. 102

(*a.u.* 652)1. ¶After the defeat of the barbarians though many had fallen in battle some few were saved. Whereupon Marius attempted to console these sur[Pg 348]vivors and to make amends by restoring to them all the plunder at a nominal price, to prevent its being thought that he had bestowed favors gratuitously upon any one. By this act Marius, who previously had been the darling of the populace alone because sprung from that class and raised to power by it, now won over even the nobles by whom he was hated, and was praised equally by all. He received from a willing and harmonious people a reëlection for the following year, to enable him to subdue his remaining foes. (Valesius, *ib.*)

2. ¶The Cimbri when they had once halted lost much of their spirit and consequently grew duller and weaker in both soul and body. The reason was that in place of their former outdoor life they rested in houses, instead of their former cold plunges they used warm baths, whereas they were wont to eat raw meat they now filled themselves with richly spiced dishes and relishes of the country, and they saturated themselves, contrary to their custom, with wine and strong drink. These practices extinguished all their fiery spirit and enervated their bodies, so that they could no longer bear toils or hardships or heat or cold or sleeplessness. (Valesius, *ib.*)

[Pg 349]

(BOOK 28, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. XCIII

B.C. 99

(*a.u.* 655)1. ¶The son of Metellus besought everybody to such an extent both in private

and in public to let his father return from exile that he received the appellation *Pius*, i.e. dutiful. (Valesius, p. 638.)

2. ¶Furius had such enmity toward Metellus that when he was censor he took his horse away. (Valesius, ib.)

3. Publius Furius,[\[56\]](#) indicted for his deeds committed in the tribuneship, was slain by the Romans in the Comitia itself. He richly deserved to die, for he was a seditious person and after first joining Saturninus and Glaucia he veered about, deserted to the opposing faction, and joined its members; it was not proper, however, for him to perish in just this way. And this action seemed to be on the whole justifiable. (Valesius, p. 637.)

FRAG. XCIV1. For there were other factional leaders, but the greatest authority was possessed by Marcius[\[57\]](#) over one group, and by Quintus[\[58\]](#) over the other: these men were eager for power, of insatiable ambition, and consequently greatly inclined toward strife. Those qualities they possessed in common; but Drusus had the advantage of birth, and of wealth, which he lavishly expended upon those who at any time made demands upon him, while the other greatly surpassed him in[Pg 350] audacity, daring, the anticipation of plots, and malignity suitable to the occasion. Hence not unnaturally, since they supplemented each other partly by their likeness and partly by their differences, they created an extremely strong factional feeling which remained even after the death of both. (Valesius, p. 638.)

2. ¶Drusus and Cæpio, formerly great friends and united by mutual ties of marriage, became privately at enmity with each other and carried their feud even into politics. (Valesius, ib.)

FRAG. XCV

B.C.

92

(*a.u.* 662)1. ¶Rutilius, an upright man, was most unjustly condemned. He was brought to court by a preconcerted plan of the knights on a charge of having been bribed while serving in Asia as lieutenant under Quintus Mucius,[\[59\]](#) and they imposed a fine upon him. The reason for this act was their rage at his having ended many of their irregularities in connection with the collecting of taxes. (Valesius, p. 637.)

2. ¶Rutilius made a very able defence, and there was no one of his words which would not be the natural utterance of an upright man who was being blackmailed and grieved far more for the conditions of the State than for his own possessions: he was convicted, however, and immediately stripped of his property. This process more than any other revealed the fact that he had in no wise deserved the sentence passed upon him. He was found to possess much less than[Pg 351] the accusers had charged him with having confiscated from Asia, and he could trace all of his goods back to just and lawful sources of acquisition. Such was his unworthy treatment, and Marius was not free from responsibility for his conviction; a man so excellent and of such good repute had been

an annoyance to him. Wherefore Rutilius, indignant at the conduct of affairs in the city, and disdaining to live longer in the company of such a creature, withdrew, though under no compulsion, and went even as far as Asia. There for a time he dwelt in Mitylene; then after that place had received injury in the Mithridatic war he transferred his residence to Smyrna and there lived to the end of his life nor wished ever to return home. And in all this he suffered not a whit in reputation or plenty. He received many gifts from Mucius and a vast number from all the peoples and kings as well who had become acquainted with him, till he possessed far more than his original property. (Valesius, p. 637.)

[Pg 352]

(BOOK 29, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. XCVI

B.C.

90

(a.u. 664)1. ¶Lupus,[\[60\]](#) suspecting that the patricians making the campaign with him were revealing his plans to the enemy, sent word about them to the senate before he had any definite information,[\[61\]](#) and, as a consequence, although they were in no case well disposed[\[62\]](#) toward each other through factional differences, he set them still more at variance. There would have been even greater disturbance, had not some of the Marsi been detected mixing with the foraging parties of the Romans and entering the ramparts under the guise of allies, where they took cognizance of speeches and actions in the camp and reported them to their own men. In consequence of this discovery they ceased to be angry with the patricians. (Valesius, p. 641.)

2. ¶Marius suspected Lupus, although a relative, and through jealousy and hope of being appointed consul even a seventh time as the only man who could bring success out of the existing situation, bade him delay: their men, he said, would have provisions, whereas the other side would not be able to hold out for any considerable time when the war was in their country. (Valesius, ib.)

3. ¶The Picentes subdued those who would not join their rebellion and abused these men in the presence of their friends and from the heads of their wives they tore out the hair along with the skin. (Valesius, ib.)

[Pg 353]

(REMAINS OF BOOKS 30-35, BOISSEVAIN.)

FRAG. XCVIII. ¶Mithridates, when the Roman envoys[\[63\]](#) arrived, did not make the slightest move, but after bringing some counter-charges and also exhibiting to the envoys the amount of his wealth, some of which he had at that time spent on various objects public and private, he remained quiet. But Nicomedes, elated by their alliance and being in need of money, invaded his territory. (Ursinus, p. 386.)

2. ¶Mithridates despatched envoys to Rome requesting them if they deemed Nicomedes a friend to persuade him or compel him to act justly toward him, or if not, to allow him (Mithridates) to take measures against his foe. They, so far from doing what he wished, even threatened him with punishment if he should not give back Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes and remain at peace with Nicomedes. His envoys they sent away the very day and furthermore ordered him never to send another one unless he should render them obedience. (Ursinus, *ib.*)

FRAG. XCVIII

B.C.

89

(*a.u.* 665)¶Cato,[\[64\]](#) the greater part of whose army was effeminate and superannuated, found his power diminished in every direction: and once, when he had ventured to rebuke them because they were unwilling to work hard or obey orders readily, he came near being overwhelmed with a shower of missiles from them. He would certainly have been killed, if they had had plenty of stones; but since the site where they were as[Pg 354]sembled was given over to agriculture and happened to be very wet, he received no hurt from the clods of earth. The man who began the mutiny, Gaius Titius,[\[65\]](#) was arrested: he was a low fellow who made his living in the courts and was excessively and shamelessly outspoken; he was sent to the city to the tribunes, but escaped punishment. (Valesius, p. 641.)

FRAG. XCIX

B.C.

88

(*a.u.* 666)1. ¶All the Asiatics, at the bidding of Mithridates, massacred the Romans; only the people of Tralles did not personally kill any one, but hired a certain Theophilus, a Paphlagonian (as if the victims were more likely thus to escape destruction, or as if it made any difference to them by whom they should be slaughtered). (Valesius, p. 642.)

2. ¶The Thracians, persuaded by Mithridates, overran Epirus and the rest of the country as far as Dodona, going even to the point of plundering the temple of Zeus. (Valesius, *ib.*)

FRAG. C

B.C.

87

(*a.u.* 667)1. ¶Cinna, as soon as he took possession of the office, was anxious upon no one point so much as to drive Sulla out of Italy. He made Mithridates his excuse, but in reality wanted this leader to remove himself that he might not, by lurking close at hand, prove a hindrance to the objects that Cinna had in mind. He fairly distinguished himself by his zeal for Sulla and would refuse to promise nothing that pleased him. For Sulla, who saw the urgency of the war and was eager for its glory, before starting had arranged everything at home for his own best interests. He ap[Pg 355]pointed Cinna and one Gnæus Octavius to be his successors, hoping in this way to retain considerable power even while absent. The second of the two he understood was generally approved for his excellence and good nature, and he thought he would cause no trouble: the other he well

knew was an unprincipled person, but he did not wish to antagonize him, because the man had some influence and was ready, as he had said and declared on oath, to assist him in every way possible. Sulla himself, though an adept at discovering the minds of men and inferring correctly in regard to the nature of things, made a thorough mistake in this matter and bequeathed a great war to the State. (Valesius, p. 642.)

2. ¶Octavius was naturally dull in politics. (Valesius, ib.)

3. ¶The Romans, when civil war set in, sent for Metellus, urging him to help them. (Ursinus, p. 386.)

4. ¶The Romans, at odds with one another, sent for Metellus and bade him come to terms with the Samnites, as he best might: for at this time they alone were still damaging Campania and the district beyond it. He, however, concluded no truce with them. They demanded citizenship to be given not to themselves alone but also to those who had deserted to their side, refused to give up any of the booty which they had, but demanded back all the captives and deserters from their own ranks, so that even the senators no longer chose to make peace with them on these terms. (Ursinus, p. 385.)[Pg 356]

5. ¶When Cinna had put in force again the law regarding the return of exiles, Marius and the rest of his followers who had been expelled leaped into the city with the army left to them by all the gates at once; these they shut, so that no one could make his escape, and despatched every man they met, making no distinction, but treating them all alike as enemies. They took special pains to destroy any persons who had possessions, because they coveted such property, and outraged their children and wives as if they had enslaved some foreign city. The heads of the most eminent citizens they fastened to the rostra. That sight was no less cruel than their ruin; for the thought might occur to the spectators that what their ancestors had adorned with the beaks of the enemy was now being deformed by the heads of the citizens.

For, in fine, so great a desire and greed for slaughter possessed Marius, that when he had killed most of his enemies and no one because of the great confusion prevailing occurred to him whom he wished to destroy, he gave the word to the soldiers to stab all in succession of the passers-by to whom he should not extend his hand. For Roman affairs had come to this, that a man had to die not only without a trial and without having incurred enmity, but by reason of Marius's hand not being stretched out. Now naturally in so great a throng and uproar it was not only no object to Marius to make the gesture, but it was not even possible, no matter how much he wished it, to use his hand as he pleased. Hence many died for naught who ought[Pg 357] certainly on every account not to have been slain. The entire number of the murdered is beyond finding out; for the slaughter went on five whole days and an equal number of nights. (Valesius, p. 642.)

B.C.

86

(*a.u.* 668)6. ¶While the Romans were offering the New Year's sacrifice at the opening

of the season and making their vows^[66] for their magistrate according to ancestral rites, the son of Marius killed a tribune with his own hands, sending his head to the consuls, and hurled another from the Capitol,—a fate which had never befallen such an official,—and debarred two praetors from both fire and water. (Valesius, p. 645.)

FRAG. CII. ¶The lieutenant of Flaccus, Fimbria, when his chief had reached Byzantium revolted against him. He was in all matters very bold and reckless, passionately fond of any notoriety whatsoever and contemptuous of all that was superior. This led him at that time, after his departure from Rome, to pretend an incorruptibility in respect to money and an interest in the soldiers, which bound them to him and set them at variance with Flaccus. He was the more able to do this because Flaccus was insatiable in regard to money, not being content to appropriate what was ordinarily left over, but enriching himself even from the soldiers' allowance for food and from the booty, which he invariably maintained belonged to him. (Valesius, p. 650.)

2. ¶When Flaccus and Fimbria had arrived at Byzantium and Flaccus after commanding them to bivouac outside the wall had gone into the city, Fim^[Pg 358]bria seized the occasion to accuse him of having taken money, and denounced him, saying that he was living in luxury within, whereas they were enduring hardships under the shelter of tents, in storm and cold. The soldiers then angrily rushed into the city, killed some of those that fell upon them and scattered to the various houses. (Valesius, ib.)

3. ¶On the occasion of some dispute between Fimbria and the quæstor Flaccus threatened to send him back to Rome whether he liked it or not, and when the other consequently made some abusive reply deprived him of his command. Fimbria set out upon his return with the worst possible will and on reaching the soldiers at Byzantium greeted them as if he were upon the point of departure, asked for a letter, and lamented his fate, pretending to have suffered undeservedly. He advised them to remember the help he had given them and to be on their guard; and his words contained a hidden reference to Flaccus, implying that he had designs upon them. Finding that they accepted his story and were well disposed toward him and suspicious of the general, he went on still further and incited them to anger by accusing Flaccus of various faults, finally stating that he would betray them for money; hence the soldiers drove away Thermus, who had been assigned to take charge of them. (Valesius, ib.)

4. ¶Fimbria destroyed many men not to serve the best ends of justice nor to secure the greatest benefit to Rome but through bad temper and lust of slaughter.^[Pg 359] A proof is that he once ordered many crosses to be made, to which he was wont to bind them and wear out their lives by cruel treatment, and then when these were found to be many more than those who were to be put to death he commanded some of the bystanders to be arrested and affixed to the crosses that were in excess, that they might not seem to have been made in vain. (Valesius, p. 653.)

5. ¶The same man on capturing Ilium despatched as many persons as he could, sparing none, and all but burned the whole city to the ground. He took the place not by storm but by guile. After bestowing some praise on them for the embassy sent to Sulla and saying that it made no difference with which one of the two they ratified a truce (for he and Sulla were both Romans) he thereupon went in among them as among friends and performed these deeds. (Valesius, ib.)

FRAG. CII

B.C.

85

(*a.u.* 669)1. ¶Metellus after being defeated by Cinna went to Sulla and was of the greatest assistance to him. For in view of his reputation for justice and piety not a few who were opposed to Sulla's policy decided that it was not without reason that Metellus had joined him but that he chose what was really juster and more advantageous for the country, and hence they went over to their side. (Valesius, p. 653.)

2. ¶A thunderbolt fell upon the Capitol, causing the destruction of the Sibylline books and of many other things. (Mai, p. 551.)

FRAG. CIII

B.C.

83

(*a.u.* 671)¶Pompey was a son of Strabo, and has been compared by Plutarch with Agesilaus the Lacedæmonian.[Pg 360] Indignant at those who held the city he proceeded absolutely alone to Picenum before he had quite yet come to man's estate: from the inhabitants on account of his father's position of command he collected a small band and set up an individual sovereignty, thinking to perform some famous exploit by himself; then he joined the party of Sulla. Beginning in this way he became no less a man than his chief, but, as his title indicates, grew to be "Great." (Valesius, p. 653.)

FRAG. CIV

B.C.

82

(*a.u.* 672)¶Sulla delivered the army to a man[67] who was in no wise distinguished[68] nor generally commended, in spite of the fact that he had many who had been with him from the beginning superior in both experience and action, whom up to that time he had employed in all emergencies and treated as most faithful. Before he became victor he was accustomed to make requests of them and use their assistance to the fullest extent. But as he drew near his dream of absolute dominion, he made no account of them any longer but reposed his trust rather in the basest men who were not conspicuous for family or possessed of a reputation for uprightness. The reason was that he saw that such persons were ready to assist him in all his projects, even the vilest; and he thought they would be most grateful to him if they should obtain even very small favors, would never show contempt nor lay claim to either his deeds or his plans. The virtuous element, on the other hand, would not be willing to help him in his evil-doing but would even rebuke him; they would de[Pg 361]mand rewards for benefits conferred,

according to merit, would feel no gratitude for them but take them as something due, and would claim his actions and counsels as their own. (Valesius, p. 654.)

FRAG. CV1. ¶Sulla up to that day that he conquered the Samnites had been a conspicuous figure, possessing a renown from his leadership and plans, and was believed to be most devoted to humaneness and piety, so that all thought that he had Fortune as an ally because of his excellence. After this event he changed so much that one would not say his earlier and his later deeds were those of the same person. This probably shows that he could not endure good fortune. Acts that he censured in other persons while he was still weak, and others, far more outrageous even, he committed: it had presumably always been his wish to do so, but he had been hindered by lack of opportunity. This fact produced a strong conviction in the minds of some that bad luck has not a little to do with creating a reputation for virtue.^[69] As soon as Sulla had vanquished the Samnites and thought he had put an end to the war (the rest of it he held of no account) he changed his tactics and, as it were, left his former personality behind outside the wall and in the battle, and proceeded to surpass Cinna and Marius and all their associates combined. Treatment that he had given to no one of the foreign peoples that had opposed him he bestowed upon his native land, as if he had subdued that as well. In the first place he sent^[Pg 362] forthwith the heads of Damasippus and the members of his party stuck on poles to Præneste, and many of those who voluntarily surrendered he killed as if he had caught them without their consent. The next day he ordered the senators to assemble at the temple of Bellona, giving them the idea that he would make some defence of his conduct, and ordered those captured alive to meet at the so-called "public" field,^[70] pretending that he would enroll them in the lists. This last class he had other men slay, and many persons from the city, mixed in among them, likewise perished: to the senators he himself at the same time addressed a most bitter speech. (Valesius, p. 654.)

2. ¶The massacre of the captured persons was going on even under Sulla's direction with unabated fury, and as they were being killed near the temple the great uproar and lamentation that they made, their shrieks and wails, invaded the senate-house, so that the senate was terrified for two reasons. The second of the two was that they were not far from expecting that they themselves, also, might yet suffer some terrible injury, so unholy were both his words and his actions: therefore many, cut to the heart with grief at the thought of reality and possibility, wished that they themselves belonged to the number of men already dead outside, and so might secure a respite at last from fear. Their cases, however, were postponed, while the rest were slaughtered and thrown into the river, so that the savagery of Mithridates, deemed so^[Pg 363] terrible, in slaughtering all the Romans in Asia in one day, was now held to be of slight importance in comparison with the number massacred and their manner of death. Nor did the terror stop here, but the slaughters which began at this point as if by a kind of signal occurred in the country district and all the cities of Italy. Toward many Sulla himself showed

hatred and toward many others his companions did the same, some truthfully and some in pretence, in order that displaying by the similarity of their deeds a character similar to his and establishing him as their friend they might not, by any dissimilarity, incur suspicion, seem to be reproving him at all, and so endanger themselves. They murdered all whom they saw to surpass them either in wealth or in any other respect, some through envy and others on account of their possessions. For under such conditions many neutral persons even, though they might have taken neither side, became subject to some private complaint, as surpassing some one in excellence or wealth and family. No safety was visible for any one against those in power who wished to commit an injustice in any case. (Valesius, p. 657.)

B.C.

81

(*a.u.* 673)3. ¶Such calamities held Rome encompassed. Who could narrate the insults to the living, many of which were offered to women, and many to the noblest and most prominent children, as if they were captives in war? Yet those acts, though most distressing, yet at least in their similarity to others that had previously taken place seemed endurable to such persons as were[Pg 364] away from them. But Sulla was not satisfied, nor was he content to do the same as others: a certain longing came over him to far excel all in the variety of his slaughters, as if there were some virtue in being second to none even in bloodguiltiness, and so he exposed to view a new device, a whitened tablet, on which he inscribed the names. Notwithstanding this all previous atrocities continued undiminished, and not even those whose names were not inscribed on the tablets were in safety. For many, some living and others actually dead, had their names subsequently inscribed at the pleasure of the slayers, so that in this aspect the phenomenon exhibited no novelties, and equally by its terror and its absurdity distressed absolutely every one. The tablets were exposed like some register of senators or list of soldiers approved, and all those passing by at one time or another ran eagerly to it in crowds, with the idea that it contained some favorable announcement: then many found relatives' names and some, indeed, their own inscribed for death, whereupon their condition, overwhelmed by such a sudden disaster, was a terrible one; many of them, making themselves known by their behavior, perished. There was no particle of safety for any one outside of Sulla's company. For whether a man approached the tablets, he incurred censure for meddling with matters not concerning him, or if he did not approach he was regarded as a malcontent. The man who read the list through or asked any question about anything inscribed became suspected of enquiring about himself[Pg 365] or his companions, and the one who did not read or enquire was suspected of being displeased at it and for that reason incurred hatred. Tears or laughter proved fatal on the instant: hence many were destroyed not because they had said or done anything forbidden, but because they either drew a long face or smiled. Their attitudes were so carefully observed as this, and it was possible for no one either to mourn or to exult over an enemy, but even the latter class were slaughtered on the ground that they were jeering at something. Furthermore many found trouble in their very names, for some

who were unacquainted with the proscribed applied their names to whomsoever they pleased, and thus many perished in the place of others. This resulted in great confusion, some naming any man they met just as ever they pleased, and the others denying that they were so called. Some were slaughtered while still ignorant of the fact that they were to die, and others, who had been previously informed, anywhere that they happened to be; and there was no place for them either holy or sacred, no safe retreat, no refuge. Some, to be sure, by perishing suddenly before learning of the catastrophe hanging over them, and some at the moment they received the news, were fortunately relieved of the terrors preceding death: those who were warned in advance and hid themselves found it a very difficult matter to escape. They did not dare to withdraw, for fear of being detected, nor could they endure to remain where they were for fear of betrayal. Very many of them[Pg 366] were betrayed by their associates and those dearest to them, and so perished. Consequently not those whose names were inscribed merely, but the rest, as well, suffered in anticipation. (Valesius, pp. 658-662.)

4. ¶The heads of all those slaughtered in any place were brought to the Roman Forum and exposed on the rostra, so that as often as proscriptions were issued, so often did the heads appear. (Valesius, ib.)

FRAG. CVI

B.C.

74

(*a.u.* 680) Lucullus said that he would rather have rescued one Roman from danger than have captured at one stroke all the forces of the enemy. (Mai, p. 551.)

FRAG. CVIII. For titles do not change the characters of men, but one makes titles take on new meanings according to one's management of affairs. Many monarchs are the source of blessings to their subjects,—wherefore such a state is called a kingdom,—whereas many who live under a democracy work innumerable evils to themselves. (Mai, p. 556. Cp. Frag. XII.)

2. For nothing leads on an army or anything else requiring some control to better or worse like the character and habits of the person presiding over it. The disposition and character of their leaders the majority imitate, and they do whatever they see them doing, some from real inclination, and others as a mere pretence. (Mai, p. 556.)

3. The subservient element is wont ever to shape itself according to the disposition of its rulers. (Mai, p. 560, from Antonius Melissa, p. 78, ed. Tigrur.)

4. For who would not prefer to be upright and at his death to lie in the bosom of the State, rather than to behold her devastated? (Mai, p. 557.)

5. If any one were building a house for you where[Pg 367] you were not going to remain, you would think the undertaking a loss: do you now wish to grow rich in that place from which you must depart repeatedly before evening? (Mai, ib.)

6. Do you not know that we tarry in others' domains just like strangers and sojourners? Do you not know that it is the lot of sojourners to be driven out when they are not expecting or looking for it? That is our case. (Mai, ib.)

7. Who would not choose to die from one blow, and that with no pain or very little, instead of after sickness? Who would not pray to depart from a sound body with sound spirits rather than to rot with some decay or dropsy, or wither away in hunger? (Mai, ib.)

8. Things hoped for that fail of realization are wont to grieve some persons more than the loss of things never expected at all. They regard the latter as far from them and so pursue them less, as if they belonged to others, whereas the former they approach closely, and grieve for them as if deprived of rightful possessions. (Mai, p. 558.)

9. Expectation of danger, without danger, puts the person expecting in the position of having made things secure beforehand through imagining some coming unpleasantness. (Mai, p. 560, from Antonius Melissa.)

10. To be elated by good fortune is like running the stadium race on a slippery course. (Mai, ib., also from Antonius.)

11. The same author [i.e., Dio the Roman] said: "Is it not an outrage to trouble the gods, when we ourselves are not willing to do what the gods deem to be[Pg 368] in our power?" (Mai, p. 561, from the Anthology of Arsenius.)

12. The same said: "It is much better to win some success and be envied than to fail and be pitied." (Mai, ib., from Arsenius.)

13. The same said: "It is impossible for any one who acts contrary to right principles to derive any benefit from them." (Mai, p. 562.)

FRAG. CVIII

B.C.

70

(*a.u.* 684)The Cretans sent an embassy to the Romans, hoping to renew the old truce and furthermore to obtain some kindness for their preservation of the quæstor and his fellow soldiers. But they, rather imbued with anger at their failure to overcome the Cretans than grateful to the enemy for not having destroyed them, made no reasonable answer and demanded back from them all the captives and deserters. They demanded hostages and large sums of money, required the largest ships and the chief men to be given up, and would not wait for an answer from the envoys' country but sent out one of the consuls immediately to take possession of those things and make war upon them if they failed to give,—as proved to be the case. For the men who at the outset, before any such demand was made and before they had conquered, had refused to make terms would naturally not endure after their victory the imposition of exorbitant demands of such a character. The Romans knowing this clearly and suspecting further that the envoys

would try to corrupt some persons with money, so as to hinder the expedition, voted in the senate that no one should lend them anything. (Ursinus, p. 388.)

FOOTNOTES

[1]Iahni Annales, vol. 141, p. 290 sqq.

[2]Mommsen (Hermes VI, pp. 82-89); Haupt (Hermes XIV, pp. 36-64, and XV, p. 160); Boissevain (Program, Rotterdam, 1884).

[3]This would give Dio a considerably longer life than is commonly allowed him.

[4]See [p. 22](#).

[5]The first alternative agrees with Plutarch, who, at the end of his life of Numa (chapter 22), says that this death by lightning of Tullus Hostilius caused many among the population at large to revere that religion which their king had for so long a time neglected.

[6]Zonaras spells *Acillius*.

[7]Zonaras spells it *Veturina*.

[8]This was probably one of the Manlii Cincinnati.

[9]The second "Manlius" is evidently an error of Zonaras. The name should be *Fabius*.

[10]Zonaras spells *Cicinatus*.

[11]The town is called *Corbio* by Livy (II, 39, 4).

[12]Zonaras spells *Icillius*.

[13]Near the end of [VII, 17](#).

[14]In Greek, *Birdless*.

[15]In Roman records these persons are known respectively as L. Postumius L. F. L. N. Megellus and Q. Mamilius Q. F. M. N. Vitulus.

[16]This name should in both cases be Gnæus.

[17][See previous footnote.]

[18]A. Atilius Calatinus is meant.

[19]Apparently a mistake for *Sulpicius*.

[20][See previous footnote.]

[21]Zonaras spells *Plætinus*.

[22]This is A. Atilius Calatinus again.

[23]A mistake for Gaius Aurelius and Publius Servilius, as at the beginning of Chapter 16.

[24][See previous footnote.]

[25]But Valerius Maximus (II, 7, 4) calls him P. Aurelius Pecuniola.

[26]A. *Atilius Calatinus* once more.

[27][See previous footnote.]

[28]This is a mistake, due to the carelessness of Zonaras. Some Gallic tribe is evidently meant.

[29]Gnæus Scipio is meant whenever Zonaras writes this form.

[30]Zonaras consistently spells this name *Lavinius*.

[31]Possibly an error on the part of Zonaras for *proconsuls*.

[32]By comparing other authors the names Alinius and Plautius are found to be the corruptions of some copyists for Dasius and Blattius.

[33][See previous footnote.]

[34]A corruption for Pityusæ.

[35]Or, in other words, Balearis Major and Balearis Minor.

[36][See previous footnote.]

[37]Dio probably wrote *Cæpio* here.

[38]Zonaras consistently spells *Flaminius*.

[39]This name is erroneously written by Zonaras for Gnæus. (Cp. Polybius 28, 3, 2; 31, 12 (also 13, 19, and 20); 32, 4 to 7.)

[40]Presumably an error for the *Nestus*, a well-known stream.

[41]This is Q. Pompeius A. F. Nepos (consul B.C. 141).

[42]Q. *Servilius Cæpio* (consul B.C. 140).

[43]Adopting Reiske's conjecture ὑπομειναι εψησεν in place of the MS. ὑπομειναι εποησεξ.

[44]These are the censors for the year B.C. 136, Ap. Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Nobilior.

[45]See note, [page 335](#).

[46]P. Furius Philus (consul B.C. 136).

[47]In the original the word "wept" is repeated. Van Herwerden thinks that the second one should be deleted, but Schenkl prefers to substitute an adverb in place of the first. In the translation I have used an adverb giving nearly the same force as the repetition of the verb.

[48]One may supply here, as Reiske suggests, "would have been overthrown", "would have been humbled", or "would have been brought low".

[49]Reading ετι ασελγειας (Boissevain's emendation) in place of the unintelligible αιτιας αλγειν of the MS.

[50]Namely, L. Betutius Barrus.

[51]A slave of the aforesaid Barrus.

[52]Possibly an error for *Gaudas*.

[53]*Cn. Manlius Maximus*.

[54]*M. Aurelius Scaurus* (consul suffectus B.C. 108).

[55]Possibly the modern *Macellaro*.

[56]He was tribune of the plebs, B.C. 99.

[57]*M. Livius Drusus*.

[58]*Q. Servilius Cæpio*.

[59]The clause as found in the MS. gives no sense. The translation here is on the basis of an emendation suggested by Boissevain.

[60]*P. Rutilius Lupus*.

[61]There are two gaps in the MS. here. "Had ... information" is a conjecture of Tafel and Gros; and "well disposed toward each other" of Reiske, who compares Book Fifty, chapter 16, of Dio.

[62][See previous footnote.]

[63]Their leader was M.' Aquilius.

[64]*L. Porcius Cato* (consul B.C. 89).

[65]Properly *C. Titinius Sisenna*.

[66]Reading *ευχας* (Reiske, Boissevain) in place of *αρχας*.

[67]*Q. Lucretius Ofella*.

[68]Supplying *μητ' επιφανει*, with Reiske.

[69]Adopting Reiske's suggestion for filling out a lacuna in the sense.

[70]The *villa publica*.

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